Outside philosophy departments, most self-identified anarchists are social anarchists who reject both the legitimacy of the state and private property. By contrast, most anarchist philosophers are of the pro-market variety. As a result, a philosopher has yet to write an analytic defence of social anarchism. Jesse Spafford fills this gap by arguing that social anarchism is a coherent philosophical position that follows from a more basic, plausible principle that constrains which moral theories are acceptable. In the process of articulating and defending social anarchism Spafford stakes out a number of bold and original positions (e.g. that people own themselves and nothing else), while providing novel solutions to some of classic problems of political philosophy (e.g. luck egalitarianism's problem of stakes). His distinctive study offers an overarching, unified political theory while also advancing many of the more fine-grained debates that occupy political philosophers. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Author(s): Jesse Spafford
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: viii; p.242
City: Cambridge
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Boundaries of Anarchism
2. The Aims of the Book
3. Something for Everyone
1 Social Anarchism
1. The Consent Theory of Legitimacy
2. The Lockean Proviso
3. The Self-Ownership Thesis
4. The Advantages of Anarchist Self-Ownership
5. The Rejection of Private Property
6. Anarchist Claim Rights
7. Is Anarchist Self-Ownership Too Permissive?
8. Is Anarchist Self-Ownership Too Restrictive?
9. Conclusion
2 The Moral Tyranny Constraint
1. The Moral Tyranny Constraint
2. Explicating the Constraint
3. Defending the Constraint
4. Three Implications of the Constraint
5. Three Objections to the Constraint
6. Conclusion
3 You Own Yourself and Nothing Else
1. The Proviso and Private Property
2. The Lockean Proviso and Self-Ownership
3. Comparing Baselines
4. Defending and Emending the Nonexistence Baseline
5. Appropriation and Children
6. Conclusion
4 Property and Legitimacy
1. Territorial Legitimacy
2. A Consent Theory of Territorial Legitimacy
3. The Absence of Appropriation
4. Land, Resources, and Artifacts
5. Initial Appropriation and Obligation Imposition
6. The Propertarian Objection
7. Commonsense Distinctions
8. Consent Theory and Self-Ownership
9. Philosophical Anarchism and the Anarchist Conclusion
10. Conclusion
5 Entitlement Theory without Entitlements
1. Hobbesian Moral Tyranny
2. The Incompatibilist Argument
3. The Left-Libertarian Solution
4. Just Holdings vs. Just Distributions
5. Is Entitlement Necessary for Justice?
6. Wilt Chamberlain and the Anarchist Conclusion
7. Libertarian Egalitarianism
8. Conclusion
6 Luck Egalitarianism without Moral Tyranny
1. Three Objections to Prudential Contextualism
2. Moralized Contextualism
3. A Theory of Sanctionable Choice
4. Applying the Theory
5. Anarchism without Moral Tyranny
6. Amending the Theory
7. Additional Advantages of the Theory
8. The Disadvantage Creation Account
9. Conclusion
7 A State-Tolerant Anarchism
1. Two Desiderata of Political Anarchism
2. Twelve Analyses of Statehood
3. A State-Tolerant Anarchism
4. In Defense of Philosophical Anarchism
5. Conclusion
References
Index
