In 1918, the Soviet revolutionary government repudiated the Tsarist regime’s sovereign debt, triggering one of the biggest sovereign defaults ever. Yet the price of Russian bonds remained high for years. Combing French archival records, Kim Oosterlinck shows that, far from irrational, investors had legitimate reasons to hope for repayment. Soviet debt recognition, a change in government, a bailout by the French government, or French banks, or a seceding country would have guaranteed at least a partial reimbursement. As Greece and other European countries raise the possibility of sovereign default, Oosterlinck’s superbly researched study is more urgent than ever.
Author(s): Kim Oosterlinck
Series: Yale Series in Economic and Financial History
Publisher: Yale University Press
Year: 2016
Language: English
Pages: 264
City: New Haven
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Contents
About This Book
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
ONE: Sovereign Debt: Default and Repudiation
TWO: Reputation, Trade Retaliation, and Recognition: The Hope That the Bolsheviks Would Change Their Position
THREE: Military Intervention and the Impact of War Events: Hopes for “White” Repayment
FOUR: A French Bailout?
FIVE: Seeking Other Potential Payers
SIX: Recent Econometric and Financial Research
SEVEN: Conclusion
Epilogue
APPENDIX A: Russian Bonds Listed out of Russia (1903)
APPENDIX B: Russian Bonds Listed on Paris Stock Exchange (2 January 1917)
Notes
References
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z
