For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true?
The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain.
Author(s): Joke Meheus (ed.)
Series: Origins: Studies in the Sources of Scientific Creativity, Vol. 2
Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Year: 2002
Language: English
Pages: 225
Preface
From Copernicus to Ptolemy: Inconsistency and Method [Thomas Nickles]
Inconsistent Reasoning toward Consistent Theories [Arthur I. Miller]
Inconsistencies in the History of Mathematics [Jean Paul Van Bendegem]
Mathematical Change and Inconsistency [Otávio Bueno]
Approximate Truth [Bryson Brown]
Inconsistency in Science: A Partial Perspective [Newton da Costa and Steven French]
Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences [Priest]
In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies [Diderik Batens]
How to Reason Sensibly yet Naturally from Inconsistencies [Joke Meheus]
Why the Logic of Explanation is Inconsistency-adaptive [Erik Weber and Kristof De Clercq]
A Paradox in Newtonian Gravitation Theory II [John D. Norton]
Inconsistency, Generic Modeling, and Conceptual Change in Science [Nancy J. Nersessian]
