Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective: Themes from Michael Devitt

Contents
Contributors
About the Editor
Chapter 1: Introduction – Michael Devitt at Eighty
Part I: Philosophy of Linguistics
Chapter 2: Invariance as the Mark of the Psychological Reality of Language
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Very Idea of ‘Psychological Reality’
2.2.1 Grammars and Psychologism
2.2.2 Chomsky on Psychological Reality
2.2.3 Minimal Realism
2.2.4 General Remarks
2.3 Devitt’s ‘Master Argument’
2.4 Questioning Premise (2): Applying the Distinctions
2.4.1 Chomsky and Devitt’s Three Distinctions
2.4.2 Products Before Competence?
2.4.3 Invariance
2.5 Questioning Premise (4): Interpreting a Grammar
2.5.1 The Intuitive Conception of Competence
2.5.2 Chomsky’s Own Words
2.5.3 Symbols
2.5.4 Intuitions and Aboutness
2.5.5 Non-intuitive Data
2.5.6 Representation
2.6 Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 3: Priorities and Diversities in Language and Thought
3.1 The Language of Thought and Diversities in Cognitive Format
3.2 Language as Expressing Thought: Diversities in Linguistic Function
3.3 Universal Grammar and the Psychology of Language Processing
3.3.1 UG-Violating Strings
3.3.2 UG-Conforming Complexities
3.4 Priorities, Sufficiencies, and Speculations
References
Part II: Theory of Reference
Chapter 4: Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?
4.1 Introduction
4.2 A Brief Look at the Development of NTR
4.2.1 Descriptivism and Its Critique
4.2.2 The Historical Chain Picture
4.2.3 The Varieties of Reference
4.2.4 The Qua Problem
4.2.5 Can Reference Never Change?
4.3 What Was the Question?
4.3.1 The “Main Problem” of the Theory of Reference
4.3.2 The Millian View and Frege’s Puzzles
4.3.3 Shared Meanings
4.3.4 Meaning, Understanding, and Manifestability
4.4 New Forms of Descriptivism
4.4.1 Rigidified Descriptions
4.4.2 Causal Descriptivism
4.4.3 Nominal Descriptivism or Metalinguistic Descriptivism
4.4.4 A Theory of Meaning?
4.4.5 Substantial and Trivial Versions of Descriptivism
4.5 Kind Terms
4.6 Back to the Millian View?
References
Chapter 5: Multiple Grounding
5.1 Devitt vs Kripke
5.2 Reference Change
5.3 Confusion
5.4 Degrees of Designation
5.5 Semantic Coordination
5.6 Coreference De Jure
5.7 Mental Files
5.8 Coordination via Proper Names
5.9 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Reference and Causal Chains
References
Chapter 7: The Qua-Problem for Names (Dismissed)
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Brief Background: The Causal Theory of Reference
7.3 Why Focus on Names?
7.4 The Qua-Problem for Names
7.5 In Defense of a “Dismissive” Response
7.6 Devitt and Sterelny’s (Tentatively) Proposed Solution
7.7 Failed Grounding?
7.8 A Trio of Objections
7.8.1 Missing the Point
7.8.2 A Different Kind of Problem but a Problem Nonetheless
7.8.3 Empty Names Left Unexplained
7.9 Referring to felis catus
7.10 The Curious Origins of an Apocryphal Problem
References
Chapter 8: Language from a Naturalistic Perspective
8.1 What to Expect
8.2 Proper Names
8.3 Two-Dimensionalism
8.4 A Second Application of Linguistic Modesty
8.5 Twin Earth for Two-Dimensionalists
8.6 The Internalism-Externalism Debate
References
Chapter 9: Michael Devitt, Cultural Evolution and the Division of Linguistic Labour
9.1 The Division of Linguistic Labour
9.2 Intuition and Evidence
9.3 Two Conceptions of Cultural Evolution
9.4 Is Vertical Transmission Different from Horizontal Transmission?
References
Part III: Theory of Meaning
Chapter 10: Still for Direct Reference
10.1 Direct-Reference Theory
10.1.1 Direct Reference, Semantic Content, Millianism, and Russellian Propositions
10.1.2 Direct Reference, Attitude Ascriptions, and Shakespearean Attitude Ascriptions
10.1.3 Direct Reference, Definite Descriptions, and Scope Ambiguity
10.2 Devitt’s Methodology and Initial Theory of Meaning
10.2.1 Devitt’s Methodology
10.2.2 Devitt’s Initial Theory of Meaning
10.3 Some Potential Hindrances to Dialogue Between Devitt and Direct-Reference Theorists
10.3.1 Direct Reference and Devitt on Propositions
10.3.2 Direct Reference and Devitt on Conventional Meaning
10.3.3 Devitt’s Notions of Opacity and Transparency, and Being Shakespearean
10.4 Devitt’s Revised Theory of Opaque Attitude Ascriptions
10.4.1 Monolingual Non-English Speakers
10.4.2 Bilingual Speakers and Devitt’s Revised View
10.5 From Devitt’s Revised Theory to Shakespearean Attitude Ascriptions
10.5.1 Devitt’s Revised Theory and Substitution of ‘Bernard’ for ‘Ortcutt’
10.5.2 A Translation Relation that Hinges on Co-reference
10.5.3 Well-Established, Frequently Used Translation
10.5.4 Distinct-Language-Only Translation Relations
10.5.5 How a Devittian Might Resist the Above Argument
10.5.6 What the Above Argument Does, and Does Not, Show About Devitt’s Revised Theory
10.5.7 Reflections on Direct-Reference Theory and the Preceding Argument that Devitt’s Revised Theory Implies Shakepearean Attitude Ascriptions
10.6 Replies to Devitt’s Arguments Against Direct-Reference Theory
10.6.1 The Identity Problem and the Opacity Problem for Direct Reference
10.6.2 A Direct-Reference Reply to Devitt’s Identity and Opacity Problems
10.7 More on Direct-Reference Theory and Explanation of Behavior
10.7.1 Truth-Conditions for ‘Because’ Sentences
10.7.2 ‘Because’ Sentences and Explanation
10.7.3 Explanations and Identity
10.7.4 Direct Reference and True ‘Because’ Sentences
10.7.5 Direct Reference and Explanation
10.8 Devitt’s Reply
10.9 Conclusion
References
Chapter 11: Naming and Non-necessity
11.1  The Examples
11.2  A Purported Proof
11.3  Quasi-a-priority
11.4 Kripke’s Revised Case
References
Chapter 12: Against Rigidity for General Terms
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Against Rigid Essentialism
12.3 Against Rigid Expressionism
12.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 13: Devitt and the Case for Narrow Meaning
13.1 Narrow Content
13.2 Syntactic Psychology
13.3 Narrow Psychology
13.4 Defending Narrow Psychology
13.5 Objections to the 1989 Picture
13.6 Abandoning Narrow Psychology
13.7 Against the Functional-Role View of Narrow Meanings
13.8 Explaining “Wide” Behavior
13.9 The Problem of Psychosemantics
13.10 Against Two Further Candidates for Narrow Meaning
References
Chapter 14: Languages and Idiolects
14.1 Introduction
14.2 To Be Defended
14.3 Objections and Replies
References
Part IV: Methodology
Chapter 15: Explanation First! The Priority of Scientific Over “Commonsense” Metaphysics
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Scientific vs. Commonsense Realism
15.2.1 Secondary Properties: Color
15.3 Language
15.3.1 Ontology
15.3.2 Linguistic Explanation
15.4 The A Priori
15.4.1 A Working vs. an Explanatory Epistemology
15.4.2 Is Quinean Holism a Good Abduction?
15.4.3 Is a Naturalistic A Priori Obscure?
15.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 16: Experimental Semantics, Descriptivism and Anti-descriptivism. Should We Endorse Referential Pluralism?
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Two Distinctions: Use vs. Reflections on Use, and Use vs. Interpretation. Testing Use
16.3 On Referential Pluralism
References
Part V: Metaphysics
Chapter 17: Scientific Realism and Epistemic Optimism
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Devitt’s Formulations of Scientific Realism
17.3 Metaphysical and Scientific Issues
17.4 Confidence
17.5 Scientific Realism
References
Chapter 18: Species Have Historical Not Intrinsic Essences
18.1 Millian Kinds
18.2 Essences
18.3 Biological Taxa
18.4 Devitt on (Partly) Historical Essences
18.5 Historical over Intrinsic Essences
18.6 Conclusion
References
Part VI: Michael Devitt’s Responses
Chapter 19: Stirring the Possum: Responses to the Bianchi Papers
19.1 Philosophy of Linguistics
19.1.1 The Linguistic Conception of Grammars (Collins, Rey)
19.1.1.1 Introduction
19.1.1.2 The “Master Argument”
19.1.1.3 Linguistic Realism and Explanation
19.1.1.4 The Paraphrase Response
19.1.1.5 Criticism of the Paraphrase Response
19.1.2 The Psychological Reality of Language (Camp)
19.2 Theory of Reference
19.2.1 Reference Borrowing (Raatikainen, Sterelny, Horwich, Recanati)
19.2.2 Grounding (Raatikainen, Recanati)
19.2.3 Kripkean or Donnellanian? (Bianchi)
19.2.4 The Qua-Problem for Proper Names (Raatikainen, Reimer)
19.2.5 Causal Descriptivism (Raatikainen, Jackson, Sterelny)
19.2.5.1 Jackson
19.2.5.2 Sterelny
19.3 Theory of Meaning
19.3.1 Direct Reference (Braun, Horwich)
19.3.2 Descriptive Names and “the Contingent A Priori” (Salmon, Schwartz)
19.3.3 Rigidity in General Terms (Schwartz)
19.3.4 Narrow Meanings (Lycan, Horwich)
19.3.5 The Use Theory (Horwich)
19.4 Methodology
19.4.1 Putting Metaphysics First (Rey)
19.4.2 “Moorean Commonsense” (Rey)
19.4.3 Intuitions (Martí, Sterelny, Jackson)
19.4.4 Experimental Semantics (Martí, Sterelny)
19.5 Metaphysics
19.5.1 The Definition of “Scientific Realism” (Godfrey-Smith)
19.5.2 Biological Essentialism (Godman and Papineau)
19.5.2.1 Introduction
19.5.2.2 Summary of Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism (IBE)
19.5.2.3 G&P on Alice and Artifacts
19.5.2.4 Implements
19.5.2.5 Species
References
Index