As demand for fresh water rises, together with population, water scarcity already features on the national security agenda of many countries. In this book, Dinardevelops a theory to explain solutions to property rights conflicts over shared rivers. Through systematic analysis of available treaty texts, corresponding side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are gleaned. Geographic and economic variables are used to explain recurring property rights outcomes. Rather than focusing on a specific river or particular geographic region, the book analyzes numerous rivers, dictated by the large number of treaty observations, and is able to test several hypotheses, devising general conclusions about the manner in which states resolve their water disputes. Policy implications are thereby also gained. While the book simultaneously considers conflict and cooperation along international rivers, it is the focus on negotiated agreements, and their embodied side-payment and cost-sharing regimes, that justifies the use of particular independent variables.
Author(s): Shlomi Dinar
Edition: 1
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 368
Book Cover......Page 1
Title......Page 8
Copyright......Page 9
Dedication......Page 10
Contents......Page 12
Illustrations......Page 14
Preface......Page 16
Acknowledgments......Page 18
1 Introduction......Page 22
2 Explaining conflict, cooperation, and negotiation along international rivers......Page 30
3 Treaty design and property rights: theory and hypotheses......Page 58
4 Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: core configurations......Page 85
5 Empirical analysis of treaty design differences: additional configurations......Page 106
6 Conclusion......Page 125
Appendix A: Rivers, configurations, and associated treaties......Page 139
Appendix B: Geographical configurations for rivers shared by two states......Page 153
Appendix C: Selected literature for select river basins......Page 156
Appendix D: Treaty analysis for bilateral river configurations......Page 162
Appendix E: Threshold, rounding justification, and country asymmetry ratios......Page 317
Notes......Page 322
Bibliography......Page 328
Index......Page 350
