Professor John Maynard Smith has written an account of a new way of thinking about evolution which has been developed in the last ten years. The theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains the first full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
Author(s): Smith J.M.
Publisher: CUP
Year: 1982
Language: English
Pages: 232
Tags: Биологические дисциплины;Матметоды и моделирование в биологии;
Front cover......Page 1
Title page......Page 3
Copyright......Page 4
Contents......Page 5
Preface......Page 7
1. Introduction......Page 9
2. The basic model......Page 18
A. The Hawk-Dove game......Page 19
B. A review of the assumptions......Page 28
C. An extended model- playing the field......Page 31
3. The war of attrition......Page 36
A. The two-strategy game with diploid inheritance......Page 48
B. Phenotypes concerned with sexual reproduction......Page 51
C. The evolution of anisogamy......Page 55
5. Learning the ESS......Page 62
6. Mixed strategies - I. A classification of mechanisms......Page 76
A. The sex ratio......Page 89
B. Status in flocks......Page 90
C. Dimorphic males......Page 94
D. Ideal free distributions......Page 98
E. Dispersal in a uniform environment......Page 100
8. Asymmetric games - I. Ownership......Page 102
9. Asymmetric games - II. A classification, and some illustrative examples......Page 114
A. Some theoretical considerations......Page 131
B. Parental care......Page 134
C. Games with cyclical dynamics......Page 138
D. Sexual selection......Page 139
E. Games with alternate moves......Page 145
11. Life history strategies and the size game......Page 148
12. Honesty, bargaining and commitment......Page 155
A. Information transfer in animal contests......Page 156
C. Bargaining, territory and - trading......Page 159
D. Commitment......Page 169
13. The evolution of cooperation......Page 175
14. Postscript......Page 182
B. A game with two pure strategies always has an ESS......Page 188
C. The Bishop-Cannings theorem......Page 190
D. Dynamics and stability......Page 191
E. Retaliation......Page 196
F. Games between relatives......Page 199
G. The war of attrition with random rewards......Page 202
H. The ESS when the strategy set is defined by one or more continuous variables......Page 205
I. To find the ESS from a set of recurrence equations......Page 206
J. Asymmetric games with cyclic dynamics......Page 207
K. The reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma......Page 210
Explanation of main terms......Page 212
References......Page 213
Subject index......Page 222
Author index......Page 229
Back cover......Page 232
