This book advances North Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth, NATO) burden analysis through a decomposition of the political, financial, social, and defense burdens members take on for the institution. The overemphasis of committing a minimum of 2% of member state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense spending, as a proxy indicator of alliance commitment does not properly reflect how commitments reduce risks should Article V be invoked through attack (i.e., 2% is a political & symbolic target adopted by Defense Ministers in 2006 at Riga). Considering defense burdens multi-dimensionally explains why some members overcontribute, as well as, why burden sharing negotiations cause friction among 30 diverse members with differing threats and risks. In creating a comprehensive institutional burden management model and focusing on risks to members, the book explores the weaknesses of major theories on the study and division of collective burdens and institutional assets. It argues that member risks and threats are essential to understanding how burdens are distributed across a set of overlapping institutions within NATO’s structure providing its central goods. The importance of the USA, as a defense underwriter for some, affects negotiations despite its absence from research empirically; new data permit testing the argument (Kavanaugh 2014). This book contributes conceptual innovation and theoretical analysis to advance student, researcher, and policymaker understanding of burden management, strategic bargaining, and defense cooperation. The contribution is a generalizable risk management model of IO burden sharing using NATO as the case for scientific study due to its prominence.
Author(s): Anessa L. Kimball
Series: Canada and International Affairs
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 258
City: Cham
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Policy Pop Out
Acronyms
1 Introduction
Explaining Arrangements Among Sovereign States Providing Collective Goods
NATO—Studying the Burden of Providing Collective Goods for a Club
Book Structure
Notes
References
2 Cooperation, Sharing Defense Burdens and Defense Institutions
Introduction
Cooperation, Coordination, Collaboration—Contracting Institutions
70 Years of a Transatlantic Defense Pact—NATO, a Critical Case for Multimethod Study
Synthesizing Seven Decades of NATO Burden Sharing Research
NATO Under Pressure: Considering Russian Aggression in Ukraine Since February 2022
Finland and Sweden—Joining NATO: Balancing Contributions with Risks
Ukraine’s Chances of “Rich Man’s Clubs”: Requests for EU (& NATO) Membership Offer Risks
Conclusions: Beyond 2%: Why Another Book?
Notes
References
3 Complexity and Burden Sharing: Member Risks and Threats
Introduction
Delegation, Agency, and NATO
Beyond Collective Action Models of Defense
Considering the US as an Underwriter—Defense-Security Agreements and Arms
External Threats—As Motivation for Partner Behavior Within a Club
NATO: Regional and Out-Of-Area Crisis Actor
Comparing Burden Shifts Across Decades, 1999 and 2019; NATO Civilian Budgets
Conclusions—Risks, Threats, and Information
Policy Pop Out 1
Notes
References
4 ‘Measuring’ NATO Member Defense Burdens—Beyond 2%
Introduction
Discord, Disagreement, and ‘NATO Defense Spending’ Targets
Physical Capital (Partner Contributions to Fixed Assets)
Continuing NATO Operations (i.e., Current Club Demands)
Punctual Demands (Crisis/Conflict Mission Contributions)
Socialization (Considering Human Capital, Community)
US Defense Agreements—As Informational Improvement by Endorsement
Partner Level Risks Brought to NATO
Conclusions: Multiple Measures for Multiple Models
Policy Pop Out 2
Notes
References
5 Theoretical Perspectives on Collective (Defense and Security) Burden Sharing
Introduction
Threat-Based Theories
Group Preferences
Strategic Culture and Critical Approaches
Rational Institutionalist Theory
Provisions Associated with Flexibility (I.E., Review, Amendment, Renegotiation and Renewal).
Describing the Partner Participation in NATO COE
Conclusions—Burden Sharing from Multiple Views
Policy Pop Out 3
Notes
References
6 Risk Management Model of Institutional Burden Sharing
Introduction
Proposing a Risk Management Model of Institutional (Defense and Security) Burdens
Threats
Informational Improvement—Rational Institutionalism
Risk Management—Rationalism, Trade-Offs
Exploitation (Free-Riding)—Collective Action
Democracy—Liberalism (a, b) & Constructivism (c, d)
Conclusions—Moving Toward Multi-method Analyses of the Risk Management Model
Notes
References
7 Support for a Risk Management Model of Institutional Burdens
Introduction
Managing Risks Model of Institutional Burden Sharing: Military Spending
Modeling Middle/Second Level NATO Partners—Participation in a New Operation
NATO—Manager of Stability: The Club in a Global System
Centres of Excellence—Redistributing NATO Burdens: Comparing Two COE
Comparing MILMED & JCBRN COE MOU In-Depth
JCBRN—Functional Relationship MOU, 2006
MILMED-Establishment MOU, 2014
Conclusions—Triangulating Methods, Models and Measures
Policy Pop Out 4
Notes
References
8 Contributions, Future Plans, Implications and Conclusions
Contributions of the Book
Future Plans
Implications
Conclusions
Notes
References
Appendix A
Tasks to Delegate in International Agreements
Appendix B
Predicted Values of Dependent Variable in a Regression Model
Appendix C
Appendix D
Data References and Public Data Sources
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
References
Index
