In Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore argues that game theory provides a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. His reinterpretation of classical social contract ideas within a game-theoretic framework generates new insights into the fundamental questions of social philosophy. He clears the way for this ambitious endeavor by first focusing on foundational issues -- paying particular attention to the failings of recent attempts to import game -- theoretic ideas into social and political philosophy.Binmore shows how ideas drawn from the classic expositions of Harsanyi and Rawls produce a synthesis that is consistent with the modern theory of noncooperative games. In the process, he notes logical weaknesses in other analyses of social cooperation and coordination, such as those offered by Rousseau, Kant, Gauthier, and Nozick. He persuasively argues that much of the current literature elaborates a faulty analysis of an irrelevant game.Game Theory and the Social Contract makes game-theoretic ideas more widely accessible to those with only a limited knowledge of the field. Instructional material is woven into the narrative, which is illustrated with many simple examples, and the mathematical content has been reduced to a minimum.
Author(s): Ken Binmore
Publisher: The MIT Press
Year: 1994
Language: English
Pages: 364
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Apology
Table of Contents
Reading Guide
Abstract of Volume II
1 A Liberal Leviathan
1.1 Whiggery
1.2 DeKanting Rawls
1.2.1 Hobbes and the State of Nature
1.2.2 Sen and the Rational Fool
1.2.3 Hume and the Social Contract
1.2.4 Schelling and Commitment
1.2.5 Rawls and Utility
1.2.6 Adam Smith and Human Sympathy
1.2.7 Harsanyi and Ideal Observers
1.2.8 Pareto and Mutual consent
1.2.9 Gauthier and Rational Contracting
1.3 Behemoth and the Market
1.4 Elephants and Donkeys
2 Toying with Tautologies
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Equilibrium
2.2.1 Hawks and Doves
2.2.2 Equilibrium
2.2.3 Prisoners’ Dilemma
2.2.4 Means and Ends
2.2.5 Suppose Everyone Behaved Like That?
2.2.6 Games That are Not the Prisoners’ Dilemma
2.3 Games and the Social Contract
2.3.1 The State of Nature as a Game
2.3.2 Hunting Stags
2.3.3 Rights and the Liberal Paradox
2.3.4 Arrow’s Paradox
2.3.5 Teleology
2.3.6 Jacob’s Ladder
2.3.7 Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice
2.4 My Dear Sir, Clear Your Mind of Cant!
2.4.1 The Categorical Imperative
2.4.2 Why Obey?
2.4.3 Be Consistent!
2.5 Time and Commitment
2.5.1 Blackmail
2.5.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
2.6 Really Meaning It
3 Squaring the Circle
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Transparent Disposition Fallacies
3.2.1 “Metagames”
3.2.2 Constrained Maximization
3.2.3 Cheap Talk and Evolution
3.2.4 Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection
3.2.5 The Tit-for-Tat Bubble
3.3 The Symmetry Fallacy
3.4 Paradox of the Twins
3.4.1 The Harsanyi Doctrine
3.4.2 Hobbesian Psychology
3.5 Newcomb’s Paradox
3.6 Paradox of the Surprise Test
4 Cardinal Comparisons
4.1 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
4.2 Intrapersonal Comparison of Utility
4.2.1 Probability
4.2.2 Von Neumann and Morgenstern Utility
4.2.3 Intensity of Preference
4.2.4 Teleological Utilitarianism
4.3 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
4.3.1 Empathetic Preferences
4.3.2 Common Interpersonal Comparisons
4.4 Kant and the Prisoners’ Dilemma
4.5 Bayesian Decision Theory
4.6 Rawlsian Maximin
4.7 The Game of Morals
Bibliography
