This book examines the large but neglected topic of the development of maritime power from both an historical and a contemporary point of view.
Navies have never been more important than they are now, in a century becoming, as widely expected, increasingly and profoundly maritime. The growing competition between China and Russia with the United States and its allies and partners around the world is essentially sea-based. The sea is also central to the world's globalised trading system and to its environmental health. Most current crises are either sea-based or have a critical maritime element to them. What happens at sea will help shape our future. Against that background, this book uses both history and contemporary events to analyse how maritime power and naval strength has been, and is being, developed. In a reader-friendly way, it seeks to show what has worked and what has not, and to uncover the recurring patterns in maritime and naval development which explain past, present and future success - and failure. It reflects on the historical experience of all navies, but in particular it poses the question of whether China is following the same pattern of naval development illustrated by Britain at the start of the 18th century, which led to two centuries of naval dominance.
This book will be of much interest to students of maritime power, naval studies, and strategic studies, as well as to naval professionals around the world.
Author(s): Geoffrey Til
Series: Cass Series: Naval Policy and History, 67
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 348
City: London
Cover
Endorsements
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
Illustrations
Preface
Notes
Abbreviations
1. Maritime Matters
1.1 Introduction: Why Maritime Power Matters
1.2 Developing Maritime Power: The Naval Revolution
1.3 Maritime Power: Its Propensity to Decline
1.4 Some Terms of the Debate
1.5 The Agenda: Profiting from the Past When Planning the Future
Notes
2. A Predisposition towards the Maritime?
2.1 Introduction: Improving Mahan
2.2 Maritime Geography
2.3 Governance and Society
2.4 Resources, Power and the Economy
2.4.1 A Maritime Economy and Maritime Resources
2.4.2 Trade and Maritime Power
2.4.3 The Maritime Economy and the Purpose and Nature of Naval Forces
2.5 Naval Forces
2.5.1 Changes and Challenges
2.5.2 What Naval Forces Need
2.6 Putting It All Together: The Belt and Road Initiative
2.7 Some Metrics of Maritime Power
Notes
3. Henry Maydman, His Context, Maritime Power and a Strategy of Means
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Singapore and the Importance of the Context
3.3 Henry Maydman's Naval Speculations of 1691: A Bleak Context
3.4 Maydman on Britain's Maritime Potential
3.4.1 Maritime Geography
3.4.2 Governance and Society
3.4.3 Trade, Economy and Resources
3.4.4 Naval Forces
3.5 Maydman's Recommendations for the Developing Maritime Power, Tier by Tier
3.5.1 Tier 1: Deciding National Policy Objectives
3.5.2 Tier 2: Allocating Resources
3.5.3 Tier 3: Deciding the Military Mix
3.5.4 Tier 4: Deciding Naval Policy and Strategy
3.6 So How Did Things Turn Out?
3.7 Conclusion: Maydman's Applicability to Modern Times?
Notes
4. The Vision Thing
4.1 The Need for a Vision?
4.1.1 The Hanseatic League
4.1.2 The Netherlands
4.1.3 Revolutionary America
4.2 Top-Down Perspectives
4.2.1 Russia
4.2.2 Singapore
4.2.3 Modern China
4.2.4 Indonesia
4.3 Conclusions and Modern-Day Approaches
4.3.1 A Mixed Approach
4.3.2 Countries Articulating the Vision
Notes
5. Willing the Means: Establishing and Resourcing Strategic Priorities
5.1 Introduction
5.2 A British Illustration of the Resources-Commitments Problem
5.3 An Athenian Example of Success
5.4 Managing the Resources-Commitment Problem: Seven Coping Mechanisms
5.4.1 A Case That Sells the Sea
5.4.2 A Case That Conforms to Strategic Reality
5.4.3 A Case That Makes the Most of What's Available
5.4.4 A Case That Deals with Uncertainty
5.4.5 A Case That Derives from Sufficient Representation
5.4.6 A Case That Ensures Follow-up
5.4.7 A Case That Provides Proof of Concept
Notes
6. Going Joint: The Maritime Mix
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Malaya, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, 1941: An Operational Case Study of Failure and Success in Jointness
6.2.1 Competing Service Agendas
6.2.2 The Disuniting Effect of Insufficient Resources
6.2.3 Uncertainty of Purpose
6.2.4 Leadership Problems
6.2.5 Defective Coordination Machinery
6.2.6 December 1941: Conclusion
6.3 Modern Day Equivalents
6.3.1 Introduction
6.3.2 Competing Service Agendas
6.3.3 The Disuniting Effect of Insufficient Resources
6.3.4 Uncertainty of Purpose
6.3.5 Leadership Problems
6.3.6 Defective Coordination Machinery
6.3.7 Conclusion
Notes
7. Establishing Naval Policy and Setting Strategy
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Three Naval Champions: Tirpitz, Gorshkov and Liu
7.2.1 Developing a Narrative
7.2.2 Achieving Representation
7.2.3 Developing Support and Winning Allies
7.2.4 Delivering the Goods
7.2.5 Champions of a Smaller Scale
7.3 The Normal Pattern of Naval Advance
7.3.1 Techniques of Universal Applicability?
7.3.2 What Navies Need: South Asian Examples
7.4 Ways and Means: Turning Vision into Reality
7.4.1 Winning Sufficient Resources
7.4.2 Having Clarity of Purpose
7.4.3 Winning a Sympathetic Audience
Notes
8. All of One Maritime Company: The Search for Synergy
8.1 Introduction: The Concept of Maritime Synergy
8.2 The Ship-Building Industry, the Wider MDIB and the Development of Maritime Power
8.2.1 South American and Indian Case Studies
8.2.2 Why Set up a Maritime Defence Industrial Base (MDIB)?
8.2.3 Setting Up a Maritime Defence Industrial Base
8.2.4 Problems with the Solutions
8.2.5 Need for an Industrial Strategy
8.3 The Merchant Shipping Industry
8.3.1 Introduction
8.3.2 The Traditional Narrative
8.3.3 Challenges to the Traditional View
8.3.4 Differing Conclusions
8.4 The Fishing Industry
8.4.1 Introduction
8.4.2 Why the Fishing Industry Matters
8.4.3 Managing and Integrating the Fishing Industry
Notes
9. Coastguards and the Assertion of Maritime Authority
9.1 Introduction
9.2 What's at Stake?
9.2.1 The Sea as Sovereign Jurisdiction
9.2.2 Marine Resources
9.2.3 Safe Transportation
9.2.4 The Sea as an Environment
9.2.5 The Sea as a Data Set
9.2.6 A Leisure Resource
9.3 Asserting Authority: The Problems
9.4 The Penalties of Failure
9.4.1 Pollution, Environmental Degradation and the Loss of Marine Resources
9.4.2 Loss of Income for Coastal States
9.4.3 Instability and Increased Disorder
9.5 Asserting Authority: The Requirements
9.5.1 Maritime Horses for Maritime Courses
9.5.2 Securing Multinational Cooperation
9.5.3 Situational Awareness
9.5.4 The Apprehension of Wrongdoers
9.5.5 The Prosecution of Wrongdoers
9.6 Delivering Cooperative Effort
9.6.1 Cooperation at the National Level
9.6.2 Capacity Building
9.6.3 Multinational Cooperation for Multinational Problems
9.6.4 The Requirement for Integrated Governance
9.7 Conclusion
Notes
10. Naval Power: The Administrative Angle
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Navies, Administration and Permanency
10.3 The Qualities of Successful Naval Administration
10.3.1 An Orientation towards the Future
10.3.2 A Sense of Mission and Duty
10.3.3 A Sufficiency of Administrators
10.3.4 Loyalty to the Naval, Governmental and National Interest
10.3.5 Individual and Corporate Honesty
10.3.6 Effective Monitoring, Regulation and Reward
10.3.7 Individual and Corporate Expertise
10.3.8 Openness
10.3.9 Collegiality
10.4 Conclusion
Notes
11. Delivering a Navy's People
11.1 Introduction: Navies Need People
11.1.1 People in Sufficient Number
11.1.2 People of Sufficient Quality
11.1.3 People Sufficiently Motivated
11.1.4 Sufficient People Planning
11.1.5 Having Sufficient Support
11.2 Solving the People Problem
11.2.1 Getting the People You Need: The Lessons of the Galleys
11.2.2 Attracting Volunteers
11.2.3 Widening the Net
11.2.4 Resorting to Force
11.2.5 Establishing Sufficiently Good Working Conditions
11.2.6 Acceptable Career Prospects
11.2.7 Job Satisfaction
11.3 Training and Educating a Navy's People
11.3.1 Training and Education Matter
11.3.2 Training and PME Compared
11.3.3 Training Matters
11.3.4 PME: Differences of View
11.3.5 Balancing Training and PME
11.3.6 What Should Be Taught, When, How and to Whom?
11.3.7 Alternate Sources of Expertise
11.3.8 Teaching Leadership?
11.4 The Unavoidable Issues of Cost
11.5 People Issues 'with Chinese Characteristics'
Notes
12. Designing the Fleet
12.1 Fleet Design and Acquisition: Why So Difficult?
12.2 Fleet Design and the Search for Balance: Insights from Past and Present
12.2.1 Medieval England and the Search for Balance
12.2.2 The Spanish Tackle the Problem
12.2.3 France 1789-1794: An Exercise in Rapid Regeneration
12.2.4 The Search for Balance: Modern Approaches
12.3 Fleet Design: The Process
12.4 Battle Force 2045: Applying Theory to Practice
12.4.1 Agreeing the Fleet's Missions and Tasks
12.4.2 Identifying and Prioritising Task Requirements
12.4.3 Exploring Technological Possibilities
12.4.4 Resourcing the Programme
12.4.5 Ensuring Readiness - But When?
12.4.6 Agreeing the Mix
12.4.7 Planning Delivery
12.4.8 Allocating Responsibilities
12.5 The Smaller Navies Angle
12.6 Summarising Fleet Design, Acquisition and Development
Notes
13. Nothing Is for Ever: Maintaining the Fleet
13.1 Maintenance: Its Nature and Scale
13.2 Generating Readiness over Time
13.3 Programmatics: The Art of Making the Best Use of What's Available
13.4 Maintaining and Sustaining a Navy's Materiel
13.4.1 Restoring and Maintaining Existing Capability
13.4.2 Moving with the Times and Enhancing Capability
13.5 Maintaining and Sustaining a Navy's People
13.6 Fleet Maintenance: Conclusion
Notes
14. A Conclusion with Chinese Characteristics
14.1 China: A Disposition towards the Maritime?
14.1.1 Maritime Geography
14.1.2 Society and Government
14.1.3 A Maritime Economy
14.1.4 Naval Forces
14.2 Context and Vision: China's Place in a Maritime World
14.3 Maritime Advocacy, Priorities and Integration
14.4 Naval Policy
14.5 Naval Administration
14.6 Maritime Synergy
14.7 Preparing the Navy's People
14.8 Designing and Maintaining a Balanced Fleet
14.9 Conclusion
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Official
Books, Chapters and Articles
Index
