An authoritative guide to the new economics of our crisis-filled century. Published in collaboration with the Institute for New Economic Thinking.
The 2008 financial crisis was a seismic event that laid bare how financial institutions’ instabilities can have devastating effects on societies and economies. COVID-19 brought similar financial devastation at the beginning of 2020 and once more massive interventions by central banks were needed to heed off the collapse of the financial system. All of which begs the question: why is our financial system so fragile and vulnerable that it needs government support so often?
For a generation of economists who have risen to prominence since 2008, these events have defined not only how they view financial instability, but financial markets more broadly. Leveraged brings together these voices to take stock of what we have learned about the costs and causes of financial fragility and to offer a new canonical framework for understanding it. Their message: the origins of financial instability in modern economies run deeper than the technical debates around banking regulation, countercyclical capital buffers, or living wills for financial institutions. Leveraged offers a fundamentally new picture of how financial institutions and societies coexist, for better or worse.
The essays here mark a new starting point for research in financial economics. As we muddle through the effects of a second financial crisis in this young century, Leveraged provides a road map and a research agenda for the future.
Author(s): Moritz Schularick
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Year: 2022
Language: English
Pages: 317
City: Chicago
Contents
Foreword by Richard Vague
Introduction: The New Economics of Debt and Financial Fragility | Moritz Schularick
Part I. Finance Unbound: The Rise of Finance and the Economy
1. How to Think about Finance | Atif Mian, Comment by Karen Dynan
2. Reconsidering the Costs and Benefits of Debt Booms for the Economy | Emil Verner, Comment by Holger Mueller
Part II. Risk-Taking: Incentives, Investors, Institutions
3. Are Bank CEOs to Blame? | Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Comment by Samuel G. Hanson
4. A New Narrative of Investors, Subprime Lending, and the 2008 Crisis | Stefania Albanesi, Comment by Fernando Ferreira
5. Bank Capital before and after Financial Crises | Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor; Comment by Anna Kovner
Part III. Mispricing Risks: Credit Booms and Risk Premia
6. Beliefs and Risk-Taking | Alessia De Stefani and Kaspar Zimmermann, Comment by Yueran Ma
7. A New Approach to Measuring Banks’ Risk Exposure | Juliane Begenau, Comment by Nina Boyarchenko
8. Is Risk Mispriced in Credit Booms? | Tyler Muir
Part IV. Financial Crises: Reconsidering the Origins and Consequences
9. Historical Banking Crises: A New Database and a Reassessment of Their Incidence and Severity | Matthew Baron and Daniel Dieckelmann, Comment by Mark Carlson
10. Was the U.S. Great Depression a Credit Boom Gone Wrong? | Natacha Postel-Vinay, Comment by Eugene N. White
11. Sectoral Credit Booms and Financial Stability | Karsten Müller Comment by Orsola Costantini
Index
