University of Arizona, 2008, -270 pp.Here are lecture notes from a game-theory course I taught to students in their second year of the economics PhD program at the University of Arizona during the 1992-1997 period. The material presented would also be helpful to first-year PhD students learning game theory as part of their microeconomic-theory sequence, as well as to advanced undergraduates learning game theory. I consider the exposition detailed, rigorous, and self-contained.
I no longer teach game theory, so these notes are currently frozen in this state. I'm making them available here because I still get requests for them. I have not updated them to reflect recent advances. I also won't be correcting any errors (though I hope that most of them have already been caught!) or adding any topics.
I would be very interested in and appreciate hearing from anyone who downloads them and finds them useful. Also I may eventually post problem sets and their solutions. Let me know if you'd like to be notified of such changes. Please email me.Strategic Form Games
Nonequilibrium Solution Concepts
Strategic Dominance
Iterated Dominance and Rationalizability
Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium
Computing Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria of 2 x 2 Strategic-Form Games
Extensive-form Games
Introduction to Extensive-Form Games
Strategies in Extensive-Form Games
Solution Concepts in Extensive-Form Games
Repeated Games
Introduction to Repeated Games
Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
A Folk Theorem Sampler
Bayesian Games
Static Games of Incomplete Information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Sender-Receiver (Signalling) Games
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games
