In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India [(2016) 5 SCC 1], a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Amendment to the Constitution and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, which replaced the existing collegium system with the NJAC, a new bipartisan model for appointing judges. This edited volume uses the judgment in the NJAC Case as a springboard to address the politics, doctrine, and developments pertaining to judicial appointments in India. It critically examines fundamental constitutional concepts such as rule of law, separation of powers, basic structure, and judicial independence which formed the basis of the judgment. It provides a rich and detailed history of post-Independence appointment of judges to locate the NJAC Case in its proper constitutional context. It also analyses reforms to judicial appointments in key South Asian and common law jurisdictions to understand what appointments in India might look like in the future. The volume has 21 essays across three parts—Part I provides an analysis of judicial appointments in India from the time prior to Independence to the present day, Part II analyses constitutional principles and their application in the NJAC Case, and Part III is a comparative enquiry into appointments processes in the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.
Author(s): Arghya Sengupta and Ritwika Sharma
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2018
Language: English
Pages: 299
Tags: judicial appointments, NJAC, NJAC Case, Indian Supreme Court, judges of the Indian Supreme Court, First Judges’ Case, Second Judges’ Case, Third Judges’ Case, collegium system, executive-judiciary relations
Title_Pages
Dedication
Foreword
Introduction
From_Kania_to_SarkariaJudicial_Appointments_from_1950_to_1973
A_Committed_JudiciaryIndira_Gandhi_and_Judicial_Appointments
Recovering_Lost_GroundThe_Case_of_the_Curious_Eighties
The_Judicial_CollegiumIssues_Controversies_and_the_Road_Ahead
A_Plague_on_Both_Your_HousesNJAC_and_the_Crisis_of_Trust
Judicial_Review_and_Parliamentary_PowerReorienting_the_Balance
Checks_and_Balances_RevisitedThe_Role_of_the_Executive_in_Judicial_Appointments
Opening_up_AppointmentsCivil_Society_Participation_in_the_NJAC
The_Obvious_Foundation_TestReinventing_the_Basic_Structure_Doctrine
Eight_Fatal_FlawsThe_Failings_of_the_National_Judicial_Appointments_Commission
The_Sole_Route_to_an_Independent_JudiciaryThe_Primacy_of_Judges_in_Appointment
Justice_Lokurs_Concurring_ViewThe_Future_of_Appointments_Reform
Justice_Chelameswars_DissentReforming_to_Preserve
The_NJAC_Case_and_Judicial_IndependenceConceptual_and_Contextual_Safeguards
Comparative_Law_in_the_NJAC_JudgmentA_Missed_Opportunity
Judicialization_of_Judicial_AppointmentsA_Response_from_the_United_Kingdom
South_AfricaAnalysing_a_Commission_Model
Appointments_to_the_Supreme_Court_of_CanadaProcedures_and_Controversies
Judicial_Appointments_in_PakistanThe_Seminal_Case_of_the_18th_Amendment
Judicial_Appointments_in_Sri_LankaA_Politicized_Trajectory
Appointments_to_the_Supreme_Court_of_NepalA_New_Beginning
Index
About_the_Editors_and_Contributors
