Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to fall back on non-moral values or first-person considerations, Stephen Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community.
Author(s): Stephen Darwall
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Year: 2006
Language: English
Pages: 362
City: Cambridge, Mass
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Part I
1 The Main Ideas I
Second-Personal Reasons
Logical and Personal Relations
A Circle of Irreducibly Second-Personal Concepts
Strawson’s Point
Rights
The Presuppositions of Second-Personal Address
Fichte’s Point
Pufendorf ’s Point
2 The Main Ideas II
Moral Obligation’s Purported Normativity
The Scope of Moral Obligation
Vindicating Moral Obligation: The Kantian Project
A Second-Personal Interpretation of the CI
A Foundation for Contractualism
3 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons
Empathy and Adam Smith on Exchange
Goading versus Guiding
Speech Acts and Felicity Conditions
Addressing Reasons for Belief
Addressing Second-Personal Practical Reasons
Second-Personal Reasons, Accountability, and Respect
Part II
4 Accountability and the Second Person
Reactive Responses as a Form of Address
Presupposing Second-Personal Competence and Authority
In Response to His Conduct (as a Person)
(At Least Partly) With Respect to Persons
(At Least Apparently) Nonmoral Cases
Respect, Dignity, and Reactive Sanctions
Accountability, Freedom, and Noncentral Cases
5 Moral Obligation and Accountability
Accountability and the Metaethics of Moral Obligation
Making Moral Obligation’s Second-Personality Explicit
Morality’s Normativity and Second-Personal Reasons
Morality as Equal Accountability
Accountability and Second-Personal Reasons
in Early Modern Natural Law
Suarez on Moral Obligation
Pufendorf on Moral Obligation
Accountability, Moral Reasons, and
the Second-Person Standpoint
CI and the Golden Rule as Second-Personal
6 Respect and the Second Person
Attitudes and Objects
Appraisal versus Recognition Respect
Respect versus Care
Kant on Respect
Self-Conceit and Morality: The Case of Stalin
Respect as Second-Personal
Manners,Honor, and Public Space
Whence Dignity?
Part III
7 The Psychology of the Second Person
Desire and Norm
Accepting Moral Norms and the Second Person
Cooperation and Second-Personal Motivation
Adam Smith on Judgments of Justice
8 Interlude: Reid versus Hume on Justice (with Contemporary Resonances)
Hume on Justice
Reid’s Critique of Hume on Justice
Reid’s Critique of Hume on Promises
Gilbert on Agreement and Obligation
Scanlon on Promising
Part IV
9 Morality and Autonomy in Kant
The Need for a Vindication of Morality/Autonomy
Kant’s Action Theory
Vindicating Morality/Autonomy in Groundwork 3
Other Arguments in the Groundwork
The Fact of Reason
The Fact of Reason: A Second-Personal Interpretation
10 Dignity and the Second Person: Variations on Fichtean Themes
Prelude: Assembling the Materials
strawson’s point
pufendorf’s point
Fichte’s Analysis: Second-Personal Address
and Free Practical Reason
Fichte’s Analysis: Positing Agency and Second-Personal Reasons
Fichte’s Point: The Principle of Right and Equal Dignity
An Objection: Slavery
Formulating the Argument
11 Freedom and Practical Reason
Normativity and the Open Question: Belief and Truth
Normativity and the Open Question:
Action, Desire, and Outcome Value
Free Agency and the Second-Person Standpoint
The Metaethics of Practical Reason: Recognitional versus
Constructivist Theories
Constructivism and the Second-Person Standpoint
Recognitional Theories and the Second-Person Standpoint
12 A Foundation for Contractualism
Versions of Contractualism
Contractualism and the Categorical Imperative
The Basis for Rational Acceptance or Reasonable Rejection
in Contractualism
Contractualism and Rule-Consequentialism
The Role of Publicity and Principles
Vindicating the Reasonable
Works Cited
Index
