Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century

Preface
Contents
Contributors
Introduction
References
Social Choice
Building Bridges Over the Great Divide
1 Introduction
2 The Main Pros and Cons of Binary and Positional Rules
3 Some Attempts to Reconcile Binary and Positional Intuitions
3.1 Black's Rule
3.2 Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
3.3 Dodgson's Rule
3.4 Rules Based on Supercovering Relation
4 Concluding Remarks
References
Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures
1 Introduction
2 Definitions
2.1 Preferences and Social Unacceptability
2.2 Voting Rules
2.3 Probability Models and Simulation Methodology
3 Results
3.1 The Probability that a Fixed Number of Socially Unacceptable Candidates Exist
3.2 The Probability that Some Voting Rules Select a Socially Unacceptable Candidate
4 Concluding Remarks
References
Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences
1 Introduction
2 May's Model and Its Alternatives
3 Studies on Inversion Probability
4 The General Interval Model
5 Inversion Probability
6 Numerical Simulations
6.1 Inequality in Population Weights
6.2 The Average Variance
6.3 The Average Absolute Bias
7 Summary
References
Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Players and Preferences
3.2 Single-Peakedness
3.3 Voting Rules
4 Game-Theoretic Model
4.1 Strategies and Outcomes
4.2 Equilibrium Concepts
5 Results
6 Conclusion
References
Meta-agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences
1 Introduction
2 The Meta-agreement Hypothesis
3 Single-Peakedness Through Rationality?
3.1 The Case of Non-convex Preferences
3.2 Meta-agreements as Constraints on Reason-Based Preferences
4 Conclusion
References
On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules
1 Introduction
2 q-Paretian Rules: Definitions
2.1 Strong q-Paretian Simple Majority Rule
2.2 Strong q-Paretian Plurality Rule
2.3 Strongest q-Paretian Simple Majority Rule
2.4 Condorcet Practical Rule
3 Extended Preferences and Multi-valued Choice
4 Manipulation Models and Manipulability Indices
5 Results
6 Conclusion
References
Weighted Voting
Effectiveness, Decisiveness, and Success in Weighted Voting Systems: Collective Behavior and Voting Measures
1 Introduction
2 Some Basics
3 Urn Models
4 Permutation Invariant Voting Systems
5 Penrose–Banzhaf Versus Shapley–Shubik
6 Weighted Voting and the Common Belief Model
7 The Council of the EU: A Case Study
8 Conclusions and Outlook
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Hoeffding's Inequality
A.2 Urn Models
References
All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games
1 Introduction
1.1 Two Motivating Situations
1.2 Background
2 Binary Voting Systems
3 Main Result
4 Conclusion
References
Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox
1 Introduction
2 The Model
2.1 Simple Games
2.2 The Bargaining Procedure
2.3 The Proposer Advantage
3 A New Donation Paradox
4 Generalizing the Example to a Class of Games
5 Discussion
6 Concluding Remarks
References
Egalitarian Collective Decisions as `Good' Corporate Governance?
1 Introduction and Overview
2 Relativism and Applied Economic Science
3 Friedman, Freeman as Brothers in Sin
3.1 Friedman
3.2 Freeman
4 An Outline of a Procedure of Stakeholder Participation as Egalitarian Bidding
4.1 An Axiomatic Characterization of Stakeholder Participation
4.2 Properties of Participation as Egalitarian Bidding
5 Critical Assessment of Incentives
5.1 Underbidding Incentives
5.2 Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsically Motivating Incentives
6 Concluding Remarks
References
Interpretation and Measurement of Power
Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors
1 Introduction
2 Obtaining the Compensation Payments
3 Efficiency and Deterrence
4 Settlements
5 Conclusion
References
Solidarity and Fair Taxation in TU Games
1 Introduction
2 Basic Definitions and Notation
3 Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values
4 Solidarity and Fair Taxation
4.1 Technical Preliminaries
4.2 Relation Between Parameters
4.3 Desirability
4.4 Positivity for Null Players
4.5 Desirability and Positivity
4.6 Social Acceptability
4.7 General Acceptability
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Analyzing the Zerkani Network with the Owen Value
1 Introduction
2 The Owen Value and an Approximation Algorithm
3 A New Game Theoretic Centrality Measure
4 The Owen Value Approximation in the Zerkani Network
4.1 The Zerkani Network Analysis
4.2 On the Partition P Considered
4.3 Numerical Results
4.4 A Brief Comparison with the Ranking Based on the Shapley Value
5 Conclusions
References
The Power of Closeness in a Network
1 Introduction
2 Algorithmic and Computational Aspects
3 Power in Small Unweighted Networks
4 Power in Weighted Networks
4.1 The Linear Network Case
4.2 The Circle Network Case
4.3 The Star Network
5 Discussion
References
Political Power on a Line Graph
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games
2.2 Line-Graph Games
3 Political Power in Majority Voting Line-Graph Games
4 Rewarding Intermediate Veto Players: Hierarchical Outcomes and the τ-Index
4.1 Hierarchical Outcomes
4.2 The τ-Index
4.3 Illustration
5 Concluding Remarks
References
EU
Double Proportionality for the European Parliament: The Tandem System
1 Introduction
2 Double Proportionality in Swiss Cantons
3 Double Proportionality for the EP
4 The Tandem System
4.1 Apportionment of Seats at Union Level
4.2 Allotment of Seats by Member State and Europarty
4.3 Assignment of Seats to Candidates
5 Conclusion
References
Explaining Contestation: Votes in the Council of the European Union
1 Introduction
2 Potential Determinants of Voting Behavior in the Council
3 Variable Operationalization and Data
3.1 Votes in the Council
3.2 Government Composition
3.3 Power
3.4 Public Attitudes Towards the EU
3.5 Net Contributions
3.6 Presidency
4 Explaining Voting Outcomes in the Council of the European Union
5 Conclusion
References
Codecision in Context Revisited: The Implications of Brexit
1 Introduction
2 The Codecision Procedure
3 The Model
3.1 Intra-institutional Bargaining
3.2 Inter-institutional Bargaining
3.3 Assumptions on Preferences
4 Results
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Field Experiments and Quasi-experiments
Proximity-Based Preferences and Their Implications Based on Data from the Styrian Parliamentary Elections in 2019
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Left-Right Dimension
4 Proximity-Based Preferences and Consistency
5 Comparing (Hypothetical) Election Outcomes
5.1 Plurality Rule
5.2 Anti-plurality Rule
5.3 Pairwise Majority Rule
5.4 Borda Rule
5.5 Approval Voting
6 Conclusion
References
Participation in Voting Over Budget Allocations: A Field Experiment
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Overview of the Literature
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Aggregation Rules
2.2 Preferences
2.3 Impact of a Vote
3 The Field Experiment
3.1 General Set-up and Design
3.2 Eliciting Impact Beliefs and Risk Preferences
3.3 Hypotheses
4 Results
4.1 Real Impact Versus Assessed Impact
4.2 Risk Preferences
4.3 Voter Turnout
4.4 Distribution of Votes
4.5 Allocation Outcomes
4.6 Non-truthful and Strategic Voting
5 Conclusion
References
The Office Makes the Politician
1 Introduction
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 National Council and Council of States
2.2 Referendum Decision
2.3 Congruence with Geographical Constituency and with the Nation
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Beyond Electoral Incentives
3.2 Estimation Equation
3.3 Identifying Assumptions
3.4 Data
4 Public Expectations and Behavior in Office
4.1 Serving in Office as an Incentive in Itself
4.2 No Changes Prior to Being Elected
5 Conclusions
References