In Volume 1 of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore restated the problems of moral and political philosophy in the language of game theory. In Volume 2, Just Playing, he unveils his own controversial theory, which abandons the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant for the naturalistic approach to morality of David Hume. According to this viewpoint, a fairness norm is a convention that evolved to coordinate behavior on an equilibrium of a society's Game of Life. This approach allows Binmore to mount an evolutionary defense of Rawls's original position that escapes the utilitarian conclusions that follow when orthodox reasoning is applied with the traditional assumptions. Using ideas borrowed from the theory of bargaining and repeated games, Binmore is led instead to a form of egalitarianism that vindicates the intuitions that led Rawls to write his Theory of Justice.Written for an interdisciplinary audience, Just Playing offers a panoramic tour through a range of new and disturbing insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, and psychology. It is essential reading for anyone who thinks it likely that ethics evolved along with the human species.
Author(s): Ken Binmore
Series: Economic Learning and Social Evolution
Publisher: The MIT Press
Year: 1998
Language: English
Pages: 615
Apology
Series Foreword
Reading Guide
Whither Away?
The Art of Compromise
Nonsense upon Stilts
Social Contracts
Reform
The Original Position
Bargaining
Moral Philosophy
Traditional Philosophical Categories
Fin de Siècle
Noncooperative Game Theory
The Ultimatum Game
Anomalies?
Cooperative Game Theory
Games in Coalitional Form.
Nash Program
Implementation
Nuances of Negotiation
Realistic Bargaining Models
Bargaining Problems
Payoff Regions
Nash Bargaining Problems
The Bargaining Set
Dividing the Dollar
Edgeworth Box
Bargaining Solutions
Nash Bargaining Solution
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Bargaining with Interpersonal Comparison
Characterizing Bargaining Solutions
The Kalai-Smorodinsky Axioms
The Nash Axioms
Renegotiation Axioms
Bargaining with Commitment
Nash Demand Game
Fixed and Variable Threats
Trustless Transactions
Repeated Games
Transitional Arrangements
Bargaining without Commitment
The Alternating Offers Game
How Realistic is Rubinstein's Model?
Other Approaches to Bargaining
The Coase Theorem
Gauthier on Bargaining over a Social Contract
Evolution in Eden
The Good, the Right, and the Seemly
Utilitarianism
Summum Bonum
Ipsedixists
Ideal Observers
Philosopher-King
The Social Contract Approach
Rule-Utilitarianism or Act-Utilitarianism?
The Big Picture
Fictitious Postulatum?
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
Evolutionary Ethics
Evolution and Justice
Reciprocity
Kinship
Equilibrium Selection
Empathy and Fairness
The Long and the Short and the Medium
Nonteleological Utilitarianism
Commitment in Eden
Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run
Retelling the Rawlsian Story
Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon
The Princess and the Pea
How Justice Works
Why Not Utilitarianism?
Rationalizing Reciprocity
Back-scratching
Rights in a Theory of the Seemly
Rights as Strategies?
Rules for Sustaining an Equilibrium
Moral Responsibility
Free Will
Nil Desperandum!
Folk Theorem
Memes
Finite Automata
Computing Payoffs
Reciprocal Sharing
Crime and Punishment
Guardians Who Guard Each Other
Tit for Tat?
How Does Cooperation Evolve?
Social Contracts in Big Societies
Social Transfers
Friendship and Coalitions
Police Forces
Punishing the Innocent
Leadership and Authority
The Role of the Emotions
Sore Thumbs
Tunnel Vision
Due Process
Anarchy to Statehood
Natural Equilibrium
Renegotiation
Getting from Here to There
Renegotiation in the Original Position
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime
Renegotiation-Proofness
What about Moral Values?
Confusing Tastes and Values
Das Adam Smith Problem
Postwelfarism
What Moral Relativism Is Not
Yearning for Utopia
Introduction
Envy
Equity in Economics
Envy-Freeness
Welfarism
Equity in Psychology
Equity in Anthropology
Sharing and Caring
Enforcement in Foraging Societies
Anarchy in Prehistory?
Kinship in Small Groups
The Game of Morals
Fair Social Contracts
Paradise Lost
Modeling the Original Position
When is Justice Dispensed?
Rawls Vindicated!
Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run
Consensus and Context
Morality in the Short Run
Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism
Paradise Regained?
Worthiness and Power
Will to Power?
Comparative Statics
To Each According to His Need?
Arbeit Macht Frei?
From Each According to His Ability?
The High and the Lowly
Socialism versus Capitalism
The Market and the Long Run
The Walrasian Bargaining Solution
Misrepresenting Personal Preferences
The Concept of a Fair Price
Time Corrupts All
Unfinished Business
Large Societies and Coalitions
Incomplete Information and Mechanism Design
A Changing Game of Life
A Perfect Commonwealth?
What is Whiggery?
Where is Whiggery?
Humean and Humane
Really Meaning It!
Naturalism
Causal Reversals
Modeling Man
Strength of Body
Reason
Passions
Experience
Harsanyi Scholarship
Introduction
Teleological Utilitarianism
Nonteleological Utilitarianism
Bargaining Theory
Introduction
Alternating Offers Game
Preferences
Stationary Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
Nonstationary Equilibria
Generalized Nash Bargaining Solutions
Nash Program
