Globalization creates lucrative opportunities for traffickers of drugs, dirty money, blood diamonds, weapons, and other contraband. Effective countermeasures require international collaboration, but what if some countries suffer while others profit from illicit trade? Only international institutions with strong compliance mechanisms can ensure that profiteers will not dodge their law enforcement responsibilities. However, the effectiveness of these institutions may also depend on their ability to flexibly adjust to fast-changing environments. Combining international legal theory and transaction cost economics, this book develops a novel, comprehensive framework which reveals the factors that determine the optimal balance between institutional credibility and flexibility. The author tests this rational design paradigm on four recent anti-trafficking efforts: narcotics, money laundering, conflict diamonds, and small arms. She sheds light on the reasons why policymakers sometimes adopt suboptimal design solutions and unearths a nascent trend toward innovative forms of international cooperation which transcend the limitations of national sovereignty.
Author(s): Christine Jojarth PhD
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2009
Language: English
Pages: 343
Half-Title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Figures......Page 9
Tables......Page 10
Abbreviations......Page 12
Preface and acknowledgments......Page 15
1 Introduction......Page 19
1.1 Crime, war, and global trafficking......Page 20
1.1.1 Criminal wars......Page 21
1.1.2 The war against crime......Page 23
1.1.3 Globalization and the transnationalization of crime......Page 24
1.2 Explaining institutional design......Page 27
1.3 Methodology......Page 33
1.4 Outline......Page 36
2 The concept of legalization......Page 38
2.1.1 Credibility: a central problem of the state......Page 40
Domestic credibility......Page 41
International credibility......Page 42
2.1.2 The downside of high levels of legalization......Page 44
2.1.3 Hard or soft legalization: a difficult trade-off......Page 46
2.2 The three dimensions of the concept of legalization......Page 47
2.2.1 Obligation......Page 48
Legal bindingness......Page 49
Compliance mechanisms......Page 55
2.2.2 Precision......Page 59
Determinacy......Page 61
Coherence......Page 63
2.2.3 Delegation......Page 64
Independence......Page 67
Centralization......Page 69
2.3.2 Obligation and delegation......Page 74
2.3.3 Precision and delegation......Page 75
3 Problem constellation......Page 77
3.1 Competing theories of institutional design......Page 78
3.1.1 Power-based theories of institutional design......Page 79
3.1.2 Domestic politics-based theories of institutional design......Page 81
3.1.3 Functionalist theories of institutional design......Page 83
3.2.1 Back to the roots of functionalist design theory......Page 85
3.2.2 Beyond the functionalist paradigm......Page 87
3.3.1 Asset specificity......Page 90
Conceptualization......Page 91
Operationalization......Page 93
Conceptualization......Page 98
Operationalization......Page 100
Conceptualization......Page 103
Operationalization......Page 104
3.4 Interaction between problem constellation variables......Page 107
4 Narcotic drugs: UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances......Page 110
4.1.1 Drugs between crime and war......Page 111
4.1.2 International initiatives......Page 115
4.1.3 The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances......Page 118
4.2 Problem constellation......Page 119
Costs......Page 120
Benefits......Page 124
Asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits......Page 127
Governance incapacity......Page 129
Relative reliance on governmental monitoring......Page 131
4.2.3 Environmental uncertainty......Page 132
Innovativeness of criminal field......Page 133
4.2.4 Summary and implications for institutional design......Page 135
4.3.1 Obligation......Page 137
Legal bindingness......Page 138
Compliance mechanisms......Page 139
Determinacy......Page 143
Coherence......Page 145
4.3.3 Delegation......Page 146
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime......Page 147
United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs......Page 148
International Narcotics Control Board......Page 150
4.3.4 Summary of actual institutional design and implications for model validity......Page 152
5 Money laundering: the Financial Action Task Force and its Forty Recommendations......Page 157
5.1.1 From drug money to terrorist finance: the launderette’s many different washing cycles......Page 158
5.1.2 International initiatives dealing with money laundering......Page 160
5.1.3 Overview of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force......Page 163
5.2.1 Asset specificity......Page 166
Costs......Page 167
Benefits......Page 170
Asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits......Page 173
Governance incapacity......Page 175
Relative reliance on governmental monitoring......Page 176
Industry opacity......Page 177
Novelty of policy issue......Page 178
Innovativeness of criminal field......Page 179
5.3 Degree of legalization......Page 183
Legal bindingness......Page 184
Compliance mechanisms......Page 185
Determinacy......Page 189
Coherence......Page 191
Centralization......Page 192
Independence......Page 193
5.3.4 Summary of actual institutional design and implications for model validity......Page 195
6 Conflict diamonds: the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme......Page 199
6.1.1 Diamonds between crime and war......Page 200
6.1.2 Containing conflict diamonds: smart sanctions and their limits......Page 204
6.1.3 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme......Page 208
6.2 Problem constellation......Page 209
Benefits......Page 210
Costs......Page 215
Asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits......Page 216
6.2.2 Behavioral uncertainty......Page 218
Industry opacity......Page 219
Reliance on governmental monitoring......Page 221
Novelty of the policy issue......Page 222
Innovativeness of policy field......Page 223
Summary and implications for institutional design......Page 224
6.3.1 Obligation......Page 226
Compliance mechanisms......Page 227
Determinacy......Page 231
Coherence......Page 232
Centralization......Page 233
Independence......Page 234
6.3.4 Summary of actual institutional design and implications for model validity......Page 238
7 Small arms and light weapons: the United Nations Program of Action......Page 239
7.1.1 Small arms and light weapons between crime and war......Page 240
7.1.2 International initiatives......Page 244
7.1.3 The UN Program of Action......Page 248
7.2.1 Asset specificity......Page 251
Costs......Page 252
Benefits......Page 257
Asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits......Page 260
Governance incapacity......Page 262
Relative reliance on governmental monitoring......Page 263
Industry opacity......Page 266
Novelty of policy issue......Page 267
Innovativeness of criminal field......Page 269
7.2.4 Summary and implications for institutional design......Page 270
Legal bindingness......Page 273
Compliance mechanisms......Page 274
Determinacy......Page 275
7.3.3 Delegation......Page 277
Independence......Page 278
Centralization......Page 280
7.3.4 Summary of actual institutional design and implications for model validity......Page 281
8 Conclusion......Page 285
8.1.1 Degree of legalization......Page 286
8.1.2 Problem constellation......Page 287
8.2.1 Bounded rationality......Page 289
8.2.2 Isomorphism......Page 292
8.3 Instrumentality......Page 296
8.3.1 Power......Page 297
8.3.2 Domestic politics......Page 300
8.4 The step beyond: bounded rationality and multi-purpose instrumentality......Page 303
References......Page 305
Index......Page 337
