Deflating Logical Consequence

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Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model‐theoretic or proof‐theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth.

Author(s): Lionel Shapiro
Publisher: The Philosophical Quarterly
Year: 2011

Language: English
Pages: 320–342

Contents
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Issue Table of Contents
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 243 (April 2011) pp. 225-446
Front Matter http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012894?origin=JSTOR-pdf USING MEREOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES TO SUPPORT METAPHYSICS [pp. 225-246] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012895?origin=JSTOR-pdf IS THERE COLLECTIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE? ARGUMENTS FROM EXPLANATION [pp. 247-269] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012896?origin=JSTOR-pdf `CHOCOLATE' AND OTHER KIND TERMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM [pp. 270-292] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012897?origin=JSTOR-pdf HOW TO USE A CONCEPT YOU REJECT [pp. 293-319] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012898?origin=JSTOR-pdf DEFLATING LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE [pp. 320-342] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012899?origin=JSTOR-pdf KORSGAARD'S CONSTITUTIVE ARGUMENTS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL REASON [pp. 343-362] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012900?origin=JSTOR-pdf MACROSCOPIC ONTOLOGY IN EVERETTIAN QUANTUM MECHANICS [pp. 363-382] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012901?origin=JSTOR-pdf DISCUSSIONS
PERCEPTUAL CONTENT AND SENSORIMOTOR EXPECTATIONS [pp. 383-391] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012902?origin=JSTOR-pdf VIOLATING REQUIREMENTS, EXITING FROM REQUIREMENTS, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY [pp. 392-399] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012903?origin=JSTOR-pdf CRITICAL STUDY
AFTER TRUTH GIVES WAY [pp. 400-409] http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23012904?origin=JSTOR-pdf BOOK REVIEWS