Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models: War, Secession and Tranquility

This document was uploaded by one of our users. The uploader already confirmed that they had the permission to publish it. If you are author/publisher or own the copyright of this documents, please report to us by using this DMCA report form.

Simply click on the Download Book button.

Yes, Book downloads on Ebookily are 100% Free.

Sometimes the book is free on Amazon As well, so go ahead and hit "Search on Amazon"

This Palgrave Pivot presents theoretical models that explain common historical sequences, such as wars of secession, the rise and fall of empires, and international war. The book uses a rational choice model to frame the incentives of specific groups coming together in a polity or leaving it. These incentives are then set in a theoretical framework to determine the outcome—unity or secession, peace or war—and are demonstrated through historical examples. The book provides two longer case studies looking directly at motives for and against secession: the first on the American Civil War from the point of view of the Confederacy, and the second on efforts by the UK government to stem the tide of Scottish independence. Another case study discusses peacekeeping as aimed at reducing the costs of secessionist wars. With its accessible use of economic theory and ability to bring to life real-world examples of conflict and secession, this book is ideal supplementary reading for courses in international relations, conflict studies, global economics and economic history.

Author(s): Paul Hallwood
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2020

Language: English
Pages: 126
City: Cham

Preface
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
2 The Neoclassical Approach
3 International Law and Secession
4 Economic Rent and Rent Seeking
5 Historical Sequences and Triggering Events
6 Conclusions
References
2 The Economic Model
1 A Simplified Union
2 Decision-Making in Region B
3 Region B’s Maximization Problem
4 The Union’s Side
5 The Union’s Maximization Problem
6 Conclusions
References
3 Intrastate Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Collapse of Empires
2.1 USSR and Eastern Europe
2.2 Yugoslavia’s Wars of Secession
3 History Without Costs
4 Conclusions
References
4 Drivers of Historical Sequences
1 Introduction
2 Dispute Cost and Persuasion Cost
3 Changes in Expected Economic Rents
4 Changes in Subjective Probabilities of Secession
5 Changes in the Subjective Rates of Discount
6 Changes in Returns if Region B Remains in the Union
7 More Examples of Internal Historical Sequences
8 Conclusions
References
5 International Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Three Main Sequences
3 Comparison with Other Models
3.1 The End of History?
3.2 Clash of Civilizations
4 Conclusions
References
6 Peacekeeping and Sequencing
1 Introduction
2 Peacekeeping Around the World
3 Understanding the Objectives of Peacekeeping
4 Peacekeeping: Fundamentals of Effectiveness
5 UN Peacekeeping
6 Other Peacekeeping Missions and Free Riding
7 To Free Ride or not?
8 Conclusions
References
7 Case Study: Secessionists Motives in the American Civil War
1 Introduction
2 Methodological Approach: A Secessionist’s Maximization Problem
3 Parameter Values
4 Empirical Results
5 Conclusions
References
8 Minimizing the Cost of Union: Fiscal Autonomy and the Case of Scotland
1 Introduction
2 Federalism
3 Democracy and Secessionist Forces
4 The Leviathan Hypothesis
5 The Case of the UK: Reforming the Financing of the Scottish Government
6 Taming the Leviathan: Fiscal Autonomy as a Game
6.1 Payoffs
7 Conclusions
References
9 Conclusions
Index