Anthropogenic Climate Change is one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century and receives more and more international awareness. The central instruments to counter climate change are emissions trading schemes (ETS) to cover GHG emissions. To increase efficiency and to ensure global reduction of emissions damaging to the climate, an international emissions trading scheme would be a rational choice. To establish such a global scheme, political decision makers could follow a bottom-up-approach by linking already existing ETS with each other. The book investigates such linkings of emissions trading schemes, which provide many benefits for the linking partners. As experience shows, although the number of schemes increased in the last decade, only a few linkings were established. Thus, the book answers the question, if and which conditions for states exist to link their emissions trading schemes. .
Author(s): Matthias Machinek
Series: Globale Gesellschaft und internationale Beziehungen
Publisher: Springer VS
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 195
City: Wiesbaden
Vorwort
Preface
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
2 Theories, Methodologies and Hypotheses
2.1 Theory
2.1.1 Neoliberal Institutionalism
2.1.2 The Theory of Hegemonic Stability
2.2 Liberal Theories, Hegemonic Stability and Emissions Trading
2.3 Research Question and Hypotheses
2.4 Structure of the Dissertation
3 Technical Part
3.1 The Concept of Carbon Pricing
3.2 The Origin: Emissions Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
3.3 Emissions Trading and the Political Sphere
3.4 The Economic Dimension of Emissions Trading
3.5 The Variety of Emissions Trading
3.5.1 Setting the Cap
3.5.2 Compliance and Compliance Coverage
3.5.3 Allocation, Auctions and Trading– How to Meet Compliance
3.5.4 Carbon Offsets
3.5.5 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification–The Importance of MRV
3.5.6 Supporting Mechanisms
4 Gathering Input: Interviews with Central Actors of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the Californian Cap and Trade Program
4.1 Experience with Linkings? Interviewing Actors of Both Schemes
4.1.1 The Interview Methodology
4.1.2 Choosing the Experts
4.1.3 The Interview Guideline
4.2 Results of the Interviews
4.2.1 Administrator (Cal) Jakub Zielkiewicz/California Air Resources Board
4.2.2 Administrative Institutional Actor (Cal) Sami Osman/Climate Action Reserve
4.2.3 Administrator (EU) Peter Zapfel/European Commission
4.2.4 Lobbyist/International Emissions Trading Association
5 Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)
5.1 What is fsQCA?
5.1.1 Sets
5.1.2 Operations with Sets
5.1.3 Set Relations: Sufficiency and Necessity
5.1.4 Truth Tables
5.1.5 Parameters of Fit
5.2 How to Analyze Conditions for Linkings
5.2.1 Difference of ETS in Size
5.2.2 Relation of the Marginal Abatement Costs (MAC) of States:
5.2.3 Importance of Trade Relations:
5.2.4 Similarity of the ETS Designs:
5.3 Execution of the Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
5.3.1 Cases of the Analysis
5.3.2 Gathering the Data
5.3.3 Calibrating the Data
5.3.4 Difference of ETS in Size
5.3.5 Relation of the Marginal Abatement Costs of States:
5.3.6 Importance of Trade Relations
5.3.7 Similarity of ETS Designs
5.4 Results
5.4.1 A Quick Reminder: Hypotheses
5.4.2 The Fuzzy-Set Truth Table
5.4.3 Solutions of the Analysis
5.4.4 Evaluation of the Results
5.5 Interim Conclusion
6 Linking Possibilities in Practice: The Case of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the California Cap and Trade Program
6.1 Emissions Trading Europe and California: Policy Targets in Contradiction?
6.2 The Design of the EU ETS in Detail
6.2.1 The EU ETS
6.2.2 Legislative Process of the EU ETS
6.2.3 The Cap
6.2.4 The Price
6.2.5 Offsets
6.2.6 Coverage
6.2.7 Free Allocation
6.2.8 Purchasing and Trading
6.2.9 Banking and Borrowing
6.2.10 Compliance
6.3 The Design of the Californian Cap and Trade Program
6.3.1 The Californian Cap and Trade Program
6.3.2 The Legislative Process of the California Cap and Trade Program
6.3.3 The Cap
6.3.4 The Price
6.3.5 Offsets
6.3.6 Coverage
6.3.7 Free Allocation
6.3.8 Purchasing and Trading
6.3.9 Banking and Borrowing
6.3.10 Compliance
7 Two Schemes, Two Designs: Opposing Policy Targets?
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 The Cap
7.1.2 The Price
7.1.3 Offsets
7.1.4 Coverage
7.1.5 Free Allocation
7.1.6 Purchasing and Trading
7.1.7 Banking and Borrowing
7.1.8 Compliance
7.2 Following the Same Policy Targets
7.3 Contradictory Policy Targets or Harmony in the End
8 Conclusion
Bibliography
