This book provides new and critical perspectives on the internal development of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (the PCSWA; Pugwash) and its role in international nuclear diplomacy during the 1960s Cold War. Conceived by western scientists dissenting from their own government’s position on nuclear weapons, the conferences brought together elite scientists from across the East-West divide to work towards nuclear disarmament and for peace. The analysis follows two lines. First, the book charts the emergence during the conferences of a distinctive form of technopolitical communication that was crucial to the role of Pugwash in Informal cross-bloc dialogue about disarmament. This enabled Pugwash to realize its paradoxical vision of working both with and against governments to promote disarmament and was key to its role as both a forum for and actor within the realm of informal diplomacy. It is argued that Pugwash scientists formed the vanguard of what came in the 1960s to be called Track II diplomacy. The relevance of the contemporary concept of Science Diplomacy for Pugwash is discussed. The second analytical focus of the book centers on the internal dynamics of the international Pugwash organization. It is argued that informal modes of working and a code of confidentiality accorded the leadership enormous power and autonomy: this small network of senior figures was able to control the Pugwash agenda and priorities, and to launch diplomatic initiatives beyond the conferences. However, by 1967, competing interests were fueling tensions and instability within Pugwash as it struggled for coherence and direction amid with the political challenges posed by the Vietnam War and European security. This crisis manifest the limits of the Pugwash project and placed its future in doubt.
Author(s): Alison Kraft
Series: SpringerBriefs in History of Science and Technology
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 147
City: Cham
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 Outline of the Book and Background Context
References
2 Moscow, Late 1960: A Breakthrough in East–West Dialogue
2.1 The Path to Moscow: Maintaining Momentum, Raising the Profile of the PCSWA
2.2 Building Goodwill at the House of Friendship
2.3 Three Western Perspectives on the Moscow Conference
2.4 Reflections of the East Coast Elite
2.5 A Tangible Outcome: An East–West Study Group on Disarmament
2.6 Not Playing the Game: The Chinese in Moscow
2.7 A Shift in the Official British View: Reassessing the PCSWA
2.8 Moscow: Watershed and Platform
References
3 Stowe, Vermont, September 1961: Two Contrasting Conferences in America
3.1 A Change of Conference Plans, a Downturn in the Superpower Relationship
3.2 The First Stowe Conference: An Icebreaker Amid Simmering Tensions
3.3 The Second Stowe Conference: Acrimony and Cold War Grandstanding
3.4 The Zuckerman Intervention: The British Change Tack on the PCSWA
3.5 1962: Cambridge and London
References
4 The Pugwash Leadership: Informal Diplomacy Beyond the Conferences, 1962–1967
4.1 October 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis
4.2 Towards a Technical Solution: Pugwash Scientists and a Novel Approach to the Detection of Nuclear Tests
4.3 The Vietnam War: The Reality of Bloc Allegiances Within Pugwash
4.4 Venice 1965/Sopot, 1966: Pugwash Conferences as Cold War Battleground
4.5 June–July 1967: Shuttle Diplomacy Between Hanoi and Washington
4.6 Pugwash and Its Scientists: Pioneering Track II Diplomacy?
References
5 The Politics of European Security: A Step Too Far for Pugwash?
5.1 Pressure to Change the Agenda: European Scientists, European Problems
5.2 The PSGES, 1964–1968: A Bold Experiment?
5.3 Early Signs of Trouble: The Issue of PSGES Autonomy
5.4 Informal Dialogue on Disarmament: The Loss of the Pugwash Monopoly
5.5 Whither Pugwash?
5.6 Ronneby, September 1967: Reasserting Pugwash Tradition, Resetting the Agenda
5.7 1968: The End of the Road for the PSGES
References
6 Conclusion
References
