This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists.
Author(s): Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld
Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 1999
Language: English
Commentary: missing parts headers
Pages: 400
City: Cambridge
Cover
Summary
Title Page
Contents
Introduction
Part 1: Decision Theory for Cooperative Decision Making
1.1 On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers
1.2 Decisions Without Ordering
1.3 A Representation of Partially Ordered Preferences
Part 2: The Truth about Consequences
2.1 Separating Probability Elicitation from Ultilities
2.2 State-dependent Ultilities
2.3 Shared Preferences and State-dependent Utilities
2.4 A Conflict Between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book
2.5 Statistical Implications of Finitely Additive Probability
Part 3: Non-Cooperative Decision Making, Inference, and Learning with Shared Evidence
3.1 Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games
3.2 Equilibrium, Common Knowledge, and Optimal Sequential Decisions
3.3 A Fair Minimax Theorem for Two-Person (Zero-Sum) Games Involving Finitely Additive Strategies
3.4 Randomization in a Bayesian Perspective
3.5 Characterization of Externally Bayesian Pooling Operators
3.6 An Approach to Consensus and Certainty with Increasing Evidence
3.7 Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion
3.8 When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion
Index of Name
Subject Index
