Papers presented at the workshop knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction which took place in Italy in June 1989.
In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians with respect to certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation.
This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.
Author(s): Cristina Bicchieri, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds,)
Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 1992
Language: English
Pages: 427
Cover
Summary
Title page
Contents
Preface
List of contributors
1 Feasibility
2 Elicitation for games
3 Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
4 Rational choice in the context of ideal games
5 Hyperrational games: Concept and resolutions
6 Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
7 Tortuous labyrinth: Noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
8 On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
9 Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
10 Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
11 Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic
12 Epistemic logic and game theory
13 Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses
14 Representing facts
15 Introduction to metamoral
16 The logic of Ulam’s games with lies
17 The acquisition of common knowledge
18 The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”
19 Knowledge-dependent games: Backward induction
20 Common knowledge and games with perfect information
21 Game solutions and the normal form
22 The dynamics of belief systems: Foundations versus coherence theories
23 Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
