Do international human rights treaties constrain governments from repressing their populations and violating rights? In Contentious Compliance, Courtenay R. Conrad and Emily Hencken Ritter present a new theory of human rights treaty effects founded on the idea that governments repress as part of a domestic conflict with potential or actual dissidents. By introducing dissent like peaceful protests, strikes, boycotts, or direct violent attacks on government, their theory improves understanding of when states will violate rights-and when international laws will work to protect people. Conrad and Ritter investigate the effect of international human rights treaties on domestic conflict and ultimately find that treaties improve human rights outcomes by altering the structure of conflict between political authorities and potential dissidents. A powerful, careful, and empirically sophisticated rejoinder to the critics of international human rights law, Contentious Compliance offers new insights and analyses that will reshape our thinking on law and political violence.
Author(s): Courtenay R. Conrad, Emily Hencken Ritter
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2019
Language: English
Pages: 288
Tags: International Law And Human Rights, Human rights, Treaties, Political Persecution, Dissenters: Legal Status, Laws, etc, Government: Resistance To, Protest Movements
Cover......Page 1
Contentious Compliance......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
Acknowledgments......Page 12
Plates......Page 22
1. Do Human Rights Treaties Protect Rights?......Page 24
1.1 Treaties And The Incentive To Violate Human Rights......Page 28
1.2 Contentious Compliance: The Argument......Page 30
1.3 Contributions To Science And Practice......Page 35
1.3.1 Human Rights Treaties and Repression......Page 40
1.3.2 Human Rights Treaties and Dissent......Page 43
1.3.3 Human Rights Treaties and the Law......Page 46
1.3.4 Human Rights Treaties and Advocacy......Page 48
1.4 Organization Of The Book......Page 49
Part I A Theory of Conflict and Treaty Constraint......Page 52
2. A Model of Conflict and Constraint......Page 54
2.1 Institutions, Conflict, And Decision-Making......Page 57
2.2 A Model Of Treaty Obligations, Courts, And Conflict......Page 59
2.2.1 The Effects and Costs of Repression and Dissent......Page 62
2.2.2 The Expected Value of Power and the Consequences of Policy Control......Page 68
2.2.3 Institutional Consequences for Government Repression......Page 72
2.2.4 Summary of Theoretical Assumptions......Page 79
2.3 Equilibrium Behavior......Page 80
2.4.1 Proof of Equilibrium Behavior......Page 82
2.4.2.1 Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3......Page 83
2.4.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4......Page 85
3. Empirical Implications of Treaty Effects on Conflict......Page 86
3.1 Establishing The Baseline: Conflict Behaviors In The Absence Of A Treaty......Page 87
3.2 A Formal Comparison: Conflict Behaviors Under A Human Rights Treaty......Page 93
3.3 Understanding Treaty Effects......Page 96
3.4 Commitment To Human Rights Treaties In Expectation Of Constraint......Page 101
3.5 Summarizing The Theory......Page 106
Part II An Empirical Investigation of Conflict & Treaty Constraint......Page 108
4. Analyzing the Effect of Treaties on Repression and Dissent......Page 110
4.1 Moving From Concepts To Measures......Page 112
4.1.1 International Human Rights Treaty Obligation......Page 113
4.1.2 Government Repression......Page 116
4.1.3 Mobilized Dissent......Page 122
4.1.4 Expected Value of Leader Retention......Page 124
4.1.5 Probability of Domestic Litigation Consequences......Page 127
4.1.6 Operational Hypotheses......Page 129
4.2.1 Counterfactual Comparison......Page 130
4.2.2 Selection Bias......Page 133
4.2.3 The Solution: A Two-Stage Treatment Estimator......Page 137
4.2.4 Estimating Simultaneous Conflict Behaviors......Page 140
5. Substantive Empirical Results: Government Repression......Page 142
5.1 Presenting Results Based On Counterfactuals......Page 144
5.2 Effect Of Cat Obligation On Government Repression......Page 148
5.2.1 Additional Test: Effect of OPCAT on Government Torture......Page 152
5.3 Effect Of Iccpr Obligation On Government Repression......Page 156
5.3.1 Additional Test: Effect of ICCPR on Political Imprisonment......Page 159
5.4 Effect Of Cedaw Obligation On Government Repression......Page 162
5.4.1 Additional Test: Effect of CEDAW onWomen's Social Rights......Page 165
5.5 Summary Of Findings: Government Repression......Page 168
5.6 Appendix 2: Empirical Results For Government Repression......Page 171
6. Substantive Empirical Results: Mobilized Dissent......Page 174
6.1 Levels Of Analysis & The Study Of Mobilized Dissent......Page 177
6.2 Effect Of Cat Obligation On Mobilized Dissent......Page 180
6.2.1 Additional Test: Alternative Measure of Leader Security......Page 185
6.3 Effect Of Iccpr Obligation On Mobilized Dissent......Page 189
6.3.1 Additional Test: Alternative Exclusion Restriction Specification......Page 193
6.4 Effect Of Cedaw Obligation On Mobilized Dissent......Page 197
6.4.1 Additional Test: Alternative Measure of Mobilized Dissent......Page 199
6.5 Summary Of Findings: Mobilized Dissent......Page 204
6.6 Appendix 3: Empirical Results For Mobilized Dissent......Page 206
Part III Conclusion......Page 214
7. Conclusion: Human Rights Treaties (Sometimes) Protect Rights......Page 216
7.1 A (More) Complete Picture Of Domestic Conflict......Page 219
7.1.1 Human Rights Treaties and Conflict......Page 220
7.1.2 Treaty Constraint Despite Selection......Page 222
7.2 The Effect Of Treaty Status On Popular Expectations......Page 228
7.2.1 The Conditioning Effect of Political Survival......Page 232
7.3 Extending The Theory......Page 237
7.3.1 Variance in Treaty Effectiveness......Page 240
7.3.2 Other Domestic Institutional Constraints......Page 241
7.3.3 Other International Institutional Constraints......Page 243
7.4 A Final Note On Policy Prescriptions......Page 244
Part IV Appendix......Page 248
A4.1 Government Repression......Page 250
A4.2 Mobilized Dissent......Page 252
Bibliography......Page 254
Index......Page 274
