Amie L. Thomasson, the Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College, has gained international recognition as a leading figure within various areas of philosophy. She has recently been celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers for her significant contributions to metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. By engaging critically with her approach to metaphysics, modality, conceptual analysis, and the methodological issues concerning ontological questions about ordinary objects, social entities, and fictional characters, as well as including a chapter from Thomasson herself where she makes explicit the internal connections which run through her body of work, this volume delivers the first thorough discussion of Thomasson’s philosophy.
Author(s): Miguel Garcia-Godinez
Series: Philosophers in Depth
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 296
City: London
Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
1: Introduction
Amie Thomasson on Ontology
Chapter Summaries
2: How it All Hangs Together
Introduction
Fiction
Phenomenological Roots
Social and Cultural Objects
Metametaphysics
Functional Pluralism
Conceptual Engineering
Conclusion
References
3: Thomasson on Easy Arguments
The Problem in a Nutshell
What Needs To Be Explained?
Easy Ontology, Focus, and Reference
Conceptual and Other Language-based Connections
Conceptual Connections and Quantifiers
Conclusion
References
4: Realism, Deflationism, and Metaphysical Explanation
Easy Ontology and Simple Realism
Joint-Carving
Fundamentality Realism
Creeping Minimalism and Metaphysical Explanation
‘Easy arguments’ for Fundamentality Realism
Upshots
References
5: Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis?
I
II
III
IV
V
References
6: Modal Normativism and Metasemantics
Introduction
Modal Normativism and Compositionality Challenges
Modal Normativism Vs. Modal Descriptivism
The Compositionality Challenge
Truth Conditional Meanings and Modal Claims
Modal Normativism and Metasemantics
Metasemantic Explanations
Metasemantic Explanations: Ambitious (Modal) Descriptivism and Its Problems
Metasemantic Explanations: Two Normativist Approaches
The Moderate Approach
The Ambitious Approach
Objections: Substantivity in the Metalanguage
Are Metaphysical Explanations Substantive?
Using Talk of Possible Worlds in the Metalanguage
Conclusion
References
7: Thomasson on Modal Language
Introduction
Thomasson’s View on Modality
Function and Meaning
The Frege-Geach Problem
Metaphysical Modality and Ordinary Language
Metaphysical Modality and Weaker Modalities
Necessity and Analyticity
Concluding Remarks
References
8: Thomasson’s Social Ontology
Introduction: Thomassonian Social Ontology
The Rule-based Account of Social Phenomena
The Normative Conception of Social Groups
The Normative Conception of Social Groups is Overly Narrow
Conclusion: A Plea for Even More Pluralism
References
9: Easy Social Ontology
Introduction
Social Ontology and Social Meta-Ontology
The Easy Approach to Ontology
Existence and Reference
Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Engineering
Easy Social Ontology
The Ontology of Social and Institutional Practices
The Function of Social and Institutional Practice Terms
The Prospects for Social Realism
The Constructivist Approach to Social and Institutional Practices
Conclusions
References
10: Artifacts and the Limits of Agentive Authority
Author-Intention-Based Accounts of Artifacts and Prototype Production
Challenges for Author-Intention-Based Accounts
Can User-Intentions Override Author-Intentions?
The Creation Strategy: Historicity and Counter-Use
A User-Based Account of Artifacts and Prototype Production
The Limits of Agentive Authority
Conclusion
References
11: Mountains and Their Boundaries
The Puzzle
Robust Creationism
Selectionism
The Modest Creationist Compromise
Boundaries in the Distant Past
Modest Creationism for Permissivists
Thomasson’s Plenitude
Locating Mountains in the Plenitude
References
12: Creationism, Easy Ontology, and Indeterminacy
Introduction
Creationism about Fictional Characters
A New Threat from Indeterminacy
Responding to the New Threat
References
Index
