Wolfgang Spohn, born 1950, is one of the most distinguished analytic philosophers and philosophers of science of Germany, editor-in-chief of Erkenntnis for more than 13 years, author of two books and more than 60 papers covering a wide range: epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, philosophical logic, philosophy of language and mind, and the theory of practical rationality. This collection presents 15 of his most important essays on theoretical philosophy. The centre piece is his uniquely successful theory of the dynamics of belief, tantamount to an account of induction and nowadays widely acknowledged as ‘ranking theory’. Like any account of induction, this theory has deep implications ingeniously elaborated in the papers included. They cover an account of deterministic and also probabilistic causation, initially subjectively relativized, but then objectivized in a projectivistic sense, and an account of explanation and of strict, of ceteris paribus, and of chance laws. They advance a coherentist epistemology, though giving foundationalist intuitions their due, and establish some coherence principles as a priori true, entailing even a weak principle of causality. They finally shed light on concept formation by more broadly embedding the epistemological considerations into the framework of two-dimensional semantics. All this is carried out with formal rigor when feasible.
Author(s): W. Spohn
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 256
Edition: 1
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 385
Contents......Page 12
Preface......Page 7
Introduction......Page 16
Part I: Belief......Page 31
1.1 Introduction......Page 32
1.2 Simple Conditional Functions......Page 35
1.3 A Problem with Simple Conditional Functions......Page 38
1.4 Ordinal Conditional Functions......Page 41
1.5 Conditionalization and Generalized Conditionalization......Page 43
1.6 Independence and Conditional Independence......Page 46
1.7 Connections with Probability Theory......Page 50
1.8 Discussion......Page 51
Part II: Causation......Page 55
2.1 Introduction......Page 56
2.2 The Conceptual and Formal Framework......Page 57
2.3 Direct Causes......Page 61
2.4 The Circumstances of Direct Causes......Page 64
2.5 The Difficulties with Indirect Causation......Page 68
2.6 Causation......Page 77
3.1 Introduction......Page 86
3.2 Variables, Propositions, Time......Page 87
3.3 Induction First......Page 89
3.4 Causation......Page 95
3.5 Redundant Causation......Page 100
3.6 Objectivization......Page 105
4.2 Causal Graphs and Bayesian Nets......Page 109
4.3 About the Causal Import of Bayesian Nets......Page 113
4.4 Actions and Interventions......Page 118
5. Causal Laws Are Objectifi cations of Inductive Schemes......Page 122
5.1 Is Causation Objective?......Page 123
5.2 Induction......Page 125
5.3 Causation......Page 129
5.4 An Explication of Objectification......Page 131
5.5 The Objectification of Induction and Causation......Page 135
5.6 Outlook......Page 142
Part III: Laws......Page 144
6.1 Preparations......Page 145
6.2 Ranking Functions......Page 148
6.3 Laws......Page 151
6.4 Other Things Being Equal, Normal, or Absent......Page 155
6.5 On the Confirmation of Laws......Page 158
6.6 Some Comparative Remarks......Page 160
7.1 Introduction......Page 163
7.2 Ranking Functions......Page 165
7.3 Symmetry and Non-negative Instantial Relevance......Page 169
7.4 Laws......Page 172
7.5 Laws and Enumerative Induction......Page 175
7.6 The Apriority of Lawfulness......Page 180
8.1 Introduction......Page 182
8.2 Chance-Credence Principles......Page 186
8.3 The Admissibility of Historic and Chance Information......Page 190
8.4 The Admissibility of Chance Information and Humean Supervenience......Page 194
8.5 Humean Supervenience......Page 198
8.6 Projection Turns the Principal Principle into a Special Case of the Reflection Principle......Page 201
8.7 Humean Projection......Page 206
8.8 Appendix on Ranking Functions and Deterministic Laws: The Same All Over Again......Page 210
Part IV: Coherence......Page 213
9.1 Introduction......Page 214
9.2 Induction and Causation......Page 215
9.3 Causation and Explanation......Page 220
9.4 Reason and Truth......Page 226
9.5 Explanations and Stable Reasons......Page 232
10.1 Introduction......Page 238
10.2 Reasons......Page 239
10.3 Two Coherence Principles......Page 241
10.4 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Enumerative Induction?......Page 245
10.5 Justifying the Coherence Principles via the Essence of Propositions?......Page 246
10.6 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Consciousness?......Page 247
10.7 Justifying the Coherence Principles via a Theory of Perception......Page 251
11.1 Introduction......Page 256
11.2 Belief, Belief Change, Reasons, and Apriority......Page 257
11.3 Dispositions and Reduction Sentences......Page 260
11.4 A Thesis Concerning the Basis of Empirical Beliefs......Page 262
11.5 Defending the Thesis......Page 264
11.6 The Foundationalist’s Last Resort?......Page 267
Part V: Concepts......Page 269
12.1 Introduction......Page 270
12.2 Beliefs and Reasons......Page 271
12.3 Kant, Kripke, Kaplan and Beliefs A Priori......Page 273
12.4 Disposition Predicates and Reduction Sentences......Page 278
12.5 Normal Conditions and A Priori Reasons......Page 280
12.6 The Categorical Base of a Disposition......Page 283
12.7 Outlook......Page 285
13. The Character of Color Terms: A Materialist View......Page 287
14.1 Introduction......Page 307
14.2 The Problems Specified......Page 309
14.3 How to Define Concepts: A Proposal......Page 315
14.4 Explanations......Page 319
14.5 Individualism Rescued?......Page 326
15. Changing Concepts......Page 331
16.1 The Thesis......Page 336
16.2 Stage Setting......Page 338
16.3 The Dialectical Background of the Thesis......Page 343
16.4 Two Arguments for the Thesis and an Objection......Page 347
16.5 The Method of Sufficiently Fine-Grained Descriptions......Page 354
16.6 Some Afterthoughts......Page 359
Bibliography......Page 361
E......Page 376
K......Page 377
R......Page 378
Z......Page 379
C......Page 380
I......Page 382
P......Page 383
T......Page 384
W......Page 385
