This volume includes a series of essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. The long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Michael Smith's essays written over a period of fifteen years and will be of interest to students in philosophy and psychology.
Author(s): Michael Smith
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2004
Language: English
Pages: 402
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
Sources......Page 13
Introduction......Page 15
Part One Moral Psychology......Page 16
Part Two Meta-Ethics......Page 22
REFERENCES......Page 27
Part One Moral Psychology......Page 29
INTRODUCTION......Page 31
1. THE ADVICE MODEL VERSUS THE EXAMPLE MODEL......Page 32
2. THE INTERNALISM REQUIREMENT AND THE IDEA OF BEING FULLY RATIONAL......Page 34
3. THE ADVICE MODEL AND THE APPEAL OF THE INTERNALISM REQUIREMENT......Page 48
CONCLUSION......Page 52
REFERENCES......Page 53
NOTES......Page 54
1. DOES SCHAFER-LANDAU ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE ARGUMENT?......Page 57
2. IS PREMISE (2) FALSE?......Page 60
3. IS PREMISE (4) UNSUPPORTED?......Page 61
4. DO CASES OF INDIRECTION CONSTITUTE A REDUCTIO OF THE INCOHERENCE ARGUMENT?......Page 63
5. IS THE ARGUMENT INVALID?......Page 65
NOTES......Page 68
3 Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will......Page 70
1. NORMATIVE REASONS VERSUS MOTIVATING REASONS......Page 73
2. NORMATIVE REASONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DELIBERATION......Page 76
3. SELF-CONTROL......Page 80
4. HOW TO DISTINGUISH RECKLESSNESS, WEAKNESS, AND COMPULSION......Page 84
REFERENCES......Page 85
NOTES......Page 86
4 Frog and Toad Lose Control......Page 87
1. LOSING CONTROL AS INSTRUMENTAL IRRATIONALITY......Page 88
2. LOSING CONTROL AS A LACK OF ORTHONOMY......Page 89
3. HOW TO EXERCISE SELF-CONTROL......Page 92
4. INTERPRETING THE END OF THE STORY......Page 95
NOTE......Page 97
5 A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility......Page 98
1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR BELIEF......Page 99
2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVALUATIVE BELIEFS AND DESIRES......Page 106
(i) Brainwashed......Page 112
(ii) Kleptomaniac......Page 113
(iii) Pre-emptive Agent......Page 114
(iv) Willingly Addicted......Page 117
4. A COMPARISON......Page 119
5. CONCLUSION......Page 123
NOTES......Page 124
6 Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion......Page 128
1. RATIONAL CAPACITIES AND BELIEF......Page 130
2. RATIONAL CAPACITIES AND DESIRE......Page 142
CONCLUSION......Page 147
REFERENCES......Page 148
NOTE......Page 149
7 On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit......Page 150
NOTES......Page 157
8 Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story......Page 160
1. HUMEANISM......Page 161
2. MOTIVATING REASONS......Page 164
3. THE NORMATIVE STORY......Page 166
REFERENCES......Page 167
9 The Possibility of Philosophy of Action......Page 169
1. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY EMOTIONS......Page 172
2. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY FEELINGS OF FRIENDSHIP......Page 175
3. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY BELIEFS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF ACTIONS......Page 177
4. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY THE EXERCISE OF SELF-CONTROL......Page 184
5. ACTIONS EXPLAINED BY FACTS ABOUT WHAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO DO......Page 188
REFERENCES......Page 190
NOTE......Page 191
Part Two Meta-Ethics......Page 193
MORAL REALISM VERSUS NIHILISM VERSUS EXPRESSIVISM......Page 195
AN INITIAL DIFFICULTY......Page 196
MINIMALISM......Page 198
THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH MINIMALISM......Page 199
EXPRESSIVISM AND INTERNALISM......Page 202
NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 204
THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 206
NON-NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 207
THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT, NIHILISM, AND EXPRESSIVISM......Page 208
THE NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST’S FIRST RESPONSE TO THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 210
THE NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST’S SECOND RESPONSE TO THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT......Page 213
EXTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 215
INTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISM......Page 216
SHOULD AN INTERNALIST NATURALISTIC MORAL REALIST BE A RELATIVIST?......Page 218
REFERENCES......Page 220
11 Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?......Page 222
1. A TRIVIALIZING DEFINITION OF “NATURAL”......Page 223
2. A BETTER DEFINITION OF “NATURAL”......Page 224
3. A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON THE CLASS OF NATURAL PROPERTIES......Page 227
4. DO WE NEED TO ADD A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON THE CLASS OF NATURAL PROPERTIES?......Page 232
5. THE SUPERVENIENCE THESIS AND THE FACT/VALUE GAP......Page 236
6. SUPERVENIENCE AS THE DENIAL THAT EVALUATIVE CLAIMS CAN BE BARELY TRUE......Page 239
7. METAPHYSICS VERSUS EPISTEMOLOGY......Page 243
NOTES......Page 245
1. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY......Page 248
2. MCDOWELL’S REJECTION OF THE ERROR THEORY......Page 249
3. MCDOWELL ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF COLOUR......Page 251
4. ARE VALUES OBJECTIVE IN MCDOWELL’S SENSE?......Page 257
5. MACKIE ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUE......Page 263
6. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY AGAIN......Page 267
NOTES......Page 269
13 In Defence of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord......Page 273
I. WHAT IS THE MORAL PROBLEM?......Page 274
II. TWO KINDS OF REASON......Page 276
III. THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 277
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 279
V. USING THE ANALYSIS TO EXPLAIN THE PRACTICALITY OF BELIEFS ABOUT NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 287
VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE PRACTICALITY OF BELIEFS ABOUT NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 288
VII. USING THE ANALYSIS TO EXPLAIN THE OBJECTIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS......Page 293
VIII. USING THE ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE REASONS TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF MORAL REQUIREMENTS......Page 294
IX. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF MORAL REQUIREMENTS......Page 295
X. CONCLUSION......Page 305
NOTES......Page 307
14 Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value......Page 311
1. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND COGNITIVISM......Page 312
2. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND RELATIVISM......Page 319
3. THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY AND REALISM......Page 326
NOTES......Page 329
15 Internalism’s Wheel......Page 332
I. EXPRESSIVISM......Page 333
II. SPEAKER RELATIVISM......Page 336
III. HARMAN’S MORAL RELATIVISM......Page 340
IV. THE NON-RELATIVE VERSION OF THE DISPOSITIONAL THEORY OF VALUE......Page 345
V. MORAL PLATONISM......Page 348
VI. REASSESSMENT......Page 351
NOTES......Page 353
16 Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation......Page 357
1. THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT......Page 358
2. THE ROLE OF THE THREE FEATURES IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION ON THE BASIS OF VALUES......Page 361
3. HOW A COGNITIVIST CAN MAKE ROOM FOR THE THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT AND ACCOMMODATE THE DIFFERENT ROLES THAT THEY PLAY IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION......Page 363
4. CAN A NON-COGNITIVIST MAKE ROOM FOR THE THREE FEATURES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGEMENT AND ACCOMMODATE THE DIFFERENT ROLES THAT THEY PLAY IN THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION?......Page 368
CONCLUSION......Page 371
NOTE......Page 372
17 Ethics and the A Priori: A Modern Parable......Page 373
NOTE......Page 394
Index......Page 395
