There are many varieties of moral relativism. Appraiser relativism, according to which the proposition expressed by a moral sentence varies from context to context, is motivated by the thought that it provides the best explanation of the intractability of fundamental moral disagreements. In response, it is standardly objected that appraiser relativism runs afoul of our linguistic intuitions about when people are contradicting one another. In Chapter One, I expand upon this objection in three ways: (i) the problematic class of intuitions is larger than has previously been noticed; (ii) three strategies that have been offered to explain away those intuitions fail; and (iii) even if we grant that appraiser relativism is true, it still would not provide us with any explanation whatsoever of the intractability of the relevant disagreements.
Agent relativism, according to which there are no universal moral requirements, is motivated by the thought that there are always reasons to comply with one's moral requirements, but that the desires to which such reasons would have to correspond are too capricious for there to be any universal moral requirements. In Chapter Two, I argue that the moral universalist is free to maintain either (i) that any fully rational, fully informed agent will have a desire that would be served by complying with what the moral universalist takes to be universal moral requirements, and so desires are not too capricious, or (ii) that a naturalistically acceptable account of reasons need not suppose that reasons are grounded in desires. Either way, the moral universalist is free to reject this motivation for agent relativism.
If desires do not provide the basis for reasons for action, what does? In Chapter Three, I give an analysis of reasons for action based on the ways in which an action can be good or bad. I argue that the analysis is preferable to two other analyses, and that it provides a promising explanation of why there are always reasons for agents to comply with their moral requirements. I conclude, however, that the analysis relies on distinctions which, despite being intuitively plausible, remain in need of theoretical justification.
Author(s): Robert Streiffer
Publisher: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year: 1999
Language: English
Pages: 105
City: Cambridge
Tags: Philosophy, Metaethics, Moral Relativism, Reasons for Action, Goodness, Gilbert Harman, David Wong, Judith Jarvis Thomson
Chapter One: Appraiser Relativism and the Reliability of our Linguistic Intuitions
1 Appraiser Relativism Defined 9
2 The Alleged Explanation of the Intractability of Moral Disagreements 12
3 Some Counterintuitive Implications of Metaethical Relativism 14
4 The First Two Strategies for Explaining Away our Linguistic Intuitions 20
5 A Test for Determining the Reliability of our Linguistic Intuitions 24
6 The Third Strategy for Explaining Away our Linguistic Intuitions 27
7 Appraiser Relativism, Explanation, and the Reliability of our Linguistic Intuitions 32
8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 35
Chapter Two: Agent Relativism and Reasons for Action
1 The Practicality Argument 39
2 Two Arguments for Moral Universalism 41
3 A Defense of the Practicality Requirement 43
4 The Desire Argument for Reasons Relativism 49
5 The Narrow Desire Argument for Reasons Relativism 55
6 Summary 63
Chapter Three: Reasons for Action and the Ways of Being Good
1 The Project 65
2 The Ways of Being Good and Moral Requirements 69
3 The Ways of Being Good and Reasons for Action 75
4 The Quick Argument for the Relevance of Morality 79
5 Some Advantages of the Quick Argument for the Relevance of Morality 80
6 The Moral Requirements Thesis 85
7 Difficulties for the Revised Reasons for Action Thesis 88
8 The Revised Argument for the Relevance of Morality 92
9 Difficulties for the Revised Argument for the Relevance of Morality 96
10 Summary and Concluding Remarks 100
References 103
