Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.
Author(s): Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver (auth.), Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver (eds.)
Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year: 2010
Language: English
Pages: 480
Tags: Economic Theory; Public Finance & Economics; Political Science; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Front Matter....Pages i-xviii
Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting....Pages 1-12
Front Matter....Pages 14-14
Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting....Pages 15-17
Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting....Pages 19-37
Front Matter....Pages 40-40
Collective Choice for Simple Preferences....Pages 41-90
Axiomatizations of Approval Voting....Pages 91-102
Front Matter....Pages 104-104
Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections....Pages 105-124
Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?....Pages 125-150
Front Matter....Pages 152-152
The Basic Approval Voting Game....Pages 153-163
Approval Voting in Large Electorates....Pages 165-197
Computational Aspects of Approval Voting....Pages 199-251
Front Matter....Pages 254-254
On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives....Pages 255-283
Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting....Pages 285-310
In Silico Voting Experiments....Pages 311-335
Front Matter....Pages 338-338
Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting....Pages 339-356
Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections....Pages 357-395
Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment....Pages 397-411
Front Matter....Pages 414-414
Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting....Pages 415-429
Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections....Pages 431-451
Front Matter....Pages 454-454
Describing Society Through Approval Data....Pages 455-468
Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference....Pages 469-481
