Author(s): Stephen Morris
Year: 2010
Language: English
Pages: 446
The Origins of State Capacity......Page 5
Basic Model Setup......Page 6
Individual Incomes and Utility......Page 7
Constraints on Government......Page 8
Taxation and Spending on Public Goods......Page 9
Legal Protection......Page 10
State Capacity Choices......Page 11
Implications......Page 12
Correlations in International Data......Page 13
Growth......Page 14
Conflict and State Capacity......Page 15
Conflict and Takeover......Page 16
Preliminaries......Page 17
Redistributive States......Page 18
Investment in State Capacity......Page 20
Implications......Page 23
State Capacity, Distortions, and Income......Page 24
A Simple Two-Factor Economy......Page 25
The Role of Taxation......Page 26
An Investment Trap for Fiscal Capacity?......Page 27
Implications......Page 28
Final Remarks......Page 29
Appendix......Page 30
References......Page 34
Author's Addresses......Page 36
Introduction......Page 37
Newspaper Text and Characteristics......Page 41
Newspaper Circulation and Consumer Characteristics......Page 43
Measuring Slant......Page 44
Selecting Phrases for Analysis......Page 45
Mapping Phrases to Ideology......Page 48
Consumer Problem......Page 50
Firm Problem......Page 51
Discussion......Page 52
Demand Parameters......Page 53
Supply Parameters......Page 54
Evidence on the Demand for Slant......Page 55
Does Consumer Ideology Affect Slant?......Page 58
Does Ownership Affect Slant?......Page 60
Implications of the Model......Page 61
Ideology of Local Reporters and Editors......Page 64
Conclusions......Page 66
Mechanics of Congressional Record......Page 67
Mechanics of Newspaper Searches......Page 68
References......Page 69
Author's Addresses......Page 73
Introduction......Page 74
The Model......Page 80
Incentive Compatibility and Limited Liability......Page 84
A Heuristic Derivation......Page 87
The Verification Theorem......Page 94
Firm Size Dynamics......Page 98
Optimality of Maximal Risk Prevention......Page 103
Nonconstant Returns to Scale......Page 105
Empirical Implications......Page 106
Conclusion......Page 108
Appendix: Sketches of Proofs......Page 109
References......Page 116
Author's Addresses......Page 119
Introduction......Page 120
Moment Inequality Model......Page 125
Test Statistics......Page 126
Form of the Test Statistics......Page 127
Test Statistic Assumptions......Page 129
Description of the GMS Method......Page 130
Step-by-Step Calculation of GMS Tests and CIs......Page 135
Assumptions......Page 137
Asymptotic Size Results......Page 138
GMS Model Specification Tests......Page 139
Plug-in Asymptotic Confidence Sets......Page 140
Local Alternative Power Comparisons......Page 141
Power Against Distant Alternatives......Page 148
Preliminary Estimation of Identified Parameters......Page 149
Experimental Design......Page 150
Simulation Results......Page 151
Test Statistic Assumptions......Page 153
Alternative Parametrization and Dependent Observations......Page 154
References......Page 156
Author's Addresses......Page 158
Introduction......Page 159
Identification......Page 160
Information......Page 162
References......Page 167
Author's Addresses......Page 168
Introduction......Page 169
Equivalence With a Multiple Testing Problem......Page 172
Single-Step Control of the Familywise Error Rate......Page 173
Step-Down Control of the Familywise Error Rate......Page 174
A Subsampling Construction......Page 175
Uniform Consistency in Level......Page 181
Confidence Regions for Functions of the Identified Set......Page 183
Empirical Illustration......Page 186
Simulation Results......Page 191
Auxiliary Results......Page 193
Technical Details for Example 2.1......Page 196
Technical Details for Remark 2.7......Page 199
Technical Details for Example 2.3......Page 203
References......Page 210
Author's Addresses......Page 211
Introduction......Page 212
Benchmark Model: Choosing a Project......Page 217
Independent Payoffs and alpha=0......Page 225
Exponential Distribution for v......Page 226
Poisson Distribution for the Number of Projects......Page 227
Incentives to Find a Project......Page 228
Paying for a Good Project......Page 231
A More Complex Delegation Scheme......Page 233
Conclusions......Page 237
Appendix......Page 238
References......Page 242
Author's Addresses......Page 243
Introduction......Page 244
Model Description......Page 248
Markovian Equilibrium......Page 250
Continuous-Time Approximation......Page 254
Continuous-Time Equilibrium......Page 258
Conclusions......Page 260
Appendix......Page 261
References......Page 281
Author's Addresses......Page 282
Introduction......Page 283
Example......Page 285
Model......Page 287
Results......Page 290
Public Monitoring......Page 293
Participation and Liability......Page 296
Literature......Page 297
Appendix: Proofs......Page 299
References......Page 305
Author's Addresses......Page 306
Introduction......Page 307
The Model......Page 310
Equilibrium......Page 311
Generic Existence of Recursive Equilibria......Page 314
Existence of Simple Markov Equilibrium......Page 316
Some Properties of the Wealth Differentials......Page 317
Proof of Theorem 1......Page 319
Perturbation Analysis......Page 320
G=1......Page 323
G>1......Page 324
Extensions......Page 330
Appendix......Page 332
References......Page 344
Author's Addresses......Page 345
Introduction......Page 346
The Model......Page 347
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)......Page 349
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009)......Page 352
Appendix A: Notation......Page 354
Some Results for Linear Functionals......Page 355
Finite Additive EU Representation and Some Preliminary Results......Page 357
Finishing the Proof of Sufficiency......Page 360
Appendix C: Counterexample......Page 371
References......Page 372
Author's Addresses......Page 373
Introduction......Page 374
Nonparametric Selection Model and Our Assumptions......Page 375
The Policy Relevant Treatment Effect......Page 376
Review of PRTE......Page 377
PRTE as a Function of Proposed Policy Changes......Page 378
Marginal Policy Changes......Page 379
Identification......Page 382
Issues in Estimation......Page 384
The Average Marginal Treatment Effect......Page 385
Applying the Analysis to Data......Page 387
Summary and Conclusions......Page 389
References......Page 390
Author's Addresses......Page 391
Introduction......Page 392
Basic Setup......Page 394
Sufficient Conditions for Geometric beta-Mixing......Page 395
Sufficient Conditions for Geometric rho-Mixing......Page 399
References......Page 405
Author's Addresses......Page 407
Membership and Circulation......Page 410
Fellows......Page 414
New Econometric Society Journals......Page 416
A Final Note......Page 418
2008 Accounts......Page 419
Membership and Institutional Subscription Rates......Page 422
Investments......Page 424
