This book provides an up-to-date look at the scientific realism/anti-realism debate, and provides a new take on that perennial philosphical issue. Specifically, Chakravartty is interested in defending a form of scientific realism, but not a naive sort of scientific realism. He develops a version of scientific realism that is, in part, informed by the new work being done on structural realism (while nevertheless remaining critical of a lot of the structural realists' arguments.) He's also interested in providing a metaphysics for scientific realism, but he tries to provide a metaphysics that the scientific anti-realist would be happy with (or at least, would be more sympathetic to than a standard metaphysics). For example, he believes in natural kinds, but he doesn't think that there's a single correct division of the world into natural kinds.
This novel, well-thought-out, and well-written take on these various issues leads me to recommend this book to anyone interested in current debates in philosophy of science or metaphysics.
Author(s): Anjan Chakravartty
Edition: 1
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2007
Language: English
Pages: 271
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Tables......Page 11
Figures......Page 12
Preface......Page 13
Abbreviations......Page 19
PART I Scientific realism today......Page 21
1.1 THE TROUBLE WITH COMMON SENSE......Page 23
1.2 A CONCEPTUAL TAXONOMY......Page 28
1.3 METAPHYSICS, EMPIRICISM, AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE......Page 33
1.4 THE RISE OF STANCE EMPIRICISM......Page 37
1.5 THE FALL OF THE CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS......Page 40
2.1 THE ENTITIES ARE NOT ALONE......Page 47
2.2 LESSONS FROM EPISTEMIC STRUCTURALISM......Page 53
2.3 SEMIREALISM (OR: HOW TO BE A SOPHISTICATED REALIST)......Page 59
2.4 OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC INDUCTIONS ON PAST SCIENCE......Page 65
2.5 THE MINIMAL INTERPRETATION OF STRUCTURE......Page 72
3.1 INVENTORY: WHAT REALISTS KNOW......Page 78
3.2 MUTUALLY ENTAILED PARTICULARS AND STRUCTURES......Page 81
3.3 ONTIC STRUCTURALISM: FAREWELL TO OBJECTS?......Page 90
3.4 ONTOLOGICAL THEORY CHANGE......Page 96
3.5 RETURN OF THE MOTLEY PARTICULARS......Page 100
PART II Metaphysical foundations......Page 107
4.1 CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND DE RE NECESSITY......Page 109
4.2 IS CAUSAL REALISM INCOHERENT?......Page 116
The contiguity objection......Page 117
The regress objection......Page 119
The demand for a causal mechanism......Page 121
4.3 A FIRST ANSWER: RELATIONS BETWEEN EVENTS......Page 122
4.4 A BETTER ANSWER: CAUSAL PROCESSES......Page 127
4.5 PROCESSES FOR EMPIRICISTS......Page 134
5.1 THE CAUSAL PROPERTY IDENTITY THESIS......Page 139
5.2 PROPERTY NAMING AND NECESSITY......Page 146
5.3 OBJECTIONS: EPISTEMIC AND METAPHYSICAL......Page 154
5.4 VACUOUS LAWS AND THE ONTOLOGY OF CAUSAL PROPERTIES......Page 161
5.5 CAUSAL LAWS, CETERIS PARIBUS......Page 167
6.1 LAW STATEMENTS AND THE ROLE OF KINDS......Page 171
6.2 ESSENCES AND CLUSTERS: TWO KINDS OF KINDS......Page 176
6.3 CLUSTERS AND BIOLOGICAL SPECIES CONCEPTS......Page 182
6.4 SOCIABILITY (OR: HOW TO MAKE KINDS WITH PROPERTIES)......Page 188
6.5 BEYOND OBJECTIVITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND PROMISCUITY......Page 194
PART III Theory meets world......Page 201
7.1 DESCRIPTIONS AND NON-LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS......Page 203
7.2 REPRESENTING VIA ABSTRACTION AND IDEALIZATION......Page 207
7.3 EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM MODELS......Page 212
7.4 THE INESCAPABILITY OF CORRESPONDENCE......Page 219
7.5 APPROXIMATION AND GEOMETRICAL STRUCTURES......Page 225
8.1 KNOWLEDGE IN THE ABSENCE OF TRUTH SIMPLICITER......Page 232
8.2 MEASURING ‘‘TRUTH-LIKENESS’’......Page 234
8.3 TRUTH AS A COMPARATOR FOR ART AND SCIENCE......Page 238
8.4 DEPICTION VERSUS DENOTATION; DESCRIPTION VERSUS REFERENCE......Page 244
8.5 PRODUCTS VERSUS PRODUCTION; THEORIES AND MODELS VERSUS PRACTICE......Page 250
References......Page 255
Index......Page 264
