Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty.
Author(s): Jan Narveson, James P. Sterba
Edition: 1
Year: 2010
Language: English
Pages: 288
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 11
1 Introduction......Page 13
More on Sterba's argument......Page 14
More on our arguments together......Page 15
Part I......Page 17
From liberty to welfare......Page 19
A partial defense......Page 24
The ideal of liberty and the problem of conflict......Page 25
The "ought" implies "can" principle......Page 27
Distant peoples......Page 40
Future generations......Page 41
A universal right to welfare......Page 43
Extending the right to welfare......Page 45
Liam Murphy/Thomas Nagel and Henry Shue......Page 51
John Harris......Page 55
Allen Buchanan......Page 57
Jeremy Waldron......Page 58
Gillian Brock......Page 60
Richard Norman and Henry Shue......Page 62
Susan Okin......Page 65
Ronald Dworkin......Page 67
Left-libertarians......Page 70
3 Objections from libertarians to my argument from liberty to equality......Page 73
Tibor Machan......Page 74
Machan's "concession"......Page 75
Actual verses nonactual conditions......Page 76
How people fare under near-libertarian conditions......Page 79
Institutional rights not needed for rare cases......Page 83
What if the rich did not exist?......Page 85
Using a Kantian argument against using people......Page 86
Rights determined by what would obtain in nonactual ideal libertarian societies......Page 87
Douglas Rasmussen (and Douglas Den Uyl)......Page 91
John Hospers......Page 94
Eric Mack (and Murray Rothbard)......Page 97
Daniel Shapiro......Page 99
Points of agreement......Page 103
A standard for approved liberties......Page 105
A standard of nonquestion-beggingness......Page 109
Interpreting morality as compromise......Page 113
Meeting Narveson's response......Page 116
Narveson's more practical challenges to my argument......Page 119
4 My argument again and its future prospects......Page 129
Part II......Page 133
Introduction......Page 135
Liberty......Page 136
Liberty: values and rights......Page 139
Liberty and harm......Page 141
Property......Page 145
Interference and failure to help......Page 147
Comparativeness......Page 148
Commensurability......Page 149
Equality and identity......Page 150
Libertarianism......Page 152
Egalitarianism......Page 154
Reconciliation?......Page 155
Universality......Page 156
Egalitarianism contrasted......Page 158
Equal and unequal liberty......Page 161
"Moral equality"......Page 162
"Luck" egalitarianism......Page 164
Rights to do vs. rights to things......Page 166
Negative and positive rights......Page 167
Criticisms of the distinction......Page 168
The issue: framed by liberalism......Page 171
Classical liberalism......Page 173
Universal Principle of Right......Page 179
Sterba's central argument......Page 180
"Conflicts" of liberties?......Page 182
A short excursion on property......Page 185
First comers......Page 189
Social contract: some general observations......Page 194
Self-interest and the interests of selves......Page 196
Reasoning from wherever we are to morals......Page 197
Input and output......Page 199
Morals......Page 201
The common good......Page 204
The interest in liberty......Page 205
"Agreement"......Page 207
Starting points......Page 210
Problems with the Rawlsian and Lockean options......Page 213
More?......Page 217
Does it work?......Page 219
Why welfare rights are a problem......Page 221
Force......Page 225
Equality of vulnerability......Page 228
Coerced assistance?......Page 231
3 The grounds for welfarism considered......Page 233
How much is the minimum?......Page 236
Arguments from economic interdependency......Page 237
The argument from "class wars"......Page 238
Liberties and compatibility......Page 243
Mutual aid......Page 244
Reality: voluntary resources......Page 246
Effects of the welfare state......Page 250
The place of private charity......Page 251
Just business......Page 254
In practice......Page 256
A more important afterthought......Page 257
4 Conclusion......Page 261
Part III......Page 263
Narveson's main argument......Page 265
My argument......Page 266
The arguments compared......Page 267
5 Response to Sterba......Page 272
Select bibliography......Page 279
Index......Page 287