Climate Liberalism examines the potential and limitations of classical-liberal approaches to pollution control and climate change. Some successful environmental strategies, such as the use of catch-shares for fisheries, instream water rights, and tradable emission permits, draw heavily upon the classical liberal intellectual tradition and its emphasis on property rights and competitive markets. This intellectual tradition has been less helpful, to date, in the development or design of climate change policies.
Climate Liberalism aims to help fill the gap in the academic literature examining the extent to which classical-liberal principles, including an emphasis on property rights, decentralized authority and dynamic markets, can inform the debate over climate-change policies. The contributors in this book approach the topic from a range of perspectives and represent multiple academic disciplines. Chapters consider the role of property rights and common-law legal systems in controlling pollution, the extent to which competitive markets backed by legal rules encourage risk minimization and adaptation, and how to identify the sorts of policy interventions that may help address climate change in ways that are consistent with liberal values.
Author(s): Jonathan H. Adler
Series: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 379
City: Cham
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
Conventional Environmental Protection
Classical-Liberal Environmental Protection
The Problem of Pollution
The Climate Challenge
Climate Liberalism
Conclusion
Notes
Pollution and Natural Rights
Introduction
Natural Rights Theory
Pollution and Natural Rights
The Efficiency Objection
The Liberty Objection
Conventionality
The Efficiency Objection, Redux
Conclusion
Notes
Do Libertarians Have Anything Useful to Contribute to Climate Change Policy?
Introduction
The Varieties of Libertarian Environmental and Climate Policies
Libertarian Dissensus
Libertarian Climate Policies
Pure Property-Based Environmental and Climate Policies
Property-Based Plus Limited Government Action
Special Problems of Climate Change for Free Market Environmentalism
Problems for Common-Law Property-Based Solutions
Problems for “Market-Based” Regulatory Instruments
Implications and Conclusion
Notes
Climate Change Adaptation Through the Prism of Individual Rights
Introduction
Property Owners’ Takings Claims Based on Adaptation Regulation
Takings Doctrine in Brief
Inequality, Causation, and Property Owners’ Takings Claims
Governments Suing Energy Companies for Adaptation Costs in Public Nuisance
The Notice/Causation Nexus
Conclusion
Notes
Common Law Tort as a Transitional Regulatory Regime: A New Perspective on Climate Change Litigation
Introduction
Tort Law in the Administrative State: A Dynamic, Information-Forcing, Experimentation Model of Common Law Tort as a Transitional Regulatory Regime
Climate Change Litigation: Laying a Foundation for Experimentation with Adaptation Measures
Conclusion: Common Law Tort as Part of the Future of Environmental Law?
Notes
Libertarianism, Pollution, and the Limits of Court Adjudication
Enforcing Rights
Navigating Indeterminacy
Limited Protections
Path Dependency
Uncertainty
Predictably Limited Protection
Institutional Competencies
Recasting the Judiciary
Focusing on Rights
Conclusion
Notes
Complexities of Climate Governance in Multidimensional Property Regimes
Introduction
Climate Change Indicators
Weather Modification
Wildfire
Siloed Approaches in Interconnected Systems
Unregulated Polluters
Pollution’s Connection to Land
A Theory of Landscape-Level Governance
Stakeholder Collaborations
Negative-Value Resources
Wildfire, A Case Study
Restoring Fire to the Natural Landscape
Conclusion
Notes
Climate Change and Class Actions
What Is a Class Action?
The Classical Liberal Case for Class Actions
Better Incentives
More Independence
Notes
Nature and the Firm
The Firm
The Firm and the Environment
Where Are the Environmental Firms?
The Airshed authority—A Thought Experiment
Firms and Federalism
Conclusion
Notes
Permission, Prohibition, and Dynamism
Economic Dynamism
Political Dynamism and the Open Society
Dynamism as a Social Value
Prohibitions and Permissions
Permissions, Innovation, and the Environment
Conclusion
Notes
Market Solutions to Large Number Environmental Problem-Induced Changes in Risk Distributions
Introduction
Challenges Presented by Changes in Risk Distributions
The Role of Alternative Risk Transfer Mechanisms
The Traditional Insurance Baseline
The Role of Alternative Risk Transfer
Captive Insurance
Catastrophe Bonds
Weather Derivatives
Using ART Methods
Harnessing ARTMs to Incentivize Adaptation
The Entrepreneur’s Role
Policy Options
Notes
A Classical Liberal Case for Target-Consistent Carbon Pricing
Property Rights and Their Limits1
The Role of Government
Friedrich Hayek’s Contributions11
Pricing, Science, and the Future16
The Case for Target-Consistent Pricing
Conclusions
Notes
Climate Change, Political Economy, and the Problem of Comparative Institutions Analysis
Introduction
Comparative Institutions Analysis in Political Economy
Climate Change Governance and Comparative Institutions Analysis
Institutional Options for Climate Change Governance
The Problem of Comparative Evaluation
Modelling to the Rescue?
History to the Rescue?
Like Cases to the Rescue?
Conclusion
Notes
The Social Cost of Carbon, Humility, and Overlapping Consensus on Climate Policy
Introduction and Overview
The Social Cost of Carbon
The Social Cost of a Pollutant: The Basic Idea
The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), and Estimates of the SCC
The SCC-Based Approach to Climate Policy
A Modest Carbon Tax Derived from SCC Estimates as an Alternative to a Pigouvian Tax
Overlapping Consensus, Ecumenical Climate Policy, and the SCC-Based Approach
Ecumenical Climate Policy: How the SCC-Based Approach is Neutral Between Different Reasonable Normative Frameworks
Overlapping Consensus on Climate Policy: How the SCC-Based Approach Can Help Identify a Policy That Is Justifiable to All
Summary of Distinctions Relevant to Evaluating the SCC-Based Approach and Policy Recommendations
Additional Worries About the SCC-Based Approach
Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Because of Overly Pessimistic Assumptions About Technology and Adaptation
Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Given Political Infeasibility and Counterproductive Blowback of Recommended Mitigation
Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Because Domestic SCC Is Only a Fraction of Global SCC
Worry: Too Little Mitigation, Because Worst-Case Scenarios Are Ignored and/or There Is Too Much Pure Time Preference (i.e., Impacts More Than a Century from Now Are Given Little Importance)
Worry: Too Little Mitigation, Because Many Harms Are Not Accounted for, Especially Harm to the Poor, Oppressed, and Most Vulnerable
Worry: Carbon Taxation Is the Wrong Mechanism for Emissions Reductions
Notes
Index
