Defensive Federalism: Protecting Territorial Minorities from the “Tyranny of the Majority”

Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Notes On Contributors
1 Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Two Faces of the Territorial Tyranny of the Majority – A Revised Federal ...
1 Introduction: Protection of Self-Government and the Tyranny of the Majority
2 Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Liberal-Democratic Face of the “Tyranny of the Majority”
3 Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Territorial Face of the “Tyranny of the Majority”
3.1 Changes in the World
3.2 Changes in Federal Analysis: Political Theory and Comparative Studies
3.2.1 Two Classical Federal Traditions
3.2.2 Later Analyses (Since the 1990s)
4 Defensive Federalism in a Nutshell
5 Contributions in this Volume
Notes
References
2 Consociational Executives: Power-Sharing Governments Between Inclusion and Functionality
1 Introduction
2 Inclusion and Functionality: Two Sides of the Same Coin?
3 Variations in Consociational Executive Design
3.1 Executive Formation
3.1.1 Cabinet Entry Rules
3.1.2 Portfolio Allocation Rules
3.1.3 Formateur Rules
3.1.4 Investiture Votes
3.2 Executive Function
3.2.1 Decision-Making Rules in Cabinet
3.2.2 Veto Rights
3.2.3 Autonomy Provisions
4 Conclusion
Notes
References
3 Exclusive Powers and Self-Governed Entities: A Tool for Defensive Federalism?
1 Introduction
2 Instruments of Power Allocation as a Hub for Changes in Power Relations
2.1 Power Relations and Institutional Hubs for Change
2.2 Shared Powers: Framework Powers
2.3 Shared Powers: Concurrent Powers
2.4 Exclusive Powers
3 Exclusive Powers and Its Side Effects
3.1 Exclusivity as a Principle of Defensive Federalism (?)
3.2 Side Effects of the Exclusivity Principle
3.2.1 Fragmentation
3.2.2 Remedying Legal Constructs
4 Moderating the Centralising Effects of Concurrent Powers
4.1 Involvement of the SNEs in Central Decision-Making
4.2 Involvement of the SNEs in the Adjudication of Federalism Disputes
4.3 The Subsidiarity Principle
5 Conclusion
Note
4 The Limits of Self Rule Without Shared Rule
1 Introduction
2 Conceptualising Self Rule and Shared Rule
3 Does Shared Rule Threaten Or Protect Self Rule?
4 Self Rule and Shared Rule in the UK
4.1 Devolution and Self Rule
4.2 Sovereignty and the Sewel Convention
4.3 Shared Rule
4.4 Devolution and Brexit: The Vulnerability of Self Rule Without Shared Rule
5 Conclusion: Does Shared Rule Defend Or Constrain Self-Government?
Note
References
5 Constitutional Asymmetries as an (In)effective Counterbalancing Tool in Protecting Territorial Self-Government?
1 Introduction
2 Territory and Identity as the (Un)Breakable Bond
3 Constitutional Asymmetry as an Alternative to Maximal Claims
4 Models for the Protection of Asymmetrical Territorial Self-Government
5 Constitutional Asymmetries as a Counterbalancing Tool
6 Why Recurring Symmetrisation Trends Matter?
7 Effectiveness of Constitutional Asymmetries: Identifying Problems
8 Effectiveness of Constitutional Asymmetries: Identifying Safeguards
9 Conclusions
Notes
References
6 Political Asymmetries: “Opting In and Opting Out” Decision-Making Procedures in Canada
1 Introduction
2 “Opting Out/Opting In”
3 “Defensive Federalism” in Canada
4 Canada as Plurinational
5 “Defensive Federalism” Mechanisms in Canada
5.1 Central Political Institutions
5.2 Federalism
6 Origins of Opting Out/Opting In Procedures in Canada
6.1 Building the Canadian Nation
6.2 The Quiet Revolution: Building the Quebec Nation
6.3 “Opting Out” of Federal Spending Programs
6.4 “Opting Out” of Federal Regulatory Programs
7 Constitutionalising Opting Out
7.1 The Victoria Charter
7.2 Pepin-Robarts Task Force
7.3 Beige Paper of Quebec Liberal Party
8 The Constitution Act, 1982
9 Post-1982 Efforts to Constitutionalise “Opting Out” From Federal Programmes
9.1 The Meech Lake Accord
9.2 The Charlottetown Accord
9.3 Quebeckers: Our Way of Being Canadian
10 “Opting Out/Opting In” Procedures in Intergovernmental Relations
10.1 Distinct Society’s Resolution
11 Assessing the Canadian Experience With “Opting In/Opting Out” Procedures
12 Protecting Self-Government
12.1 The Application of “Opting Out” Procedures May Be Quite Restricted
12.2 “Opting Out” Procedures May Have Conditions That Limit Government Autonomy
12.3 “Opting Out” Procedures May Depend On the Central Government’s Continued Acquiescence
12.4 Central State Officials May Oppose “Opting Out” Procedures
12.5 Inefficiencies
12.6 “Opting Out” May Trigger Greater Public Opposition When Applied to Rights Rather Than Programmes
13 Recognition and Accommodation of Minority Nations
13.1 “Opting Out” and Canadian Plurinationalism
13.2 The Functioning of Central Political Institutions
13.3 Democratic Accountability
13.4 State Nationalism
13.5 Governments That Do Not Represent “Minority Nations” May Seek to Take Advantage of “Opting Out” Procedures
Notes
Bibliography
7 Agreeing to Disagree: Federal Veto Powers in Switzerland
1 Introduction
2 Federalism and Veto Powers: What We Know So Far
2.1 Federalism, Territorial Vetoes and Minority Protection
2.2 Veto Players, Bargaining Logics and Their Effects
3 Territorial Vetoes in Switzerland
3.1 Overview
3.2 Cantonal Veto Powers: Always, for All, Cooperative
3.3 Defending Territorial Minorities?
3.4 Comparative Assessment
4 Concluding Discussion: Three Theses On Federal Veto Powers
Notes
References
8 The Role of Constitutional Judges in Protecting Territorial Self-Government
1 Introduction
2 Constitutional Courts and Territorial Self-Government
3 Constitutional Judges Protecting Territorial Self-Government? The Distribution of Powers as Litmus Test
3.1 Exclusive Subnational Powers
3.2 Concurrent Subnational Powers
3.3 Suspension of Subnational Powers
4 Conclusion
Notes
References
9 The Defensiveness of Nation States: Preventing Majority Domination in the European Union
1 Introduction
2 The EU and Defensive Federalism
3 The Puzzle of Sovereignty in Europe
4 Preventing Majority Domination in the EU
Notes
References
10 Federal Chiaroscuros: Concluding Remarks
Index