With stocks reduced, and plans revised, relations between states with nuclear arsenals have been transformed after the Cold War. However, Patrick Morgan argues that these changes have not been accompanied by great advances in our knowledge of whether and how deterrence works. He accordingly explores the state of deterrence theory and its continuing relevance under conditions of nuclear proliferation, collective security organizations, and a revolution in military affairs.
Author(s): Patrick M. Morgan
Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2003
Language: English
Pages: 359
Tags: Международные отношения;Международные отношения;
0521822572......Page 1
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 13
Abbreviations and acronyms......Page 15
Preface......Page 17
The origins of Cold War deterrence......Page 23
Severe conflict......Page 30
The assumption of rationality......Page 33
The concept of a retaliatory threat......Page 35
The concept of unacceptable damage......Page 36
The idea of credibility......Page 37
The problem of stability......Page 42
The core political/policy debates......Page 44
Deterrence, deterrence theory, and the end of the Cold War......Page 48
Conclusion......Page 63
2 Deterrence and rationality......Page 64
Rationality and the conception of deterrence......Page 66
Inconsistencies......Page 68
Why associate deterrence with rationality?......Page 80
Rationality and deterrence in practice......Page 87
Rationality and the theory revisited......Page 89
Conclusion......Page 100
3 General deterrence......Page 102
Variants of general deterrence......Page 109
General deterrence and the stability problem......Page 115
General deterrence and the credibility problem......Page 123
Thinking about what makes for success......Page 127
Conclusion......Page 136
4 Testing, testing, one...two...three......Page 138
Specifying what is to be explained......Page 139
Offering a theory......Page 141
Operationalization......Page 142
Developing a sample or population......Page 145
Evidence on a grand scale......Page 151
Rationality again......Page 155
Are states vulnerable to the same deficiencies?......Page 160
Do states display the same deficiencies in deterrence situations?......Page 162
An evaluation......Page 170
Doing it by the numbers......Page 174
Conclusion......Page 186
Collective actors......Page 194
General deterrence......Page 197
Immediate deterrence......Page 200
Collective actor advantages......Page 211
Further implications......Page 212
Preliminary evidence......Page 214
Conclusion......Page 223
Revolutions in military affairs......Page 225
Technological changes......Page 230
New social and organizational elements......Page 234
New strategy......Page 235
A revolution?......Page 239
The revolution in military affairs and deterrence......Page 240
Offense versus defense......Page 246
The critics......Page 253
Possible responses......Page 257
Conclusion......Page 259
Deterrence in the Cold War era......Page 260
The post-Cold War era......Page 264
Deterrence among great powers......Page 269
Deterrence in the global management of security......Page 277
Deterrence and rogue states......Page 291
Deterrence among states other than great powers......Page 298
Deterrence in intrastate conflicts......Page 301
Conclusion......Page 304
8 Some conclusions......Page 307
References......Page 316
Index of names......Page 346
Index of subjects......Page 351
