This book contributes to the theoretical discussions of equilibria that rest on error―in which we include mistaken choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the people intended to play them.
Our study of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question, considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim at the improvement of their usefulness.
Discussing the possibility of changing both game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts at improvement.
Author(s): Uri Weiss, Joseph Agassi
Series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, 469
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2023
Language: English
Pages: 239
City: Cham
About My Teacher, Friend, and Coauthor—Joseph Agassi
References
Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 What is Game Theory?
1.2 The Uses of Game Theory
1.3 Game Theory and Peace
1.3.1 On Trust and Information
1.4 Equilibria
References
2 Strategic Decisions
2.1 Preface
2.2 What is the Most Important Strategic Decision?
2.2.1 What and Who Determines the Game?
2.3 Conclusion
References
3 Game Theory Encourages Peace
3.1 Game Theory Peace and Democracy
3.1.1 About Trust
References
4 Game Theory for International Accords
4.1 The Political Aspect of Game Theory
4.2 A Comparison Between Our Approach and the Related Literature
4.3 Additional Morals to Learn from Aumann’s Nobel Lecture (2005)
4.4 Conclusion
References
5 Game Theory and Social Science
5.1 Game Theory and the Social Science I
5.2 Preliminaries
5.3 Part II
5.4 Conclusion
References
6 The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana
6.1 Introduction: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Versus the Stag Hunt
6.1.1 The Repeated Version
6.2 Against the Vision of the Pax Romana
6.3 In Favor of the Vision of the European Union
6.4 Conditional Generosity Versus Conditional Aggressiveness
6.5 A Game-Theoretical View of Brexit
6.6 Conclusion
References
7 Playing the Game of International Law
7.1 Preface
7.2 Introduction
7.3 Historical Background
7.4 Kissinger Versus Keynes in Game Theoretical Perspective
7.5 From Negotiation to Litigation in Peace Processes
7.6 Realist Negotiation Versus Negotiation in the Shadow of the Law
7.6.1 The Distributive Effect
7.6.2 The Morals from the Above Example
7.6.3 The Reduction of Terrorism Effect
7.6.4 The Effect on the Chance to Achieve Peace
7.7 Conclusion
References
8 Mutual Threat: The Cold War Game
8.1 The Cold War After 1949
8.2 The Repeated Chicken Game Versus the One-Time Chicken Game
8.3 A Game with Complete Information Versus Games with Incomplete Information
8.4 The Sequential Chicken Game Versus the Chicken Game
8.5 A Game with a Possibility to Coordinate by Communication and Agreements
8.6 The Mad
References
9 Equilibria of War and Peace: Diverse Options of Cooperation
9.1 Preface
9.2 What is a Game?
9.3 Nash Equilibria
9.4 The Hostile Prisoner’s Dilemma
9.5 Other Equilibria
9.6 Game Theory as Social Science
References
10 The Game Not Chosen
10.1 Preface
10.2 Motivation
10.3 Definitions
10.4 The Game Not Chosen
10.5 New Equilibria
References
11 Cooperative Game Theory Mobilized for Peace
11.1 Preface
11.2 The Map of the Possible Games
11.3 The Current State of Cooperative Game Theory
11.4 About the Need for Clarifications in Cooperative Game Theory
11.5 Conclusions
References
12 A General Theory of Choice
12.1 Theory of Choice
12.1.1 Preface
12.2 Introduction
12.2.1 When to Accept a Proposal?
12.3 How to Choose?
12.4 Opportunity Cost Theory and a Proposal for Improvement Upon It
12.5 Game Theory
12.6 Decision Theory
References
13 Toward Optimistic Future
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