In the spring of 1256, Thomas was appointed in Paris to the highest medieval university position: magister in sacrae paginae — master in the study of the Scriptures, for the exegesis of which grammar, rhetoric, dialectics and philosophy were used. While he remained in office, until 1259, he composed numerous works, including these Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, a set of 29 disputed questions on aspects of faith and the human condition, prepared for the debates that he presided over during Lent and Advent.
Disputation was not only one of the usual techniques of university teaching (with lectio and praedicatio), but it became a mandatory method in the Order of Preachers. The quaestio began with a discussion, called a disputatio, for which the master chose one or more theses and assigned some students to the altercation. The main function of the dispute was to exercise students in formulating arguments, and the master controlled the exercise through interventions during the session. After the oral dispute, the master made the determination by repeating, reorganizing and, in certain cases, correcting the arguments for and against the thesis. Finally, he gave his own answer and solutions for each of the arguments.
On Truth
- de Scientia Dei - on the Knowledge of God
- de Ideis - on Ideas
- de Verbo - on the Divine Word and Names of Things
- de Providentia - on Providence
- de Praedestinatione - on Predestination
- de Libro Vitae - on the Book of Life
- de Cognitione Angelorum - on the Knowledge of the Angels
- de Communicatione Scientiae Angelicae per Illuminationes et Locutiones - on the Communication of the Angels through Illuminations and Locutions
- de Mente in qua est Imago Trinitatis - on the Mind inasmuch as it is the Image of the Trinity
- de Magistro - on Teaching
- de Prophetia - on Prophesy
- de Raptu - on Rapture, or religious ecstasy
- de Fide - on Faith
- de Ratione Superiori et Inferiori - on Superior and Inferior Reason
- de Synderesi - on Synderesis
- de Conscientia - on Conscience
- de Cognitione Primi Hominis in Statu Innocentiae - on the Knowledge of the first man in the State of Innocence
- de Cognitione Animae post Mortem - on the Knowledge of the Soul after death
- de Scientia Animae Christi - on the Knowledge of the Soul of Christ
- de Bono - on the Good
- de Appetitu Boni et Voluntate - on the Striving for Good and the Will
- de Voluntate Dei - on the Will of God
- de Hominis Libero Arbitrio - on the Free Decision of Man
- de Sensualitate - on Sensuality, or rather "the sensitive appetitive part of the soul"[24]
- de Passionibus - on the Emotions
- de Gratia - on Grace
- de Remissio Peccatorum - on the Remission of Sins
- de Gratia Christi - On the Grace of Christ
This is one of the texts where Aquinas elaborates his theory of angelic knowledge, alongside the Summa Theologicae, Quodlibet 9, and the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum.[14] This question covers a point that is not addressed in the latter Scriptum, namely how angels had what Augustine called "morning knowledge" without having direct access to God.[15] Aquinas lays out Augustine's problem statement that angels had only natural powers and yet still had "morning knowledge" of Creation, which would require supernatural access, and answers it in two different ways, but does not choose which is the right answer.[16] Either, says Aquinas, angels only gain "morning knowledge" after beatification, and have no inherent access to it as they are originally created, or their perception of God was not direct but a reflection of knowledge imbued into them, a copy of God's Word in the angel as it were.[17]
This is a systematicization of what Aqunias initially addressed in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, which was to finally mature in the Summa Theologicae.[18] In it, he discusses ideas such as a distinction between knowing that one has a soul versus knowing what that soul actually is, i.e. the general nature of souls.[19] The former he further subdivides into knowing that one has a soul because of one's actions, because of an innate awareness of souls of themselves, by simply reasoning it out, and as a result of judging that it is simply true that one has a soul.[20]
This question provides insight into Aquinas's view of teaching itself.[21] Aquinas presents an Augustinian view of teaching being divided into "interior" and "exterior" processes; that is modified by Aristotelian ideas.[22] The former process is inventio, a means of teaching that is reserved to God, the principal teacher, a process of "natural reason [arriving] by itself at the knowledge of things previously unknown".[23] The latter process is disciplina, a means of teaching available to Man, a process whereby a teacher attempts to convey to a student the same inventio processes that the teacher has undergone.[23]