Author(s): Romans Pancs
Publisher: The MIT Press
Year: 2018
Language: English
Pages: 437
Contents......Page 2
Notation......Page 6
Preface......Page 9
1.1 Introduction......Page 18
1.3 Prediction: The Contract Set......Page 20
1.4 A Refined Prediction: Walrasian Equilibrium......Page 22
1.5 Common Assumptions......Page 25
1.6 Graphical Illustrations in the Edgeworth Box......Page 28
1.7 The First Welfare Theorem......Page 33
1.8 The Second Welfare Theorem......Page 37
1.9 Equilibrium Existence (and Nonexistence)......Page 42
1.10 Uniqueness, Stability, and Comparative Statics......Page 52
1.11 Time and Uncertainty......Page 67
1.12 Concluding Remarks......Page 74
1.13 Appendix: A Proof Sketch of Theorem 1.3......Page 78
1.14 Bibliographical Notes......Page 82
Problems......Page 83
2.1 Introduction......Page 99
2.2 Obedience to Authority Leads to Immoral Behavior......Page 100
2.3 Markets Lead to Immoral Behavior......Page 103
2.4 Markets Lead to Moral Behavior......Page 111
2.5 Concluding Remarks......Page 117
Problems......Page 118
3.1 Introduction......Page 121
3.2 The Jungle Economy......Page 122
3.3 Jungle vs. Walrasian Market......Page 127
3.4 A Metaphor for TTC in Walrasian Context......Page 138
3.5 Matching Agents to Agents......Page 145
3.6 Concluding Remarks......Page 159
3.7 Bibliographical Notes......Page 160
Problems......Page 161
4.2 Exploitation in a Production Economy......Page 169
4.3 The Prevalence of Markets: Core......Page 176
4.4 Socialism......Page 189
4.5 Concluding Remarks......Page 202
Problems......Page 203
5.1 Introduction......Page 213
5.2 Risk Seeking......Page 214
5.3 Superstars......Page 216
5.4 Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Inequality......Page 233
5.6 Bibliographical Notes......Page 245
Problems......Page 246
6.2 When Having Markets Does not Feel Quite Right......Page 251
6.3 A Signaling Model of Gift Giving......Page 264
6.5 Bibliographical Notes......Page 278
Problems......Page 279
7.1 Introduction......Page 284
7.2 Kantian Equilibrium......Page 287
7.3 An Application to Voting......Page 294
7.4 Concluding Remarks......Page 299
7.5 Bibliographical Notes......Page 301
Problems......Page 302
8.1 Introduction......Page 309
8.2 The Utilitarian Social Welfare Function......Page 310
8.3 Routing......Page 311
8.4 Local Public Goods......Page 323
8.5 Concluding Remarks......Page 327
Problems......Page 328
9.1 Methodological Individualism......Page 330
9.2 Design by Constrained Optimization......Page 332
9.3 Constraints in Economic Design......Page 342
9.4 A Curious Case of Incompatible Constraints......Page 344
9.5 Economics as an Art Form......Page 348
9.6 Bibliographical Notes......Page 349
Problems......Page 351
Solutions to Odd-Numbered Problems......Page 355
Bibliography......Page 420
Index......Page 432
