EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as the One
Belt One Road (OBOR), is a key strategic initiative unveiled by Xi
Jinping in 2013 that aims to establish several economic corridors
between China and Eurasia over land and South East Asia over sea.
The initiative has been analysed from various strategic perspectives,
with its impact on labour conditions for both Chinese and foreign
workers perhaps less so; though there have been instances, such
as in Piraeus in Greece, where the issue was brought to the fore.
The M4 motorway project in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
is co-financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Department for International
Development (DFID). The Netherlands is a stakeholder
in both the ADB and the AIIB. The ADB is the ‘lead co-financer’
and it is their safeguard policies that are applicable on the project.
The ADB, alongside other Multilateral Development Banks such as
the World Bank, has in the past been subject to public scrutiny with
regard to its compliance with international human rights standards,
as well as the Core Labour Standards (CLS) of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO). In response to external pressures, in 2001
the bank became one of the first MDBs to commit to push for full
compliance with the CLS and national labour laws. Nevertheless, it
has not proceeded to integrate them into its internal policies; this
has, as we have seen in the context of the M4 project, diminished
the practical relevance of its original commitment to the CLS.
The Loan Agreements between Pakistan and the Asian
Development Bank are unequivocal on the issue, stipulating that
the borrower “shall ensure, that the core labour standards and the
Borrower’s applicable labour laws and regulations are complied with
during Project implementation”. It also stipulates that “contractors,
other providers of goods and services, and their subcontractors,
engaged under contracts for Works, have Works contracts…”.
But the empirical data, consisting of interviews conducted
with workers involved in the M4 project, has evidenced the widespread
informality of labour relations around the M4 project: many
workers were not officially employed by subcontractors, some of
which may themselves not be registered companies. This context
4
and structure also make it much easier to evade compliance with
regard to right to unionise and collectively bargain, as well as increasing
the risk of other CLS violations, such as the recourse to
child labour or forced labour.
While the ADB is imposing extensive reporting obligations
on the Borrower for certain other issues (environmental impacts,
resettlement policies), it does not extend them to labour rights. We
believe that our findings warrant a much more extensive monitoring
of labour conditions in ADB projects.
Author(s): Remco E. Breuker & Imke B.L.H. van Gardingen
Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press.
Year: 2019
Language: English
Pages: 454
City: The Hague, The Netherlands
Table of contents
Contributors v
Part I. From Boardroom to Building Site:
The Belt and Road Initiative and the M4 Motorway in
Pakistan’s Punjab Province
Executive Summary 3
Introduction: Don’t Check the Boxes, Check the People 5
1: Background, Financing and Local Context 11
2: The Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Corridor 19
The Belt and Road Initiative 19
CPEC 24
IFI Safeguards: The ADB and the AIIB 27
3: Asking the Workers Themselves: A Case Study of Workers’ Rights 35
Methodology 35
Themes in the Interviews 36
Marginalized Labour Groups 51
CPEC 53
Conclusion 57
4: Construction Workers in Precarious Conditions and the Role of
Labour Inspectorates 59
The Labour Inspectorate in Pakistan 62
Inspections on the Worksite: Paper and Practice 69
Empowering the Pakistan Labour Inspectorate 72
Conclusion 76
5: The Asian Development Bank, Core Labour Standards and the
M4 Highway Project 79
Introduction 79
Multilateral Development Banks and Human Rights 80
MDBs’ Approach to Integrating Human Rights 83
The Asian Development Bank and Labour Rights 85
The ADB’s CLS Commitments in Action 89
Conclusion 93
x
Part II. From CSR Seminar to Sweatshop:
Detecting North Korean Forced Labour in
Textile Supply Chains
Addendum: States and the Private Economy in their Occasional Joint Roles
in Labour Exploitation: A Methodological Consideration xiv
Executive Summary 99
Introduction: From CSR to Sweatshop 101
1: Dandong, the DPRK, China, and Labour 105
Historical Context 105
Dandong’s Economy 108
An International Trade 111
Conclusion 113
2: Dandong as a Special Economic Zone 115
A Special Economic Zone with Boundless Future Ambitions 115
Special Economic Zones: Globally on the Rise 119
Outsourcing to DPRK 125
Conclusion 130
3: Export Processing via North Korea 133
The Context 134
Empirical Data on the Chinese Company Networks 141
US Shipments 194
Summary 212
4: North Korean Labourers in China 215
Introduction 215
Numbers and Locations of North Korean Workers 216
Recruitment Process, Visas, and Confiscation of Documents 220
Wages 224
Working Conditions 227
Living Conditions, Surveillance, Restriction of Personal Freedom 231
Conclusion 234
5: Garment Production in the Prison Camps and Political
Annihilation Camps 237
Introduction 237
What Garments are Produced? 242
The Production Process 243
Punishment 248
State-organized Forced Labour and Slavery 250
xi
Summarizing the Indescribable 253
6: The Role of Overseas Companies: How Policies do not Match
Local Needs 255
Awareness and Current Policies 255
Risk Analysis 258
7: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights and
North Korean Forced Labour in the Garment Industry 261
Introduction 261
The Responsibility to Respect 263
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 267
The Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garment and Textiles 272
The U.K. Modern Slavery Act 277
Conclusion 279
8: Addressing North Korean Forced Labour by Means of International
Economic Sanctions 281
Concluding Observations 292
Appendices Part I 295
Appendices Part II 371
Bibliography Part I 403
Bibliography Part II 415
