The authors explain how parties and candidates position themselves on the Left-Right ideological dimension and other issue dimensions. Their unified theoretical approach to voter behavior and party strategies takes into account voter preferences, voter's partisan attachments, expected turnout, and the location of the political status quo. The approach, tested through extensive cross-national analysis, includes studies of the plurality-based two-party contests in the U.S. and multiple-party competition in France, Britain, and Norway.
Author(s): James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill III, Bernard Grofman
Year: 2005
Language: English
Pages: 332
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Tables and Figures......Page 12
Acknowledgments......Page 19
1.1 Introduction to the Unified Theory of Party Competition......Page 23
1.2 Data and Methodology......Page 27
1.3. Justifying Our Theoretical Focus: Why Assume a Unified Model of Party Competition with Vote-Maximizing Parties?......Page 28
1.4 Plan of the Book......Page 32
2.1 Introduction......Page 37
2.2.1 Deterministic Policy Voting......Page 38
2.2.2 Unmeasured Voter Motivations: Probabilistic Voting Models......Page 39
2.3.1 A Unified Specification That Incorporates Measured Nonpolicy Variables......Page 41
2.4 The Unified Discounting Model......Page 45
2.5 Discussion......Page 48
3.1 Introduction......Page 50
3.2 The Logic of Policy Competition in the Unified Spatial Model: Illustrative Examples of How Nonpolicy Considerations Matter......Page 53
3.2.2 Illustrative Example 2: Policy Divergence in a Deterministic Voting Model with Partisan Components......Page 55
3.2.3 Illustrative Example 3: Voter Discounting of Candidate Positions......Page 60
3.2.4. Illustrative Example 4: Incorporating Probabilistic Choice into the Partisan Voting Model......Page 61
3.3.1 Policy Equilibrium: Definitions and Illustrative Examples......Page 62
3.3.2. Applying Equilibrium Analysis to Real-World Elections: A Methodology Based upon an Iterative Algorithm......Page 64
3.3.3 Equilibrium Analysis Versus Analysis of Parties' One-Step Policy Strategies......Page 66
3.4 Empirical Application to the 1988 French Presidential Election......Page 68
3.4.1 Candidate Strategies for the Policy-Only Voting Model......Page 70
3.4.2 Incorporation of Partisanship: A Unified Model......Page 71
4.1 Introduction......Page 74
4.2 The Model......Page 75
4.2.1 Theoretical Results on Candidates' Vote-Maximizing Strategies......Page 76
4.3 Centrifugal Incentives for Candidate Strategies......Page 79
4.3.1 The Quantitative Effects of Model Parameters......Page 81
4.4 An Empirical Illustration......Page 85
4.5 Robustness of Equilibrium Positions to the Salience of Partisanship......Page 89
4.6 Discussion......Page 92
5.1 Introduction......Page 94
5.2 The Context of the 1988 French Presidential Election......Page 95
5.2.1 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1988 Presidential Election......Page 96
5.3 Candidate Competition under the Policy-Only Model......Page 99
5.4 Candidate Competition under a Unified Model with Nonpolicy Factors......Page 101
5.5.1 Motivations for Citizens to Discount the Candidates' Positions in the 1988 Election......Page 107
5.5.2 Candidate Equilibrium for the Unified Discounting Model......Page 112
5.6 Conclusion......Page 115
6.1 Introduction......Page 116
6.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1989 Parliamentary Election......Page 118
6.3 Party Competition in the Policy-only Model......Page 121
6.4 Party Competition in the Unified Model......Page 124
6.5.1 Motivations for Citizens to Discount Parties' Positions in Norwegian Elections......Page 127
6.6 Coalition-Seeking Motivations......Page 133
6.7 Conclusion......Page 138
7.1 Introduction......Page 139
7.2.1 Abstention due to Alienation......Page 142
7.2.2 Abstention due to Indifference......Page 143
7.2.3 A Unified Indifference-Alienation Model......Page 144
7.3 Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model: Illustrative Arguments......Page 145
7.4 Conclusion......Page 152
8.1 Introduction......Page 154
8.2 Hypotheses on Voting Behavior and Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Mode......Page 155
8.3.1 A Unified Turnout Model of the 1988 Presidential Vote......Page 156
8.3.2 Candidate Positioning and Electoral Outcomes under the Unified Turnout Model......Page 161
8.4 Unified Turnout Models for the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections......Page 164
8.5 Candidate Equilibrium under the Unified Turnout Model......Page 166
8.6 The Unified Turnout Model with Policy Discounting......Page 169
8.7 Discussion......Page 172
9.1 Introduction......Page 174
9.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1997 General Election......Page 176
9.3 Party Competition under the Policy-only Model......Page 178
9.4 Party Competition under the Unified Model......Page 182
9.5 Party Competition under a Unified Turnout Model: The Strategic Effects of Abstention due to Alienation......Page 186
9.6 Conclusion......Page 190
10.1 Introduction......Page 192
10.2.1 Data Resources......Page 193
10.2.2 Hypotheses about Assimilation and Contrast Effects......Page 194
10.3 Discussion......Page 204
11.1 Introduction......Page 206
11.2 Spatial Models with Full Information: How Valence Advantages Motivate Divergence between Policy-Seeking Candidates......Page 209
11.3. A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 1: The Effects of Uncertainty.........Page 210
11.3.1 Policy-Seeking Equilibrium Strategies with v = 0......Page 212
11.3.2 Effects of a Valence Advantage......Page 213
11.3.3 Mixtures of Policy-Seeking and Office-Seeking Motivations......Page 216
11.4. A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 2: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Voter Distribution......Page 217
11.5 Conclusion......Page 221
12.1 Introduction......Page 223
12.1.1 The Contexts of the 1988 American and French Presidential Elections......Page 224
12.2 Equilibrium Strategies under Electoral Certainty......Page 226
12.3 Modeling Election Uncertainty over Valence Issues in Empirical Applications......Page 230
12.4 Candidate Equilibria under Valence-Related Election Uncertainty......Page 234
12.4.1 Equilibria in the 1988 French Presidential Election under Valence-Related Uncertainty......Page 235
12.4.2 Equilibria in the 1988 U.S. Presidential Election under Valence-Related Uncertainty......Page 238
12.4.3 Applications of the Valence-Related Uncertainty Model to the 1997 British General Election......Page 240
12.5 Equilibria under PolicyRelated Uncertainty: Application to France......Page 244
12.6 Discussion......Page 247
13.1 Introduction......Page 249
13.2 Evaluating the Unified Model: Does It Satisfactorily Explain Party Behavior?......Page 254
13.3 Directions for Future Research......Page 256
13.4 Final Remarks......Page 261
Appendix 1.1 Literature Review......Page 263
Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice......Page 267
Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research......Page 269
Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald......Page 273
Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation......Page 276
Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria......Page 280
Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1......Page 285
Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria......Page 287
Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck......Page 290
Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations......Page 292
Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1......Page 297
Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model......Page 299
Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications......Page 301
Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models......Page 304
Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1......Page 309
Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects......Page 311
References......Page 315
Index......Page 329
