The thoroughly expanded Second Edition presents a unique, hands-on approach to game theory. While most books on the subject are too abstract or too basic for mathematicians, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition offers a blend of theory and applications, allowing readers to use theory and software to create and analyze real-world decision-making models.
With a rigorous, yet accessible, treatment of mathematics, the book focuses on results that can be used to determine optimal game strategies. Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition demonstrates how to use modern software, such as Maple™, Mathematica®, and Gambit, to create, analyze, and implement effective decision-making models. Coverage includes the main aspects of game theory including the fundamentals of two-person zero-sum games, cooperative games, and population games as well as a large number of examples from various fields, such as economics, transportation, warfare, asset distribution, political science, and biology. The Second Edition features:
• A new chapter on extensive games, which greatly expands the implementation of available models
• New sections on correlated equilibria and exact formulas for three-player cooperative games
• Many updated topics including threats in bargaining games and evolutionary stable strategies
• Solutions and methods used to solve all odd-numbered problems
• A companion website containing the related Maple and Mathematica data sets and code
A trusted and proven guide for students of mathematics and economics, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition is also an excellent resource for researchers and practitioners in economics, finance, engineering, operations research, statistics, and computer science.
Content:Chapter 1 Matrix Two?Person Games (pages 5–59):
Chapter 2 Solution Methods for Matrix Games (pages 60–114):
Chapter 3 Two?Person Nonzero Sum Games (pages 115–175):
Chapter 4 Games in Extensive Form: Sequential Decision Making (pages 176–212):
Chapter 5 N?Person Nonzero Sum Games and Games with a Continuum of Strategies (pages 213–287):
Chapter 6 Cooperative Games (pages 288–394):
Chapter 7 Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Population Games (pages 395–431):