In this volume, the third in his trilogy on the philosophical and legal aspects of war and conflict, Larry May locates a normative grounding for the crime of aggression-the only one of the three crimes charged at Nuremberg that is not currently being prosecuted-that is similar to that for crimes against humanity and war crimes. He considers cases from the Nuremberg trials, philosophical debates in the Just War tradition, and more recent debates about the International Criminal Court, as well as the hard cases of humanitarian intervention and terrorist aggression. May argues that crimes of aggression, sometimes called crimes against peace, deserve international prosecution when one State undermines the ability of another State to protect human rights. His thesis refutes the traditional understanding of aggression, which often has been interpreted as a crossing of borders by one sovereign state into another sovereign state. At Nuremberg, crimes against humanity charges were only pursued if the defendant also engaged in the crime of aggression. May argues for a reversal of this position, contending that aggression charges should be pursued only if the defendant's acts involve serious human rights violations.
Author(s): Larry May
Series: Philosophical and Legal Aspects of War and Conflict
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2008
Language: English
Pages: 366
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgments......Page 11
PART A PACIFISM AND JUST WARS......Page 13
1 Introduction......Page 15
I. Condemning War but Fighting for Peace......Page 18
II. War and Contemporary International Law......Page 21
III. Many Unjustified Wars but Few Criminal Leaders......Page 25
IV. Minimalism, Consensus, and Solidarity......Page 29
V. Summary of the Arguments of the Book......Page 33
2 Grotius and Contingent Pacifism......Page 37
I. Grotius on Just Wars......Page 39
II. Grotius on Justifiable Killing in War......Page 42
III. The Idea of Contingent Pacifism......Page 45
IV. An Objection to Contingent Pacifism......Page 49
V. Contingent Pacifism and International Law......Page 52
3 International Solidarity and the Duty to Aid......Page 58
I. A Historical Note......Page 59
II. The Idea of an International Community......Page 63
III. Solidarity of the International Community......Page 67
IV. Objections......Page 72
V. The Duties of Solidarity......Page 76
PART B RETHINKING THE NORMATIVE AD BELLUMPRINCIPLES......Page 83
4 The Principle of Priority or First Strike......Page 85
I. Gentili and the Justification of Offensive War......Page 87
II. Grotius on Fear of Attack......Page 90
III. First Strikes: The Priority Principle......Page 93
IV. Last Resort as the Ultimate Restraint......Page 96
V. Contemporary Warfare and the Priority Principle......Page 99
VI. International Criminal Law and the Priority Principle......Page 102
5 The Principle of Just Cause......Page 106
I. Conversion of Heathens and Promotion of Democracy......Page 108
II. Paradigmatic Just Causes: Individual and Collective Self-Defense......Page 112
III. Reconceptualizing the Principle of Just Cause......Page 115
IV. Just Cause and the Element of State Aggression......Page 119
V. The Bifurcated Normative Principles of Jus ad Bellum......Page 122
VI. Rethinking the Separation of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello......Page 125
6 The Principle of Proportionality......Page 129
I. Proportionality in Traditional Just War Theory......Page 131
II. Necessity and Proportionality in International Law......Page 136
III. Self-Defense and Proportionate Response......Page 138
IV. Proportionality and Minor Jus ad Bellum Principles......Page 141
V. Connecting Proportionality, Priority, and Just Cause......Page 145
PART C THE PRECEDENT OF NUREMBERG......Page 151
7 Custom and the Nuremberg “Precedent”......Page 153
I. Just War Theory and Aggression......Page 154
II. The Nuremberg “Precedent”......Page 158
III. Rules in International Law......Page 161
IV. Jus Cogens Norms and the Crime of Aggression......Page 164
V. The Conservative Approach to Custom......Page 168
VI. The Rules of the International Community......Page 171
8 Prosecuting Military and Political Leaders......Page 175
I. The Admiral Doenitz Case......Page 177
II. Doenitz’s Defense......Page 180
III. The Ministries Case......Page 183
IV. Political Ministers and Waging War......Page 186
V. Roles and Actus Reus......Page 189
VI. A Successful Prosecution: Admiral Raeder......Page 193
9 Prosecuting Civilians for Complicity......Page 197
I. The Case against Krupp......Page 198
II. The Case against I. G. Farben......Page 203
III. Judge Hebert’s Concurring Opinion......Page 206
IV. Mens Rea and Conspiracy......Page 210
PART D CONCEPTUALIZING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION......Page 217
10 Defining State Aggression......Page 219
I. What Is Aggression?......Page 221
II. Historical Roots of the Idea of State Aggression......Page 224
III. Waging Aggressive War......Page 230
IV. The Wrong of Aggression......Page 234
V. Who Decides? Another Lesson from Nuremberg......Page 237
11 Act and Circumstance in the Crime of Aggression......Page 241
I. The Problem of Acts......Page 242
II. State Aggression as a Circumstance......Page 246
III. Participating and Being Liable......Page 251
IV. Participating in the Circumstances of War......Page 254
V. Revisiting the Superior Orders Defense......Page 258
12 Individual Mens Rea and Collective Liability......Page 262
I. Conspiracy at Nuremberg......Page 263
II. Intent to Wage War......Page 268
III. Two Intentions......Page 272
IV. Conspiring to Wage Aggressive War......Page 275
V. Collective Liability Schemes......Page 278
PART E HARD CASES AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS......Page 283
13 Humanitarian Intervention......Page 285
I. Humanitarian Intervention in International Law......Page 287
II. Immunity, Complicity, and Collective Liability......Page 290
III. The Applicability of the Doctrine of Double Effect......Page 295
IV. Collective Responsibility of States......Page 298
V. Defending Humanitarian Wars......Page 301
VI. Should Anyone Be Prosecuted for Humanitarian Wars?......Page 305
14 Terrorist Aggression......Page 309
I. Piracy and Terrorism......Page 310
II. Legitimate Authority and Non-State Actors......Page 314
III. Similarities between State and Non-State Actors......Page 318
IV. Prosecuting Terrorist Aggression......Page 320
V. Terrorists and Due Process Rights......Page 324
VI. Human Rights after September 11, 2001......Page 327
15 Defending International Criminal Trials for Aggression......Page 331
I. Koskenniemi’s Critique of International Criminal Law......Page 332
II. The Diversity of Norms Defense......Page 336
III. Drumbl’s Arguments about Retribution and Deterrence......Page 341
IV. Political Leaders Defending Themselves......Page 345
V. International Criminal Trials and Aggression......Page 350
Bibliography......Page 355
Index......Page 363
