To those who believe that there is such a thing as the logic of conditionals this dissertation may appear to be yet another attempt to unravel its secrets - which it is not. As a logician, you can do no more than devise a logic for conditionals and try to persuade your readers to adopt it. You may succeed in doing so if you are able to demonstrate that the one you propose is a better logic for conditionals than the ones proposed so far. The phrase 'better for conditionals' should, however, not be misunderstood. In particular, it should not be interpreted as meaning 'more like the real one'. The best logic for conditionals one might propose is not that which they actually possess. It cannot be, not because this actual logic would be not good enough, but simply because there is no such thing. Whether a given logic is better than some alternative has little to do with its better fitting the facts; it is more a question of efficacy.
Author(s): Frank Veltman
Year: 1985
Language: English
Pages: 238
Cover ......Page 1
Acknowledgements ......Page 4
Table of contents ......Page 6
Part 1. The Problem of conditionals ......Page 8
1.1. Methodological remarks ......Page 9
1.1.1. The case of the marbles ......Page 10
1.1.2. Logic as a descriptive science ......Page 13
1.1.2.1. The rationalist tradition ......Page 15
1.1.2.2. The empirical approach ......Page 17
1.1.3. A more pragmatic view ......Page 22
1.2. Explanatory strategies ......Page 30
1.2.1.1. The standard explanation ......Page 31
1.2.1.2. Truth and evidence ......Page 37
1.2.1.3. Probability semantics ......Page 40
1.2.1.4. Relevance logic ......Page 46
1.2.2. Pragmatic correctness ......Page 48
1.2.3. Logical form ......Page 52
Notes to Part 1 ......Page 57
Part 2. Possible worlds semantics (mainly on counterfactual conditionals) ......Page 60
2.1.1. Worlds and propositions ......Page 61
2.1.2. Logical notions ......Page 70
2.2.1. Constraints on consequents ......Page 77
2.2.2. Constraints on antecedents ......Page 87
2.3.1. Ramsey's suggestion and Stalnaker's theory ......Page 99
2.3.2. Comparative similarity according to Lewis ......Page 108
2.3.3. Premise semantics ......Page 117
2.3.4. Comparative similarity induced ......Page 122
2.4. Model-Theoretic Results ......Page 127
2.4.1. Comparing ordering functions and selection functions ......Page 128
2.4.2. The completeness of P ......Page 135
2.4.3. Extensions of P ......Page 141
Notes to Part 2 ......Page 152
Part 3. Data semantics (mainly on indicative conditionals) ......Page 157
3.1.1. Information models ......Page 158
3.1.2. Between assertability and truth ......Page 164
3.1.3. Data logic. Preliminaries ......Page 179
3.2. Pragmatic correctness and incorrectness ......Page 189
3.2.1. Gricean constraints ......Page 190
3.2.2. Odd conditionals ......Page 192
3.2.3. A test for pragmatic correctness ......Page 197
3.3.1. Deduction principles ......Page 201
3.3.2. Completeness and decidability ......Page 204
3.4.1. Data lattices ......Page 211
3.4.2. Complex conditionals ......Page 216
3.4.3. Counterfactuals ......Page 219
Notes to Part 3 ......Page 222
References ......Page 227
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) ......Page 232
Stellingen ......Page 235
