This book brings together insights from the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind and existing work on autonomous agency from both philosophy of action and feminist philosophy. It then utilizes this proposed account of autonomous agency to make sense of the impairments in agency that commonly occur in cases of dissociative identity disorder, mood disorders, and psychopathy.
While much of the existing philosophical work on autonomy focuses on threats that come from outside the agent, this book addresses how inner conflict, instability of character, or motivational issues can disrupt agency. In the first half of the book, the author conceptualizes what it means to be self-governing and to exercise autonomous agency. In the second half, she investigates the extent to which agents with various forms of mental disorder are capable of exercising autonomy. In her view, many forms of mental disorder involve disruptions to self-governance, so that agents lack sufficient control over their intentional behavior or are unable to formulate and execute coherent action plans. However, this does not mean that they are utterly incapable of autonomous agency; rather, their ability to exercise this capacity is compromised in important respects. Understanding these agential impairments can help to deepen our understanding of what it means to exercise autonomy, and also devise more effective treatments that restore subjects’ agency.
Author(s): Michelle Maiese
Series: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 236
City: New York
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
1. Autonomous Agency: Conditions for an Adequate Account
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Frankfurt’s Identification Account
1.2.1 Second-Order Volitions and Identification
1.2.2 Intelligibility and the Problem of External Manipulation
1.2.3 The Regress Problem
1.3 Pre-reflective Agency and Reasons-Responsiveness
1.4 Autonomy as Relational
1.5 Summary of Conditions, and a Way Forward
2. An Enactivist Conception of Autonomous Agency
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Agency, Biological Autonomy, and Sensorimotor Autonomy
2.2.1 Basic Agency, Trying, and Habits
2.2.2 Affective Framing, Regional Identities, and the Self
2.3 The Stability and Plasticity of Habit
2.4 The Role of Social Influences
2.4.1 Relational Autonomy and the Socially Embedded Self
2.4.2 The Mindshaping Thesis
2.5 Concluding Remarks
3. Enactivism Meets Frankfurt: Embracing, Resisting, and Reconfiguring Habits
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Need for Self-Modification
3.3 From Sensorimotor Equilibration to Self-Equilibration
3.4 Changing What We Care About
3.4.1 Virtual Actions and Agentic Skills
3.4.2 Equilibration and the Contribution of the Environment
3.5 Authenticity, Regress, and Manipulation: Making Sense of Autonomy Deficits
3.6 Concluding Remarks
4. Ambivalence and Agency in Dissociative Identity Disorder
4.1 Introduction: Disruptions to Autonomous Agency in Mental Disorder
4.2 Dissociative Identity Disorder and the Single Self Thesis
4.3 Extreme Ambivalence in DID
4.4 Disruptions to Agency and Instability of the Self
4.4.1 Disjointed Affective Framings
4.4.2 Is Ambivalence Always a Threat to Autonomy?
4.5 Self-Equilibration in Cases of DID
4.6 Concluding Remarks
5. “Getting Stuck” in Mood Disorders
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Disruptions to Motivation in Depression
5.3 A Depressive Comportment: Inflexible Habits and
Constriction of the Affordance Field
5.4 Self-Equilibration in Cases of Depression
5.5 Disruptions to Agency in Bipolar Disorder
5.5.1 Distortion of the Affordance Field in Mania
5.5.2 Unstable Agency and Fluctuating Moods
5.5.3 Self-Equilibration in Bipolar Disorder
5.6 Concluding Remarks
6. One-Dimensional Selfhood in Psychopathy
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Reasons-Responsivity and Ethical Know-How
6.3 Inflexible Agency and Affordance Engagement
6.4 Instability and Lack of Character
6.5 Self-Equilibration and Relational Autonomy
6.6 Concluding Remarks
7. Further Implications: Responsibility and Treatment
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Agency and Moral Responsibility
7.2.1 Responsibility in Cases of DID
7.2.2 Responsible Agency Among Agents with Mood
Disorders
7.2.3 Responsible Psychopaths?
7.3 Legal Responsibility, Relational Autonomy, and Restorative Justice
7.4 Promoting Autonomy Via Holistic Treatment
7.4.1 Moving Beyond Medication
7.4.2 Recovery and Patients as Experts
7.5 Concluding Remarks
Index
