I read this book for a graduate seminar on Ethics. In "The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," Kant astutely observes how ordinary people speak about morality. He argues, ordinary people's views are presupposed about morality, that there is one supreme moral principle it is the "Categorical Imperative" which is discussed in section two of the book. In section one, he talks about value, and special regard or esteem we have for someone who does the right things. Sometimes, people do the right things for wrong reasons. He is interested in what has to be true for an action to have moral worth. He has a kind of criticism of Utilitarians. Utilitarians say you can talk about what is good, i.e., happiness, before talking about what is right or moral. For Kantians "right" comes prior to the question of what is good. One must bring morality in before talking about the good. Talent and ability is good if put to good use, it can also be bad; for example computer hackers creating "viruses." Only one thing is good in and of itself unconditionally, which is a good "will" which means the will of a person who wants to do the right thing. Even if the plan doesn't work out they still have good will. They desire to do the right thing because it is the right thing.
Kant argues that action has moral worth only if it is done out of respect for duty. For example, if a shopkeeper is honest in an effort to look good to customers he did the right thing, but only in "conformity with duty." He acted out of inclination. If the shopkeeper is honest out of being nice or likes kids then his action is still done out of inclination because he "likes to do it," but his moral worth is less in the action. The shopkeeper who has moral worth is the one who is honest because it was the right thing to do.
Kant's 2nd proposition is that an action gets its moral worth from its "maxim." Maxim is a technical term for Kant; maxim is a kind of principle that explains why someone does something. Kant thinks that whenever we act on an action there always is some maxim that we are acting on. So you can think of a maxim as having the form: I will do A (some kind of action) in C (some set of circumstances) for P. (for some purpose). Now it is not as if normally when you act you formulate to yourself here is my maxim, here is what I am acting on. However, Kant thinks that when you do something there is some maxim that describes your choice. Therefore, Kant thinks there is an underlying maxim there, and it is this maxim Kant thinks that is the real decider about whether your action has moral worth or not. Only actions with the right maxim he thinks have moral worth.
Kant's3rd proposition is that duty is the necessity of acting out of respect for law, (not government law). Kant thinks that actions get there moral worth from being done out of respect for a "universal moral law" that is binding on all rational beings. This is the real clincher for Kant in the first section of his book. That actions have moral worth when the person who did the action did it because he or she thought that there is a moral law that commands them to do the action. For example, "I must obey that law, it is necessary; I have no choice but to obey the law." That notion of following the universal moral law is what gives the action, Kant thinks, its worth that is what makes it worthy of the special esteem he thinks we give actions when people have done them just because they thought they were right.
This is the setup for Kant's all important and famous "categorical imperative which he argues applies to everyone. This is all in Section II. We can deduce many rules from the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is the only one fundamental principle of morality, but it can be formulated in a variety of different ways. Kant had three formulas of the categorical imperative. All three formulas are a different way of wording the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is a moral law that has to apply to all rational beings, regardless of what ends they have.
The 1st formula is the "Universal Law Formula," which Kant said that every action has a maxim. Whenever you do anything there is some maxim, some subjective principle you are acting on and that we shouldn't act on any maxim that we couldn't choose to become a universal law. Kant then goes on to say that still for every action, in addition to its maxim, there is also an end, every action has an end. Mill and Aristotle also say this. Kant says if you have a categorical imperative there has to be an end that all rational beings see as a good end, this is mandatory. It can't be some kind of effect of our actions, because the kinds of things we produce in the phenomenal world only have value because we care about them. It has to be an end that all rational beings must care about; it can't be a utilitarian end, or one from consequences. If we value it as an end it has value, if we choose it as an end then there is a claim on others to see it as important as well, thus, this is a real mandatory end that humanity itself sees. Rational nature itself then has value.
The 2nd formula is "The Formula of Humanity" which states, I'm not just special because everyone thinks they are valuable. Can't treat other people as merely a means to an end. This gives one a claim to the help from other people. Slavery is an epitome of this formula as an example. It is wrong to treat people ONLY as a means to an end. (However, you are not using a grocery bagger as such because he gets paid). When you put the Universal Law Formula and Formula of Humanity together, you get another way of formulating the Categorical Imperative.
The 3rd Formula is "The Kingdom of Ends Formula." We ought to be thinking of ourselves as legislators for a kingdom of people who are ends to themselves and for Kant that is what we are doing when we are acting morally. We should only act on maxims that can be laws for a community (Kingdom) of rational beings. Thus, we are both subjects and sovereigns in this community, because we make our own laws and then we must obey them. This is the reason Kant thinks that the categorical imperative is binding on all of us because we impose it on ourselves and make the laws, not binding just because somebody might punish us if we disobey. We already accept the categorical imperative according to Kant without thinking about it. We end up with the ideas of autonomy and motivation. We end up with the idea that reason alone must be capable of motivating us to act a certain way which for Kant means we have autonomy (self rule), (motivated by reason as opposed to desires), which gives us free will. We can only be bound by moral laws if we have this kind of autonomy, if we are motivated by reason, if we have in a sense a free will. Kant thinks it goes in the other direction as well, if we have a free will then we are bound by the categorical imperative.
Thus, philosophers ask do we truly have free will? Also, to what extent are we moved by causation? Kant says laws govern causation. One type of law is Newton's laws of motion, scientific laws. Philosophers debate the question is human actions like these laws? Can we predict human actions? Do our desires cause us to act in certain ways; can our actions be predetermined? Some say yes. Aristotle calls this "efficient causation." Some call them "laws of natural necessity." Given the way the natural world works, things have to happen in a certain way and the world is governed by certain laws.
Kant says if we have a free will, then the laws that govern our choices are not going to be laws of natural necessity. If we have a free will, then our will or our practical reason will choose its own principles, its own laws to act on, and those will be the laws that will cause us to do certain things. If we have a free will, then our will chooses certain principles these must have form of a law for everyone; a universal law, this is the categorical imperative. Thus, for Kant, if we have free will then the categorical imperative is binding on us.
I recommend you read this work slowly and repeat key passages for better comprehension. Kant's work is a must for anyone interested in philosophy, and ethics.
Author(s): Sally Sedgwick
Series: Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 219
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 4
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
Abbreviations of Kant’s works......Page 13
1 . KANT’s LIFE: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH......Page 15
2.1 The Groundwork is a treatise in practical philosophy......Page 17
2.2 The Groundwork is a not a text in applied ethics......Page 18
2.3 Relation of the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals......Page 19
i. On the two divisions of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals......Page 20
iii. Further clarification of the relation of the Groundwork to the......Page 21
3.1 The substantial doctrine......Page 22
3.2 The universality of the supreme practical law......Page 23
3.4 The rational grounding of practical philosophy......Page 24
4. THE GROUNDING OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY MUST BE REASON NOT RELIGION......Page 25
5. GROUNDING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN REASON VERSUS EXPERIENCE: ARGUMENT 1......Page 27
5.1 Empirical versus non-empirical judgments......Page 29
5.2 Reasons for doubting that we can know empirical judgments to be universally and necessarily valid......Page 30
6. GROUNDING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN REASON VERSUS EXPERIENCE: ARGUMENT 2......Page 32
6.1 Freedom must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of morality......Page 33
6.2 Kant’s rejection of the thesis of “comparative” or “psychological” freedom......Page 35
7.1 Kant’s determinism......Page 36
7.2 Kant’s conception of freedom......Page 37
7.3 Kant’s strategy for harmonizing freedom and nature......Page 38
7.4 Saving freedom: argument 1......Page 39
7.5 Saving freedom: argument 2......Page 40
1.1 The objectives of the Groundwork......Page 43
1.3 On the need for a grounding or justification......Page 44
2. ETHICS, PHYSICS, LOGIC (387F.)......Page 45
2.1 The “formal” nature of logic......Page 46
2.2 The “material” nature of physics and ethics......Page 47
2.4 Physics and ethics, although “material,” both have a “pure” (and hence “metaphysical”) part......Page 48
2.5 Unlike logic, physics and ethics both have an “empirical” part......Page 49
3. THE “METAPHYSICS” OF MORALS (388)......Page 51
3.1 Ambiguities in Kant’s use of the term “metaphysics”......Page 52
4.1 On the importance of dividing labor (388–390)......Page 53
5. BREAKING INTO A NEW FIELD: THE PURE WILL (390F.)......Page 55
6. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUNDWORK (392)......Page 56
1.1 The title of Section I......Page 61
1.2 The opening paragraphs of Section I: The common cognition of a good will......Page 63
2. NOTHING IS GOOD WITHOUT LIMITATION BUT THE GOOD WILL (393–396)......Page 64
2.1 The “true vocation” of reason (395–396)......Page 67
2.2 Actual versus intended effects of willing (395–397)......Page 69
2.3 Deontological and teleological elements of Kant’s practical philosophy......Page 71
2.4 The “highest” versus the “sole and complete” good (396)......Page 72
3. FURTHER EXPLICATION OF THE NATURE OF A GOOD WILL: FOUR MOTIVATIONAL TYPES (397–399)......Page 73
3.2 Case 2: Acting in conformity with duty but not from immediate inclination (397)......Page 74
3.3 Case 3: Acting in conformity with duty and from immediate inclination (397–398)......Page 76
3.4 Case 4: Acting from duty (398)......Page 79
3.5 A common objection to Case 4......Page 80
4. THE INDIRECT DUTY TO SECURE OUR OWN HAPPINESS (399)......Page 82
4.1 The “precept” versus the “inclination” of happiness (399)......Page 83
5. THE THREE PROPOSITIONS OF MORALITY (399–401)......Page 84
6. RESPECT AS A SPECIAL KIND OF FEELING (401N)......Page 89
7. THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF THE SUPREME PRACTICAL PRINCIPLE (402–403)......Page 90
8. THE LYING PROMISE EXAMPLE (402F.)......Page 91
9. FROM “COMMON RATIONAL MORAL COGNITION” TO “PHILOSOPHIC MORAL COGNITION” (403–405)......Page 94
2. DUTY IS NOT A CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE (406–412)......Page 97
2.1 Experience provides no evidence that there is such a thing as a moral disposition (407–408)......Page 98
2.2 We cannot derive from experience laws that are apodictically valid for all rational natures (408)......Page 99
2.4 Morality cannot be grounded on popular opinion (409–412)......Page 100
2.5 Popular opinion versus “common reason” (409–412)......Page 102
3. ADVANCE FROM POPULAR PHILOSOPHY TO A METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (412)......Page 103
4. THE WILL AS PURE PRACTICAL REASON (412–414)......Page 104
4.1 A will that is “infallibly” determined by reason (412–414)......Page 105
4.2 A will that is “fallibly” determined by reason (412f.)......Page 106
4.3 For the fallible will, duty is expressed in the form of an imperative (413–414)......Page 107
5. IMPERATIVES: HYPOTHETICAL VERSUS CATEGORICAL (414–421)......Page 108
5.1 Problematic hypothetical imperatives: commanding means to the achievement of possible ends (415)......Page 109
5.2 Assertoric hypothetical imperatives: commanding means to the achievement of actual ends (415–416)......Page 110
5.3 The categorical imperative: commanding means to unconditional ends (416)......Page 112
5.4 On the merely conditional validity of assertoric hypothetical imperatives......Page 113
5.5 The indeterminacy of the concept of happiness (418–419)......Page 115
5.6 The analytic character of hypothetical imperatives (415–421)......Page 116
5.7 Review: On why hypothetical imperatives are conditional and categorical imperatives are unconditional......Page 118
5.8 How are categorical imperatives possible? (419–421)......Page 119
5.9 The categorical imperative as an “a priori synthetic proposition” (420)......Page 120
6. FIRST FORMULA OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW (“FUL”) (421)......Page 121
6.1 The “single” categorical imperative versus many categorical imperatives (421)......Page 122
6.2 The matter and the form of the categorical imperative (416)......Page 123
6.3 The formula of universal law as the formula of nature (“FN”) ( 421)......Page 125
7. FOUR DUTIES: VERSION 1 (422–423)......Page 126
7.1 Perfect duty to oneself: The duty to preserve one’s own life (422)......Page 127
7.2 Perfect duty to others: The duty to not tell a false promise (422)......Page 129
7.3 Imperfect duty to oneself: The duty to develop one’s talents (423)......Page 132
7.4 Imperfect duty to others: The duty of benevolence (423)......Page 134
8.1 Perfect versus imperfect duties (421, 424)......Page 135
8.2 On the “impossibility” of willing an immoral maxim as universal law (424)......Page 138
8.3 On the sense in which willing an immoral maxim produces no contradiction (424)......Page 139
8.4 On the fact that the categorical imperative test is not a prudential test......Page 140
8.5 Worries about rigorism......Page 142
9. INTERLUDE: FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND FORMULA OF THE MORAL LAW (424–429)......Page 145
9.1 Clarifying the concept of the will of a rational being (425–429)......Page 147
9.2 Our rational or objective end (426–428)......Page 149
10. SECOND FORMULA OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: FORMULA OF HUMANITY (“FH”) (429)......Page 151
11.1 Perfect duty to oneself: The duty to preserve one’s own life (429)......Page 152
11.2 Perfect duty to others: The duty not to tell a false promise (429f.)......Page 153
11.3 Imperfect duty to oneself: The duty to develop one’s talents (430)......Page 154
11.4 Imperfect duty to others: The duty of benevolence (430)......Page 155
12. THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND FORMULAE OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (431, 436)......Page 156
13. THE THIRD FORMULA OF THE LAW: FORMULA OF AUTONOMY (“FA”) (431–434)......Page 157
14. REGARDING ONESELF AS LAWGIVING IN A KINGDOM OF ENDS (433–438)......Page 160
15. AUTONOMY AS THE GROUND OF DIGNITY (434–436)......Page 161
16. ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE THREE FORMULAE OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (436–437)......Page 162
17. THE “PARADOX” REGARDING WHAT SERVES AS AN “INFLEXIBLE PRECEPT OF THE WILL” (439)......Page 164
18.1 Autonomy of the will as the sole and supreme principle of morality (440)......Page 165
18.2 On the analytic procedure of Sections I and II......Page 166
18.3 Heteronomy of the will as the source of all spurious principles of morality (441)......Page 167
18.4 Division of all possible principles of morality taken from heteronomy assumed as the basic concept (441–445)......Page 169
18.5 Empirical heteronomous grounds (442)......Page 170
18.6 Rational heteronomous grounds (443)......Page 172
19.1 On what Kant believes he has accomplished in Section II......Page 174
19.2 What remains to be done: the project of Section III (444f.)......Page 175
19.3 Elaboration......Page 178
19.4 On why Kant’s method in Section III must be “synthetic”......Page 180
1 . THE STRUCTURE AND DIFFICULTY OF SECTION III......Page 182
2.1 The connection between freedom and autonomy......Page 183
2.2 A free will is a will under moral laws (447)......Page 185
2.3 The principle of morality is a synthetic proposition (447)......Page 186
3. FREEDOM MUST BE PRESUPPOSED AS A PROPERTY OF THE WILL OF ALL RATIONAL BEINGS (447–448)......Page 190
3.2 Morality must be derived solely from the property of freedom (447)......Page 191
3.4 From presupposition to proof (447f.)......Page 192
3.5 Every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is really free in a practical respect (448)......Page 193
4.1 On how it is possible that we subject ourselves to the moral law (449)......Page 194
4.2 Kant draws attention to a limitation of his discussion so far (449)......Page 196
4.3 A worry about circular reasoning (450–453)......Page 197
4.4 Freedom and the will’s own lawgiving as reciprocal concepts (450)......Page 198
5.1 Recapitulation: Kant’s task in Section III......Page 199
5.2 The two standpoint strategy (450ff.)......Page 200
5.3 The standpoint of nature......Page 202
5.4 The standpoint of freedom......Page 203
5.5 On the limits of the standpoint of nature (451–463)......Page 204
5.6 Is Kant inconsistent regarding the unknowability of things in themselves? (453)......Page 206
6. HOW IS A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE POSSIBLE? (453–455)......Page 207
6.1 A question about Kant’s rejection of the analytic method of proof......Page 208
6.2 The “third cognition”......Page 209
7. ON THE EXTREME BOUNDARY OF ALL PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (455–463)......Page 210
WORKS BY KANT CITED IN THE TEXT......Page 213
OTHER WORKS CITED......Page 214
GENERAL WORKS NOT CITED......Page 216
Index......Page 217
