This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.
Author(s): Adrian Van Deemen, Agnieszka Rusinowska (eds.)
Series: Theory and Decision Library C: 43
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2010
Language: English
Pages: 281
Tags: Economic Theory; Public Finance & Economics
Front Matter....Pages i-xiv
From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result....Pages 1-16
The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists....Pages 17-29
Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models....Pages 31-56
Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules....Pages 57-68
Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making....Pages 69-83
Rights Revisited, and Limited....Pages 85-97
Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes....Pages 99-109
Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof....Pages 111-123
Making (Non-standard) Choices....Pages 125-136
Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages: An Intuitive Approach....Pages 137-150
Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the European Union....Pages 151-167
Stabilizing Power Sharing....Pages 169-184
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games....Pages 185-209
Networks, Information and Choice....Pages 211-230
Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets....Pages 231-247
Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games....Pages 249-266
