内容简介 · · · · · ·
The utilitarian economist and Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi and the liberal egalitarian philosopher John Rawls were two of the most eminent scholars writing on problems of social justice in the last century. This volume pays tribute to Harsanyi and Rawls by investigating themes that figure prominently in their work. In some cases, the contributors explore issues considered by Harsanyi and Rawls in more depth and from novel perspectives. In others, the contributors use the work of Harsanyi and Rawls as points of departure for pursuing the construction of theories for the evaluation of social justice. The introductory essay by the editors provides background information on the relevant economics, game theory, philosophy, and social choice theory, as well as readers' guides to the individual contributions, to make this volume widely accessible to scholars in a wide range of disciplines.
Author(s): Fleurbaey, Marc (EDT)/ Salles, Maurice (EDT)/ Weymark, John A. (EDT)
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 472
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
List of Contributors
1 Introduction
1.1 Themes from Rawls
1.1.1 Harsanyi on Rawls
1.1.2 Liberal Egalitarian Approaches to Personal Responsibility
1.1.3 Arneson on Personal Responsibility
1.1.4 Griffin on Moral Intuition
1.2 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
1.2.1 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
1.2.2 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
1.2.3 The Sen--Weymark Critique
1.2.4 Roemer on the Sen--Weymark Critique
1.2.5 Social Welfare Functionals and Welfarism
1.2.6 Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark on Social Aggregation under Uncertainty
1.2.7 D'Aspremont and Mongin on Welfarism and Social Aggregation
1.2.8 Hild, Jeffrey, and Risse on Ex Ante versus Ex Post Social Aggregation
1.3 Goodness and Well-Being
1.3.1 Broome on the Coherence of Preference-Based Utilitarianism
1.3.2 Sugden on a Common Currency of Advantage
1.3.3 Fleurbaey and Maniquet on Fair Social Orderings
1.3.4 Barry on Want Satisfaction
1.4 Sharing the Gains from Social Cooperation
1.4.1 Naturalistic versus Normative Theories
1.4.2 Game Theory
1.4.3 Binmore on Natural Justice
1.4.4 Skyrms on the Evolutionary Viability of Fairness Norms
1.4.5 McClennen on the Use of Cooperative Dispositions as a Coordinating Device
1.5 Rights and Liberties
1.5.1 Pettit on Republicanism
1.5.2 Riley on Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities
1.6 Concluding Remarks
References
PART ONE THEMES FROM RAWLS
2 Rawls's Theory of Justice
2.1 What Choices People Would Make in Ignorance of Their Own Personal Interests
2.2 The Maximin Principle
2.3 Other Absolute-Priority Principles in Rawls's Theory
2.4 Rawls's Attempt to Deny Moral Credit to Many People Performing Valuable Services to Society
2.5 Some Comments on Rawls's Argument
2.6 Rawls's Conception of Justice and Social Policy
2.7 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
2.8 Another Interpretation of Free Will: The Bearer's Responsibility View
References
3 Rawls and Responsibility
3.1 Rawls on Deservingness and Responsibility
3.2 The Canonical Moment Version of Rawlsian Justice
3.3 Responsibility for Voluntary Choices is Problematic
3.4 Responsibility for Ends Reconsidered
3.5 Joint Responsibility on the Part of Individual and Society for Individual Ends
3.6 Effectively Equivalent Options
3.7 AreWe Responsible At Most for What Lies Within Our Control?
3.8 The Hybrid Proposal
3.9 Bert’s Case
3.10 Two Rawlsian Rejoinders
4 Improving Our Ethical Beliefs
4.1 Piecemeal Appeal to Intuition
4.2 Purist Views
4.3 Have We Been too Hard on Intuitions?
4.4 The Coherence Theory
4.5 A Coherence Theory for Ethics
4.6 What We Need
PART TWO Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
5 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Is Not a Utilitarian
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Harsanyi's Argument
5.3 Why the IO Is Not a Utilitarian
5.4 The Analogy With Individual Choice
5.5 Conclusion
References
6 Social Aggregation and the Expected Utility Hypothesis
6.1 Introduction
6.2 State-Contingent Alternatives and Social Evaluation Functionals
6.3 Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Information Partitions
6.4 Expected Utility Theory for State-Contingent Alternatives
6.5 Welfarism
6.6 Single-Profile Aggregation
6.7 Multiprofile Aggregation
6.8 Single-Information-Set Aggregation
6.9 Single-Preference-Profile Aggregation
6.10 Concluding Remarks
References
7 A Welfarist Version of Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem
7.1 Introduction
7.2 A SWFL Version of the Aggregation Theorem for a Single Profile of VNM Preferences
7.3 A Welfarist Version of the Aggregation Theorem
7.4 Concluding Remarks: More on SWFLs and Cardinality
References
8 Preference Aggregation after Harsanyi
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Harsanyi's Utilitarianism
8.3 Aggregation Ex Ante
8.4 Aggregation Ex Post
References
PART THREE GOODNESS AND WELL-BEING
9 Can There Be a Preference-Based Utilitarianism?
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Uncertainty
9.3 Additivity
9.4 Preferencism as an Account of Individual Good
9.5 Ideal Preferencism
9.6 A Quantitative Concept of Good
9.7 The Expectational Concept
9.8 Interpersonal Comparability
9.9 Evolutionary Equilibrium
9.10 Conclusion
References
10 A Common Currency of Advantage
10.1 The Common Currency of Pleasure
10.2 Harsanyi, Imaginative Empathy, and Rational Preference
10.3 Rawls and Primary Goods
10.4 Money Metrics
10.5 An Impersonal Money-Metric of Opportunity
10.6 Conclusion
References
11 Utilitarianism versus Fairness in Welfare Economics
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Justifying Social Orderings
11.2.1 Ordinalism versus Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
11.2.2 Social Rankings versus Allocation Rules
11.3 Constructing Social Orderings
11.3.1 Direct Inquiry
11.3.2 Rationalizing Allocation Rules
11.4 Concluding Comments
References
12 Rationality and Want-Satisfaction
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Rawls's Objection
12.3 Elster's Objection
12.4 Conclusion
PART FOUR: SHARING THE GAINS FROM SOCIAL COOPERATION
13 Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Teleological Utilitarianism
13.3 Nonteleological Moral Theories
13.3.1 Harsanyi’s Nonteleological Utilitarianism
13.3.2 Rawls’ Model
13.3.3 Kantian Foundations for Interpersonal Comparison
13.4 The Original Position as a Natural Norm
13.4.1 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run
13.4.2 Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon
13.5 Reform
References
14 The Social Contract Naturalized
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Distributive Justice, Symmetry
14.3 Evolution of Justice I
14.4 Distributive Justice, Asymmetry
14.5 Evolution of Justice II
14.6 Conclusion
Postscript July 2006
References
15 An Alternative Model of Rational Cooperation
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Mutual Gains and Losses
15.3 Modeling Cooperative Interaction
15.4 What Drives the Equilibrium Analysis?
15.5 Rethinking Rational Cooperation
15.6 Mixed Games
15.7 Repeated Interaction over Time
15.8 Bargaining Theory
15.9 A More Realistic Setting
15.10 An Alternative Model of Cooperation
15.11 The Case for the Revised Model of Cooperation
15.12 Rule-Governed Choice
15.13 The Efficiency-Egalitarian Principle
15.14 The Problem of Ideology
15.15 The Question of Adaptive Efficiency
15.16 A Final Observation
References
PART FIVE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
16 Republican Political Theory
16.1 The Republican Ideal of Freedom
16.1.1 The Constant Connection
16.1.2 Interference and Arbitrary Interference
16.1.3 The Harder-to-Lose-Freedom Effect
16.1.4 The Easier-to-Lose-Freedom Effect
16.1.5 Three Further Remarks
References
16.2 The Significance of the Republican Ideal
16.2.1 The Paley Connection
16.2.2 Redistribution and Freedom as Noninterference
16.2.3 Redistribution and Freedom as Nondomination
References
17 Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Harsanyi's Liberal Rule Utilitarianism
17.3 Absolute Priorities within a Liberal Utilitarian Code
17.4 Conclusion
References
Index
