Supply and Demand Management in Ride-Sourcing Markets

Front Cover
Supply and Demand Management in Ride-Sourcing Markets
Supply and Demand Management in Ride-Sourcing Markets
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
About the authors
Preface
1 - Introduction of ride-sourcing markets
1.1 Background
1.2 Theoretical developments
1.2.1 Stationary equilibrium state
1.2.2 Monopoly optimum, social optimum, and Pareto-efficient solutions
1.2.3 Regulations
1.2.4 Ride-pooling services
1.2.5 Congestion externalities
1.2.6 Platform competition and platform integration
1.2.7 Ride sourcing and public transit
1.2.8 On-demand matching and its key decision variables
1.3 Outline of this book
References
2 - Fundamentals of ride-sourcing market equilibrium analyses
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Passenger demand
2.1.2 Driver supply
2.2 Matching frictions (inductive approaches)
2.2.1 Perfect matching function
2.2.2 Production functions
2.3 Matching frictions (deductive approaches)
2.3.1 Queuing models
2.3.2 First-come-first-served (FCFS)
2.3.3 Batch-matching process
2.4 Market measures
2.4.1 Monopoly optimum
2.4.1.1 Production-function-based model
2.4.1.2 Queuing model
2.4.1.3 FCFS-based model
2.4.2 Social optimum
2.4.2.1 Production-function-based model
2.4.2.2 Queuing model
2.4.2.3 FCFS-based model
2.4.3 Pareto-efficient solutions
2.4.3.1 Production function-based model
2.4.3.2 Queuing model
2.4.3.3 FCFS-based model
2.5 Discussion
Glossary of notation
References
3 - Calibration and validation of matching functions for ride-sourcing markets
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Matching functions and market metrics
3.2.1 Base model
3.2.2 Matching functions
3.2.2.1 Perfect matching
3.2.2.2 Cobb–Douglas production function
3.2.2.3 M/M/1 queuing model
3.2.2.4 M/M/1/k queuing model
3.2.2.5 M/M/N queuing model
3.2.2.6 First-come-first-served (FCFS) model
3.2.2.7 Batch-matching model
3.2.2.8 Summary of matching functions
3.2.3 Key market metrics
3.3 Experimental settings
3.3.1 Simulator
3.3.2 Experiment
3.4 Analysis of experimental results
3.4.1 Market segmentation
3.4.2 Best-fit models for estimation of matching rate
3.4.3 Best-fit models for the estimation of matching time
3.4.4 Best-fit models for the estimation of passenger pick-up time
3.4.5 Best-fit models for the estimation of passengers' total waiting time
3.5 Summary
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
Appendix 3.A
Glossary of notation
References
4 - Government regulations for ride-sourcing services
4.1 Properties of the pareto-efficient solutions
4.2 An alternative method to obtain and analyse pareto-efficient solutions
4.3 Regulations
4.3.1 Price-cap regulation
4.3.2 Fleet size regulation
4.3.3 Wage regulation
4.3.4 Income regulation
4.3.5 Commission regulation
4.3.6 Commission ratio regulation
4.3.7 Minimum utilisation rate regulation
4.3.8 Demand regulation
4.3.9 Summary
4.3.10 Numerical illustrations
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
5 - Equilibrium analysis for ride-pooling services
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Pool-matching schemes
5.2.1 En-route pool-matching scheme
5.2.1.1 General model
5.2.1.2 Probabilistic model
5.2.2 Pre-assigned pool-matching with meeting points
5.2.3 Comparisons
5.3 Equilibrium analyses
5.3.1 Supply and demand function
5.3.2 Market equilibrium
5.3.3 Comparative static effects of regulatory variables
5.4 Market measures
5.4.1 Monopoly optimum
5.4.2 Social optimum
5.4.3 Pareto-efficient solutions
5.5 Numerical illustrations
5.5.1 Experimental settings
5.5.2 Detour-unconstrained scenario
5.5.3 Detour-constrained scenario
5.6 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
6 - Ride-pooling services and traffic congestion
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Equilibrium analyses
6.2.1 Demand function
6.2.2 Speed function
6.2.3 Supply function
6.2.4 Equilibrium solution
6.3 Market measures
6.3.1 Monopoly optimum
6.3.2 Social optimum
6.3.3 Pareto-efficient solutions
6.4 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
7 - Equilibrium analysis for ride-pooling services in the presence of traffic congestion
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Equilibrium analyses
7.2.1 Vehicle conservation
7.2.2 Demand function
7.2.3 Supply function
7.2.4 Equilibrium solution
7.3 Market measures
7.3.1 Monopoly optimum (MO)
7.3.2 Social optimum (SO)
7.3.3 Pareto-efficient solutions
7.4 Numerical studies
7.4.1 Equilibrium outcomes
7.4.2 Optimal operating strategies (non-pooling market)
7.4.3 Optimal operating strategies (ride-pooling market)
7.4.4 Effects of matching window
7.5 Conclusion and remarks
Glossary of notation
References
8 - Revisiting government regulations for ride-sourcing services under traffic congestion
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Theoretical analyses
8.2.1 Monopoly optimum
8.2.2 Social optimum
8.2.3 Pareto-efficient solutions
8.3 Numerical studies
8.3.1 Settings
8.3.2 Market with drivers with heterogeneous reservation rates and no traffic congestion
8.3.3 Market with drivers with heterogeneous reservation rates and traffic congestion
8.3.4 Effects of driver rationing
8.3.5 Summary and discussion
8.4 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
9 - Third-party platform integration in ride-sourcing markets
9.1 Background
9.2 Market equilibrium and optimal strategies
9.2.1 Market without platform integration
9.2.2 Market with platform integration
9.3 Evaluation of the performance of platform integration
9.3.1 Effect of vehicle fleet size at the Nash equilibrium/social optimum
9.3.2 Effect of platform integration at the Nash equilibrium
9.3.3 Effect of platform integration at the Social optimum
9.4 Numerical studies
9.4.1 Effect of market fragmentation
9.4.2 Effect of vehicle fleet size
9.4.3 Effect of commission fee
9.5 Conclusion
Appendix 9.A. Proof of Lemma 9-1
Appendix 9.B. Proof of theorem 9-1
Appendix 9.C. Proof of Lemma 9-2
Appendix 9.D. Proof of theorem 9-2
Appendix 9.E. Proof of Lemma 9-3
Appendix 9.F. Proof of Lemma 9-4
Appendix 9.G. Proof of theorem 9-3
Appendix 9.H. Proof of Lemma 9-5
Appendix 9.I. Proof of theorem 9-4
Appendix 9.J. General matching function
Glossary of notation
References
10 - Ride-sourcing services and public transit
10.1 Background
10.2 Model description
10.3 Optimal strategy design
10.3.1 Monopoly optimum
10.3.2 Social optimum
10.3.3 Second-best solution
10.4 Numerical case study
10.4.1 Analysis of equilibrium states
10.4.2 Analysis of profit- and/or social welfare-maximising strategies
10.5 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
Appendix 10.A
11 - Optimization of matching-time interval and matching radius in ride-sourcing markets
11.1 Research problem
11.2 Modelling and optimising the matching process
11.2.1 Online matching process
11.2.2 Matched passenger–driver pairs
11.2.3 Expected pick-up distance
11.2.4 System performance measure
11.2.5 General model properties
11.2.5.1 Effect of matching radius
11.2.5.2 Effect of matching-time interval
11.3 Model properties in imbalanced scenarios
11.3.1 Effects of matching-time interval
11.3.2 Properties of optimal matching-time interval
11.3.3 Further discussion
11.4 Numerical studies
11.4.1 Balanced scenario
11.4.2 Imbalanced scenarios
11.4.3 Model performance in a dynamic simulation environment
11.5 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
12 - Labour supply analysis of ride-sourcing services
12.1 Background
12.1.1 Motivation
12.1.2 Research questions
12.1.3 Methodology
12.1.4 Results
12.1.5 Main contributions
12.2 Related literature
12.3 Labour supply model
12.3.1 Optimal decisions on hours worked based on income targets
12.3.2 Importance of the extensive margin in the labour supply model
12.4 Modelling endogeneity of income rates and self-selected participation in the labour force
12.4.1 Methodological implications of self-selection and endogeneity
12.4.1.1 Modelling self-selected participation in the labour force
12.4.1.2 Modelling the endogeneity of the hourly income rate
12.4.2 Model of labour supply elasticity on a ride-sourcing platform
12.5 Research design
12.5.1 Research context
12.5.2 Large-scale natural experiment
12.5.2.1 Income multiplier
12.5.2.2 Exogenous shocks in natural experiments
12.5.3 Data description
12.5.3.1 Variable description
12.5.4 Driver classification along the extensive and intensive margins
12.5.5 Empirical analysis
12.5.5.1 Basic model
12.5.5.2 Consideration of potential sample selection bias
12.5.5.3 Identification of the outcome equation
12.6 Results and discussion
12.6.1 Model estimation
12.6.1.1 Evidence of sample selection and endogeneity bias
12.6.1.2 Validity of IVs
12.6.2 Estimates of labour supply elasticity in the presence of driver heterogeneity
12.6.3 Labour supply in subgroups
12.7 Conclusion
Glossary of notation
References
13 - Some empirical laws of ride-pooling services
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Literature review
13.3 Optimisation framework and data descriptions
13.3.1 Definitions of the key measures
13.3.2 Optimisation algorithms
13.3.3 Random matching without an optimisation objective
13.3.4 Experimental settings and data description
13.4 Empirical laws
13.4.1 Law of passenger detour distance
13.4.2 Law of average vehicle routing distance
13.4.3 Law of pool-matching probability
13.4.3.1 Discussions on matching probability
13.4.4 Effect of matching radius
13.4.5 Discussion on empirical laws
13.5 Conclusions
Appendices
Appendix 13.A. Probabilistic density distribution of Δl¯ under objective P1
Appendix 13.B. Probabilistic density distribution of l¯d under objective P1
Appendix 13.C. Empirical law of Δl¯ under objective P1
Appendix 13.D. Empirical law of l¯d under objective P1
Appendix 13.E. Empirical fitting of p under objective P1
Appendix 13.F. Probabilistic density distribution of Δl¯ under objective P2
Appendix 13.G. Probabilistic density distribution of l¯d under objective P2
Appendix 13.H. Empirical law of Δl¯ under objective P2
Appendix 13.I. Empirical law of l¯d under objective P2
Appendix 13.J. Empirical fitting of p under objective P2
Appendix 13.K. Probabilistic density distribution of Δl¯ under objective P3
Appendix 13.L. Probabilistic density distribution of l¯d under objective P3
Appendix 13.M. Empirical law of Δl¯ under objective P3
Appendix 13.N. Empirical law of l¯d under objective P3
Appendix 13.O. Empirical fitting of p under objective P3
Appendix 13.P. Proof of ∂M/∂N﹥0 and ∂M/∂N≤1
Appendix 13.Q. Empirical laws for the downtown area of Manhattan
Glossary of notation
References
14 - Summary
Glossary of abbreviations
Index
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B
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D
E
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I
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
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