In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This title brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversight tools available to the legislature vary based on constitutionally defined powers of the legislature, institutional arrangements between the branches of government, divisions of authority between national, regional, and local governments, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the legislature, and the resources available to it. Sections of this volume is devoted to examining budget oversight from the formulation and approval of the budget, to implementation and the ex post examination of the public accounts. Special attention is also paid to mechanisms to assist parliaments such as Public Accounts Committees and independent parliamentary budget offices. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, legislative strengthening practitioners, and students of legislative development.
Author(s): Rick Stapenhurst, Riccardo Pelizzo, David M. Olson, Lisa Von Trapp
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 300
Contents......Page 6
Foreword......Page 16
Introduction......Page 18
The Distribution of Oversight Tools and Implications......Page 19
Oversight and the Budget Process......Page 20
A Study of Countries’ Experiences......Page 22
I. OVERVIEW......Page 24
1. Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation......Page 26
The Distribution of Oversight Tools and the Potential for Oversight......Page 30
Table 1.4 Tools of Legislative Oversight, by Form of Government......Page 32
Table 1.13 Presence of Ombudsman as Oversight Tool, by Income Level......Page 36
Table 1.14 Number of Oversight Tools, by Level of Democracy......Page 37
Annex: Oversight and Democracy......Page 39
Notes......Page 43
Bibliography......Page 44
2. Oversight and Democracy Reconsidered......Page 46
Legislative Oversight: Causes and Consequences......Page 47
Table 2.1 Correlation Analysis of Level of Democracy and Oversight Tools......Page 49
Table 2.9b Interpellations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Senate......Page 57
Conclusion......Page 60
Notes......Page 62
Bibliography......Page 63
II. OVERSIGHT AND THE BUDGET PROCESS......Page 66
3. The Legislature and the Budget......Page 68
Figure 3.1 Heart of Executive-Legislative Relations: The Budget Process......Page 70
Box 3.3 The Polish Parliament’s Budget Research Office......Page 74
Conclusions......Page 78
Bibliography......Page 80
4. Budgets – An Accountant’s Perspective......Page 84
Budgets and Control......Page 86
Beyond Budgets......Page 89
Budget and Performance Centers......Page 90
Implications for Parliamentary Oversight......Page 92
Conclusion......Page 93
Bibliography......Page 94
5. Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions......Page 96
Variables......Page 98
Data......Page 101
Construction of the Index......Page 103
Discussion and Analysis......Page 105
Conclusions......Page 108
Annex Table 1 Data for the Index and Amendment Dummy......Page 109
Bibliography......Page 111
Recommendations of International Good Practices......Page 116
Early Release of Budget Information......Page 117
The Role of the Legislature......Page 122
Table 6.8 Does a Legislative Committee (Or Committees) Hold Public Hearings on the Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework Presented in the Budget in Which Testimony from the Executive Branch and the Public Is Heard?......Page 125
Table 6.9 Does the Executive Present More Details or Provide a Better Explanation of any Budget Proposal, if Members of the Legislature (Including from Minority Parties) Request Such Information?......Page 126
Bibliography......Page 127
7. A Note on What Happens if No Budget Is Passed before the Fiscal Year Begins......Page 128
Table 7.2 Provisions for Spending in the Event No Budget Is Enacted before the Fiscal Year, by System of Government......Page 130
Notes......Page 131
8. Public Accounts Committees......Page 134
Public Accounts Committees (PACs)......Page 135
Roles and Functions of PACs......Page 136
The Success of PACs......Page 137
Notes......Page 144
Bibliography......Page 145
9. The Value of a Nonpartisan, Independent, Objective Analytical Unit to the Legislative Role in Budget Preparation......Page 148
Potential Value......Page 149
Core Functions......Page 150
Examples of Independent Budget Units......Page 153
Bibliography......Page 155
10. Legislative Budget Offices: International Experience......Page 158
Examples of Specialized Legislative Budget Offices......Page 159
Independent Budget Office Issues......Page 168
Notes......Page 173
Bibliography......Page 174
III. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES......Page 176
Oversight in the Polish Sejm......Page 178
Resources for Parliamentary Review of Administration......Page 180
Contexts of State, Power, and Time......Page 184
Bibliography......Page 186
12. Separation of Powers and Legislative Oversight in Russia......Page 190
Oversight......Page 191
Table 12.1 Federal Budget Laws, 1992–2002......Page 193
Conclusions......Page 197
Notes......Page 198
Bibliography......Page 199
Challenges to Reforming Parliamentary Effectiveness......Page 200
Oversight and Effectiveness in the Westminster Parliament......Page 201
Select Committees......Page 204
Bibliography......Page 207
14. Explaining Patterns of Oversight in Brazilian Subnational Governments......Page 210
Institutions Shaping Legislative Oversight......Page 211
Table 14.2 Estimated Veto Frequency, 1991–98......Page 214
Bibliography......Page 217
15. Evolving Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia......Page 218
The Evolving Structure and Roles of the Indonesian Legislature......Page 220
The Tools of Oversight......Page 221
The Special Case of the Military......Page 226
Constitutional Change and Continuing Realities......Page 227
Bibliography......Page 230
The Knesset and Its Oversight Role......Page 234
The Parliamentary Committee System in the Knesset......Page 235
Conclusions......Page 243
Bibliography......Page 244
17. Parliamentary Oversight of Defense in South Africa......Page 246
The Establishment of Parliamentary Defense Oversight......Page 247
The Strategic Defense Procurement Package and Parliamentary Oversight......Page 249
The Implications for Defense Oversight......Page 252
Postscript......Page 255
Bibliography......Page 256
18. Keeping a Watchful Eye? Parliaments and the Politics of Budgeting in Latin America......Page 260
Parliaments and Budget Governance......Page 261
Figure 18.1 Governance of the Budget......Page 262
Table 18.1 Legislative Capabilities Index in Latin America (2005)......Page 263
Figure 18.2 Budget Institutions and Fiscal Discipline in Latin America, 2000......Page 265
Figure 18.3 Reform Path of Budget Institutions in Latin America, 1990–2005......Page 267
Figure 18.4 Index of Legislative Budgeting in Latin America, 2003......Page 268
Institutional Capacities......Page 273
Political Incentives......Page 274
Conclusions: Politics of Public Budgeting......Page 278
Notes......Page 279
Bibliography......Page 280
19. Does Parliament Make a Difference? The Role of the Italian Parliament in Financial Policy......Page 284
Institutional Theories......Page 285
The Italian Parliament......Page 286
Data Analysis......Page 289
Notes......Page 292
Bibliography......Page 293
Procedures for Approving the State Budget......Page 296
Bargaining Process......Page 297
Political Negotiations of the Draft of the State Budget......Page 298
Table 20.1 Deputies’ Perception of Importance of Individual Activities of the Parliament, 1993 to 2003......Page 299
Table 20.5 Voting on the State Budgets in the 4th Electoral Term......Page 300
Supreme Audit Office......Page 302
Table 20.7 Activity of the Budget Committee over Five Terms, 1990–2004......Page 303
Control Functions of the Budget Committee......Page 304
Conclusion......Page 306
Annex Table 20.2 Names of Political Parties in English and Czech and Their Czech Abbreviations......Page 307
Bibliography......Page 308
21. Budget Accountability and Legislative Oversight in Transition: The Case of Post-Suharto Indonesia......Page 310
Democratization and the Evolving Political Role of Indonesia’s Parliament Post-Suharto......Page 311
Internal Organization of the DPR......Page 313
Parliament and the Budget Process......Page 315
Conclusion......Page 322
Annex DPR Sectoral Commissions and Their Government Working Counterparts......Page 323
Bibliography......Page 325
22. Establishment of Uganda’s Parliamentary Budget Office and Parliamentary Budget Committee......Page 328
The Structure of the Parliament of Uganda and the New Budget Committee......Page 329
The Parliamentary Budget Office......Page 330
The Budget Cycle......Page 333
The Successes......Page 336
Challenges......Page 337
Annex: Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) Initial Structure......Page 339
Oversight as Concept......Page 340
Constitution and Power Distribution......Page 342
Organization, Procedures, and Members of Parliaments......Page 343
Contexts, Time, and Executives......Page 345
Bibliography......Page 347
Index......Page 350
Box 3.1 Brazilian Congress and the Budget Process......Page 71
Box 3.2 Ghana’s Parliament and Introducing Value Added Tax......Page 72
Box 3.4 Enhancing Financial Transparency by Broadening Access to Information......Page 76
Box 3.5 Analyzing the Political Context......Page 79
Box 13.1 Objectives and Tasks for Scrutiny Committees......Page 206
Figure 21.1 Responsibilities in the Public Expenditure Management Cycle......Page 317
Box 21.2 Budget for Sale: The Role of Budget Brokers......Page 320
Figure 3.2 Fiduciary Obligation......Page 75
Figure 4.1 Model of a Controlled Process......Page 87
Figure 5.1 Index of Legislative Budget Institutions......Page 106
Table 1.1 The Tools of Legislative Oversight......Page 27
Table 1.3 Number of Legislative Oversight Tools Used by Surveyed Countries......Page 31
Table 1.5b Number of Oversight Tools, by Form of Government......Page 33
Table 1.8 Use of Hearings in Plenary Sittings, by Income Level......Page 34
Table 1.11 Use of Interpellation, by Income Level......Page 35
Annex Table 1 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Formally Democratic......Page 40
Annex Table 2 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Liberal Democratic......Page 41
Table 2.3 Logistic Regression, with Liberal Democracy as a Dependent Variable......Page 50
Table 2.5 Oversight Tools, Income Level, and Democracy in Africa......Page 51
Table 2.6a Number of Oversight Acts in Italy’s Legislature—Chamber of Deputies, 1976 to 2001......Page 53
Table 2.6b Number of Oversight Acts from the 7th to the 13th Italian Senate......Page 54
Table 2.8a Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Chamber......Page 55
Table 2.9a Interpellations Addressed to the Foreign Affairs Ministry from the Chamber of Deputies......Page 56
Table 2.11 Logit Models, with Oversight Tools and Democracy......Page 58
Table 3.1 Legislatures’ Powers to Amend the Budget......Page 73
Table 5.1 Spearman Correlations between Indices......Page 104
Table 5.2 Comparison of Budget-Amending and Non-Budget-Amending Legislatures......Page 107
Annex Table 2 Construction of Composite Variables......Page 110
Table 6.1 When Does the Executive Release a Prebudget Statement to the Public?......Page 118
Table 6.2 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Government’s Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework?......Page 119
Table 6.3 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Government’s Policies and Priorities That Will Guide the Development of Detailed Estimates for the Upcoming Budget?......Page 120
Table 6.4 Are Any Arrangements in Place for the Legislature to Establish Aggregate Expenditure Ceilings before Beginning Debate on Individual Expenditure Items?......Page 121
Table 6.6 Is There a Specialized Budget Research Organization Attached to the Legislature That Conducts Analyses of the Budget (Organization May Be Part of the Audit Offi ce)?......Page 123
Table 6.7 What Best Describes the Committee Structure for Dealing with the Budget?......Page 124
Table 7.1 If the Budget Is Not Approved by the Legislature before the Start of the Fiscal Year, Which of the Following Describes the Consequences?......Page 129
Table 8.1 Results Achieved by the PAC: How Frequently Has the PAC Achieved the Following Result?......Page 138
Table 8.2 Success and Composition of the PAC: How Important Is This Factor?......Page 139
Table 8.3 Success and Powers of PACs: How Important Are These Factors?......Page 140
Table 8.4 Answers to the Question: Are Practices and Procedures Important for the Success of a PAC?......Page 141
Table 8.5 The Least Important Practices and Dynamics for the Success of the PAC......Page 142
Table 9.2 Staffing by Core Function......Page 152
Table 10.1 Characteristics of Budget Offices Reviewed......Page 172
Table 14.1 Government and Opposition Average Party Cohesion, 1991–98......Page 213
Table 18.2 Legal Framework of Budgetary Systems in Latin America, 2005......Page 266
Table 18.3 Executive-Legislative Budget Relations in Latin America......Page 269
Table 19.1 Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001......Page 290
Table 19.2 Regression Analyses......Page 291
Table 20.6 Committees according to Their Prestige in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic......Page 301
Table 20.8 Fulfillment of the State Budget between 1991 and 2003......Page 305
Table 21.1 Top 10 Political Parties in the 1999 and 2004 General Elections......Page 312
