This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009. The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and game theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.
Author(s): Sanmay Das, Michael Ostrovsky, David Pennock, Boleslaw Szymanski
Edition: 1
Year: 2009
Language: English
Pages: 117
Table of Contents......Page 10
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions......Page 12
Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google......Page 14
A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets......Page 15
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion......Page 24
A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile......Page 36
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions......Page 37
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets......Page 51
Market Design for a P2P Backup System (Extended Abstract)......Page 66
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism......Page 69
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market......Page 72
A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling......Page 85
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization (Extended Abstract)......Page 98
Revenue Submodularity......Page 100
Fair Package Assignment......Page 103
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale......Page 104
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It......Page 106
Author Index......Page 118
