The Evolution Of Transnational Rule-Makers Through Crises

Cover
Half-title
Title page
Copyright information
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
Introduction: How Private Rule-Makers Evolve through Crises
I.1 Introduction
I.2 The Complexity of Delineating the Contours of Crises
I.3 Crises and Their Interaction with the Quest for Organizational Resilience
I.4 A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into Transnational Rule-Making through Crises
1.5 The Different Facets of Resilience and Evolution of Private Rulemaking
Part I Global Governance and Politics
1 The Resilience of Private Authority in Times of Crisis
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Resilience of Private Collective Action
1.2.1 What Makes a System Resilient? Insights from Ecosystems Theory
1.2.2 The Rise of Private Collective Action to Authority as a Manifestation of Neoliberalism
1.2.3 The European Example of Private Governance
1.2.4 Resilience and Crises
1.2.4.1 Finance
1.2.4.2 Manufacturing
1.2.5 The Role of Crises, Regulatory Disasters, and Tipping Points in Challenging Resilience
1.3 Free Riding of Private Ordering
1.3.1 The Initial Rise to Authority
1.3.2 The Transition to Proactive Free-Riding
1.4 An Emerging Agenda toward a New Theory of Private Collective Action
1.5 Conclusion
2 Between Public and Private: Heterarchy in an Age of Intangibles and Financialization
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Beyond State-Centrism: The Dialectic of Globalization and Fragmentation
2.1.2 Sectoral Differentiation
2.1.3 Finance and Politics in the Twenty-First Century
2.1.4 The Development of Financial Instruments and Institutions
2.2 Conclusions
3 Corporations and the Making of Public Standards in International Law: The Case of China in the International Telecommunication Union
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Battle for Facial Recognition Standards and a New Internet Protocol at the ITU
3.2.1 China's Choice for the ITU
3.2.2 China's New IP proposal
3.2.3 China Telecom's Proposal for Standards on Facial Recognition
3.2.4 Interim Evaluation
3.3 Corporate Influence in Public Standard-Setting Bodies
3.4 Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability
3.5 Human Rights
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Part II Evolution and Resilience in Banking and Finance
4 Standard-Setting and Organizational Resilience: The Case of the Institute of International Finance
4.1 Introduction
4.2 A Brief History of the IIF's Economic Activism
4.2.1 IIF in the 1980s: Addressing the Information Gap in the Sovereign Debt Market
4.2.2 IIF in the 1990s: Shaping the New Paradigm of Banking Regulation
4.2.3 IIF in the 2000s: Strengthening the Contractual Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring
4.3 The Contractual Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the COVID-19 Pandemic
4.4 Standard-Setting and Organizational Resilience
4.5 Conclusions
5 Resilience and Change in Private Standard-Setting The Case of LIBOR
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Origins and Evolution of LIBOR
5.3 The Financial Crisis and the BBA's Reforms
5.4 The Barclays Settlement and Its Aftermath
5.5 Reforming Benchmarks, Replacing LIBOR
5.6 Conclusion
6 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the Post-crisis International Governance of Banking Regulation: Continuity Despite Weakness
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Regulatory Regime for Banking
6.3 The Weaknesses of the BCBS
6.4 The Resilience of the BCBS
6.4.1 Exogenous Factors Accounting for Resilience
6.4.2 Endogenous Factors Accounting for Resilience
6.4.2.1 Extended Membership
6.4.2.2 The BCBS' Peer Assessment Program
6.5 Conclusion
Part III Evolution and Resilience in Sustainability and Food Safety Regimes
7 Human Rights Due Diligence and Evolution of Voluntary Sustainability Standards
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Regulatory Failures and Transnational Private Regulation
7.3 HRDD as Threat and Opportunity for VSS
7.4 Relevant Aspects of HRDD for VSS
7.5 Impact of HRDD on VSS
7.5.1 Expanding Requirements
7.5.2 Collaboration in Risk Mitigation and Remediations
7.6 Conclusion
8 The Politics of Collaborative Governance in Global Supply Chains: Power and Pushback in the Bangladesh Accord
8.1 Introduction: Collaborative Action and Transnational Governance
8.2 Worker Safety as a Collective Action Problem in Apparel Supply Chains
8.3 Labor Governance in the Bangladesh RMG Sector
8.4 The Bangladesh Accord for Building and Fire Safety
Transnational Co-determination
Industry-wide, Pre-competitive Collaboration
Legally Enforceable Commitment
Developing Worker Voice
Leverage through Collective Action
Accountability through Collective Oversight
Pooling of Resources
Highly Focused Approach
8.5 Contesting the Regulatory Power of Collaborative Governance: The Bangladesh High Court Case
8.6 Conclusion
9 The Evolution of the Global Food Safety Initiative: The Dynamics of the Legitimacy of a Transnational Private Rule-Maker
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Dynamics of Legitimacy in Transnational Private Rule-Making
9.3 The Rise of GFSI
9.4 GFSI's Organizational and Regulatory Evolution
9.4.1 Pluralization of Its Constituents
9.4.2 Advances in Openness and Transparency
9.4.3 Expansion and Ratchetting up of Food Standards' Quality
9.4.4 Globalization of Benchmarking Activities
9.5 Constructing and Managing GFSI's Legitimacy
9.5.1 Legitimacy Dynamics
9.5.2 Institutionalizing Legitimacy
Part IV Evolution and Adaptation in Sector-Specific Regimes
10 Organizational Responses of Transnational Private Regulators after Major Accidents: The Case of the American Petroleum Institute and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The API's Strength and Relative Influence as a Transnational Private Regulator
10.2.1 The Origins of API and Its Growth in Significance
10.2.2 The API's Influence and Resistance to Governmental Safety Regulations
10.3 The DWH Accident
10.3.1 The DWH Accident, Criticisms to the Regulatory Regime, and the Adoption of SEMS Regulations
10.3.2 Criticisms of the Role of the API as Standard-Setter
10.4 The API's Organizational Response to the DWH Accident
10.4.1 Creation of the Center for Offshore Safety (COS)
10.4.2 The Governance of COS
10.5 Changes to SEMS Regulations: Introducing a Co-regulatory Scheme
10.5.1 The Role of COS for the Implementation of SEMS Regulations
10.5.2 SEMS Regulations through the Lens of Co-regulation
10.5.3 The Role of BSEE as Meta-regulator and Its Interactions with the COS
10.5.3.1 The Oversight of BSEE to the Third-Party Audit Scheme
10.5.3.2 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the BSEE-COS Co-regulatory Scheme
10.6 The Transnational Dimension of the API's Organizational Changes and Lessons for Regulators beyond the United States
10.7 Conclusion
11 The Accountability Response of the Global Anti-doping Regime to the Russian Doping Scandal (2015-2020)
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Practice and Systems of Accountability in Transnational Regimes
11.2.1 Defining and Conceptualizing Accountability
11.2.2 Accountability and Legitimacy in Transnational Regulatory Regimes
11.3 The Setup of the Anti-doping Regime Prior to the Scandal Outbreak
11.3.1 A 'Void Accountability Mechanism' for the Governing Bodies and a Weak Accountability Framework at the Operational Level
11.3.2 The Role of the State
11.4 The Outbreak of the Scandal and the Regime's Accountability Reactions
11.5 Analyzing the Regime's Resilience through Its Accountability Response
11.5.1 Transparency
11.5.2 Liability
11.5.3 Controllability
11.5.4 Responsibility
11.5.5 Responsiveness
11.6 Discussion
11.7 Conclusion
12 ''Keynesian'' Shipping Containers?: Maritime Transnational Regulation before the Advent of ''Neoliberalism''
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Visions of Globalization in the Scholarship on Private Lawmaking
12.3 Keynesian Standardization? Container Standardization before the Heyday of Neoliberalism
12.4 Concluding Remarks: Material Standards in Global Governance
Part V Resilience in Technical Standardization
13 The International Organization for Standardization: A Seventy-Five-Year Journey toward Organizational Resilience
13.1 Introduction
13.2 ISO's Origins and Its Growth in Strength and Influence
13.3 Meeting the Needs of Developing Countries and DEVCO's Creation
13.4 ISO's Key Traits of Resilience
13.4.1 Standard-Setting Capacity and Flexibility
13.4.2 Coordination of Activities through Partnerships
13.4.3 Alignment of Principles with Strategic Goals
13.4.4 Institutional Setup, Complexity, and Governance Principles
13.4.5 Business Model
13.5 Conclusion
14 Global Rivalry over Leadership in ICT Standardization: SDO Governance amid Changing Patterns of Participation
14.1 Introduction
14.2 The Rise of China and Huawei as Global Technology Leaders
14.2.1 Empirical Evidence on Chinese and Huawei's Participation in SDOs
14.2.2 Huawei's Rise as a Moment of Stress for SDO Governance
14.2.3 Fragility of Existing Norms of SDO Governance
14.3 SDO Governance Processes
14.3.1 Models of SDO governance
14.3.2 Integrity of SDO Processes of Different Governance Models
14.4 Formal Rules of SDO Leadership Selection
14.4.1 ITU
14.4.2 3GPP
14.4.3 IEEE-SA
14.4.4 IETF
14.4.5 Takeaways from Analyzing the Rules for Leadership Appointment
14.5 Legal and Institutional Dimensions of SDO Leadership
14.6 Conclusion
15 The International Electrotechnical Commission: A 115-Year Journey of Challenges, Change, and Resilience
15.1 Introduction
15.2 The International Electrotechnical Commission: Essential Attributes
15.3 Explaining Resilience
15.3.1 Theoretical Sketch
15.3.2 Does the IEC Meet the Requirements for the Pursuit of Resilience? Applying the Analytical Framework to the Specific Case
15.4 IEC Resilience in the Face of Technological Change
15.5 IEC Resilience vis-à-vis Possible Competitor SDOs
15.6 IEC Resilience and the Global South: Economic Globalization, International Politics, and Transnational Private Regulation
15.6.1 A Growing Yet Still Marginal Role for Most Stakeholders from the Global South
15.6.2 The Rise of China as a Special Challenge for the IEC
15.6.3 IEC Responses to the Rise of China
15.7 Unresolved Challenges
15.7.1 Democratic versus Expertise-Based Legitimacy: The Rise and Resurgence of the Consumer Movement
15.7.2 Gender Equality in IEC Standard-Setting
15.8 Conclusion: Learning Resilience?
Epilogue: An Evolutionary Theory of Transnational Private Regulation: Investigating Causes and Effects of Crises
I.1 Who Are the Transnational Private Regulators?
I.2 How Is the Transnational Regulatory Space Composed and Organized?
I.3 What Is the Relationship between Transnational Private and Public Regulators?
I.4 TPR and Crises Responses: From Organizational to Relational Resilience?
I.5 TPR and Its Evolution: The Way Forward
Index